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Conversational understanding (CU) refers to the ability to accurately interpret 
the meaning of discourse-embedded language. Siegal and Surian (2007) have 
suggested that the developmental expression of CU often reflects the unmasking of a 
cognitive competence obscured by processing biases associated with a shortage of 
computational resources. This thesis sought to investigate the relationship between 
developing computational resources (conceptualized in terms of executive functioning 
(EF)) and CU in 3- to 6-year-old children. According to Miyake et al. (2000), EF can 
be considered to reflect three main skills - inhibition and updating of mental 
representations, and mental set shifting. This thesis investigated the independent 
contribution of these three aspects ofEF to CU. 
Experiments 1 and 2 investigated whether a relationship exists between the 
three components ofEF and a narrow, scalar implicature (SI) measure of CO. 
Updating ability was found to demonstrate significant relations with SI scores. 
Experiment 3 revealed that shifting ability is significantly related to a broad, 
conversational violations task (CVT) measure of CU. Experiment 4 used training to 
significantly enhance children's shifting ability. However, this did not lead to a 
corresponding improvement in CVT perfonnance. 
Experiment 5 investigated the relationship between EF and CU in bilingual 
children. Bilinguals demonstrated a non-significant shifting advantage relative to 
monolingual controls, but did not demonstrate a CO superiority. Experiment 6 
provided a more detailed analysis of the relationship between EF and CO by 
presenting monolingual children with both the narrow and broad CO measures 
previously presented, along with the updating, inhibitory and shifting EF measures 
used in Experiments 2-5 and three new measures of these EF components. All three 
EF components were found to demonstrate relations with CVT perfonnance after the 
effects of age and verbal intelligence had been controlled for. 
The consistent demonstration of significant relationships between EF 
components and CU revealed in this thesis provides partial support for Siegal and 
Surian's masked competence model of the developmental expression of CU. 
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Chapter 1: Conversational understanding 1 
Chapter 1: Conversational understanding in young children 
1.1 Focus ofthis thesis 
"Conversational understanding" (CU) refers to the ability to accurately interpret 
the meaning of discourse-embedded language. It denotes the ability to appreciate the 
functional use of language - the way in which it is actually adapted to communicate 
in the world. This can be contrasted with a formalistic appreciation of language which 
is concerned with understanding the grammatical rules constraining the way linguistic 
elements are combined. 
When communicating, speakers adjust the language they use to accommodate the 
linguistic, physical and general knowledge context in which it is given (Clark, & 
Carlson, 1981; Clark, & Marshall, 1981). For example, if a speaker has just spoken to 
their conversational partner about someone called Jack, they might continue to talk 
about Jack using the referring expression "he". The replacement of the expression 
"Jack" with "he" would be based on the assumption that the partner would take the 
preceding linguistic context into account and thus identify "he" as Jack rather than 
some other male. Similarly, a speaker conversing with someone who has just missed 
hitting the ball during a game of tennis might tell that person to "try harder", The 
speaker would assume that the listener would take the physical tennis-game context 
into account and so realise that they should try harder to hit the ball rather than try 
harder to achieve some other aim such as learning another language or writing poetry, 
Further, a speaker might tell their partner that they had frostbite and assume that the 
partner would take the general knowledge that frostbite only occurs when someone is 
exposed to very cold conditions, into account. The partner might thus be expected to 
realise that the speaker had recently been somewhere very cold. 
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As illustrated above, CU requires integration of information provided by the 
logical/literal meaning of the words used in a message, with contextual information. 
Integration of information from the two sources (logic and context) enables more 
accurate inference of the intended meaning behind the communication. 
Although most adults would seem to have mastered the ability to accurately 
interpret language in context, studies have consistently reported that young children 
find integration of information from the domains of language used and the context 
used in, difficult. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relation between CU 
and aspects of executive functioning (EF) involving the ability to focus, inhibit and 
update information, the absence of which may "mask" children's competence on 
many cognitive tasks. 
1.2 Conversational understanding in childhood 
Some investigators have observed that early on, children demonstrate the presence 
of a lexical bias evidenced by a concentrated focus on the words used in a message. 
Friend and Bryant (2000) presented English-speaking 4-, 7- and lO-year-olds with 
communications in which the words used indicated positive affect: e.g. "You're doing 
a great job" but the vocal expression used to transmit the message indicated negative 
affect: e.g. the message was delivered using an angry tone of voice. Friend and Bryant 
then asked the children to indicate whether they thought the speaker was happy or 
angry by pointing to facial stimuli depicting happy or angry expressions. 4- and 7-
year-old's ratings of speaker emotions were found to more closely reflect the affect 
expressed lexically than the affect expressed vocally, whereas the ratings of the 10-
year-oIds more closely reflected the vocal expressions. The younger children 
appeared to concentrate on the words used to the neglect of vocal cues to affect. 
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Further evidence of a bias to focus on the words used in communication was 
found by Lee, Torrance, and Olson, (2001) in a nursery rhyme context. English-
speaking 3- to 7-year-olds were presented with excerpts from nursery rhymes e.g. 
"Hickory dickory dock, the mouse ran up the clock", and asked to judge Teddy's 
description of what was happening in the rhyme. Although Teddy was told he did not 
have to use the same words as the rhyme, children below 6-years-old judged 
descriptions he gave using true paraphrases such as "the mouse raced up the clock", 
negatively, rewarding only those descriptions which used the same words as the 
rhyme i.e. "the mouse ran up the clock", Young children seemed unable to detach 
from the specific words used in the nursery rhyme context. 
However, it would not seem that children are simply bound to a lexical focus. 
Olson and Hildyard (1981) presented English-speaking 4- to 8-year-olds with a story 
depicting a communication between characters: children were told about a boy who 
was not happy with the amount of popcorn he had, and who consequently said to his 
friend "You've got more than me", Olson and Hildyard found that when they asked 
the children what the boy in the story had said, 4- to 5-year-olds tended to respond 
with the boy's intended meaning i.e. give me some of your popcorn, rather than his 
actual statement. This contrasts with the 7- to 8-year-olds who reported both the boy's 
statement and his intended meaning. 
Robinson, Goelman and Olson (1983) presented children with a referential 
communication game in which they were presented with ambiguous instructions and 
in which their ambiguous instructions were acted upon. An example of an ambiguous 
instruction was the command "Pick up the red flower" when both a big red flower and 
a small red flower were available. The speaker and the listener had independent sets 
of the same items to choose from and would both choose an item following the 
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instruction and compare selections. Robinson, Goelman and Olson found that when 
questioned as to what had actually been said following a mismatch between the 
selections of the speaker and listener, in which the speaker had picked up the big red 
flower, English-speaking 5-year-olds correctly rejected incorrect paraphrases such as 
"Did youII say to pick up the blue flower?" and correctly accepted verbatim 
repetitions of ambiguous sentences such as "Did you/I say to pick up the red flower?" 
However the children were nevertheless significantly less likely to correctly reject 
disambiguated interpretations of ambiguous instructions such as "Did youII say to 
pick up the big red flower?" Knowledge of speaker's intentions appeared to influence 
children's representations of messages. 
Beal and Flavell (1984) reported a similar finding. They presented English-
speaking 6- to 8-year-olds with ambiguous messages purporting to identify the 
pictures that a character had selected from a variety presented. For example, children 
might be presented with pictures of a blue circle, a blue triangle and a red triangle and 
given the identifying message "The blue one". The experimenter then indicated to 
half of the children the picture that the character had intended them to identify. The 
other half remained ignorant. All children were then asked whether the message could 
identify each of the pictures shown. Beal and Flavell found that children who knew 
the intended referent were less likely to acknowledge that the ambiguous message 
could identify multiple referents, favouring the intended referent. Children with 
knowledge of the speaker's intention seemed unable to focus on the literal message 
itself. 
Further, Lee, Torrance and Olson (2001) found that presenting an utterance in a 
narrative/story context, e.g. Big Bird and Snuffy go to Maria's for lunch. Big Bird 
says "I want some food", made it difficult for children to children to focus on the 
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exact words used in a message. Lee, Torrance and Olson asked English-speaking 3- to 
7-year-olds to judge Teddy's description of the utterance in the narrative and 
instructed Teddy to repeat exactly what the character had said, using the same words. 
Nevertheless, children below 6-years-old rewarded Teddy for true paraphrases such as 
"I want something to eat" which used different words from the original utterance. 
Young children seemed unable to focus on the specific words used in the narrative 
context. 
In contrast to the lexical bias studies, the reports above indicate that children are 
able to consider factors external to the utterance itself. Nevertheless, as with the 
lexical studies, these investigations again indicate the tendency of children to 
demonstrate an inappropriate focus when processing communication: in these cases 
towards contextually determined intentions at the expense of lexical considerations. 
However, other studies have reported a lack of bias. Dews et aI., (1996) 
presented English-speaking 5- and 6-year-olds with clips from popular cartoons 
showing characters delivering ironic criticisms in which the logical/literal meaning of 
their communication was positive but the intended meaning was negative. For 
example, a character described someone who refused to aid them as "helpful". Dews 
et al then presented the children with two possible meanings for each ironic criticism, 
one positive and one negative, and asked the children to select which one the 
character had intended. 5-year-olds were found to perform at chance levels on this 
task indicating they were neither biased towards the literal message content nor the 
conflicting situational cues to ironic meaning. 
More recently, Filippova and Astington (2008) provided an in-depth 
investigation of the irony appreciation of 5-, 7- and 9-year-olds. Fili ppova and 
Astington used narratives accompanied by pictures to present ironic comments (e.g. a 
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story depicted a character who kept missing goals in a football match and who was 
subsequently described as "a great scorer.") Children's ability to understand different 
aspects of irony was also investigated through the use of questions probing the 
meaning of the ironic utterance given, the belief of the speaker giving the utterance, 
the communicative intention of the speaker and the speaker's attitude. Filippova and 
Astington found that children demonstrated appreciation of these different aspects of 
irony in a set order: the order in which they are mentioned above, but that 
appreciation of all aspects was not revealed until 7-years-of-age, indicating that 
children do not clearly appreciate irony until 7 years. 
It appears that young children are not bound to demonstrate an inappropriate focus 
when interpreting communication. However, all of the above studies appear to 
indicate that young children are unable to consider the logical elements of a message 
in light of contextual factors. 
1.3 The Gricean framework and the Relevance approach 
Grice (1975) proposed that appreciation of certain conversational rules/maxims 
relating the message to its communicative context, provided the foundation for CU. 
He depicted communication as a cooperative exchange and argued that the speaker 
could be expected to adhere, where possible, to maxims governing the 
informativeness (Maxims of First and Second Quantity), truthfulness (Maxim of 
Quality) and relevance (Maxim of Relation) of their contribution. That is to say that 
the speaker could be counted upon to make their contribution as informative as the 
listener required but not more informative than necessary, to be truthful and to make 
their contribution relevant to the context in which it was given. Appreciation of these 
maxims was expected to prompt the listener to draw information from both the 
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message itself and the context it was presented in. This was thought to enable 
assessment of the communication in terms of its environment, and so allow accurate 
inference of the speaker's intended meaning. Apparent maxim violations produced 
within this cooperatively construed exchange, were thought to provoke listener 
inference of implied meanings. These meanings are not apparent from sole focus on 
either the message, or the context of the communication, but emerge from 
consideration of the message in light of its context and the Gricean maxims relating 
the two. 
For example, a speaker's production of the message "You are being really 
helpful", in a context in which their conversational partner is not aiding them in any 
way, can be considered with regard to the Maxim of Quality. The message appears to 
be in direct conflict with the maxim concerning the truthfulness of communication, as 
the physical context indicates that the partner is not being at all helpful. Neither sole 
consideration of the message, nor of the absence of aid context, tells the partner that 
the speaker wants to be helped. However consideration of the message in light of the 
context and Maxim of Quality emphasises the fact that the partner is not helping. The 
partner's perception that the speaker is trying to draw attention to the fact that they are 
not helping leads the partner to infer that the speaker is wanting their help. 
The direction of the message "You might want to look where you're going" to an 
adult who has just bumped into the speaker, could be considered with regard to the 
Maxim of Second Quantity. The message appears to be in direct conflict with the 
maxim demanding that the speaker refrain from providing too much information, as 
the physical context indicates that the listener is an adult, who as such would be 
expected to already be aware of the advised instruction. Neither sole consideration of 
the message, nor of the bumping context, tells us about the speaker's opinion about 
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the other adult. However consideration of the message in light of the context and 
Maxim of Second Quantity indicates that speaker thinks the other adult is acting as if 
he does not possess the knowledge expected of him, and so leads the other listener to 
infer that the speaker has a poor opinion of them. 
A speaker's production of the message "People" in a context in which they have 
been asked who they met at a function, can be considered with regard to the Maxim of 
First Quantity. The message appears to be in direct conflict with the maxim 
demanding that the speaker give as much information as is necessary as the preceding 
linguistic context: "Who did you meet?" indicates that the enquirer was already aware 
that people were met. The message is thus unlikely to have provided the enquirer with 
the information they were seeking. Neither sole consideration of the reply message, 
nor of the particular question context, tells the enquirer that the speaker wants to be 
unhelpful. However consideration of the message in light of the context and Maxim 
of First Quantity indicates that the speaker is trying to avoid answering the question, 
and so leads the partner to infer that the speaker is deliberately trying to be unhelpful. 
The delivery of the message "Her mother is nice" in a context in which the 
speaker has been asked what they think of someone called Chloe, can be considered 
with regard to the Maxim of Relevance. The message appears to be in direct conflict 
with the maxim requiring that communication should be relevant to the current 
context, as a comment concerning Chloe's mother is not directly relevant to the 
linguistic context which seeks an opinion of Chloe. Neither sole consideration of the 
message, nor of the particular question context, informs the enquirer that the speaker 
does not think Chloe is nice. However consideration of the message in light of the 
context and Maxim of Relevance emphasises the fact that the speaker doesn't feel 
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able to say talk about Chloe in a similar manner, and so leads the partner to infer that 
the speaker does not like Chloe. 
In addition to his main maxims, Grice (1975) also speculated about the need to 
involve others such as a Maxim of Politeness requiring speakers to make their 
communication respectful. Consider production of this message "The food was 
horrible!" in a context in which the listener has made the speaker's dinner. The 
message appears to be in direct conflict with the maxim requiring that communication 
should be respectful, as it is disrespectful to refer to tell someone that food is horrible 
in a physical context in which the person listening has been responsible for preparing 
that food. Neither sole consideration ofthe message, nor of the physical context, tells 
the listener that the speaker is trying to be rude to them. However consideration of the 
message in light of the context and Maxim of Politeness emphasises the fact that the 
speaker does not want to be polite, and so leads the listener to infer that the speaker is 
trying to be rude to them. 
Sperber and Wilson's (1986) Relevance Theory account of CU, focuses on the 
maxim Grice conceived as restricting the relevance of the speaker's communication to 
the context in which it is given. Relevance theory maintains that all other 
conversational maxims ultimately derive from this "Relevance" maxim. According to 
the Relevance account, the listener determines the speaker's intended meaning by 
searching via inference for the relevance of the utterance meaning to the context in 
which it is presented. Search criteria are defined in terms of the relative processing 
effort involved, with effort calculated in terms of the cognitive effects gained i.e. 
knowledge, given the processing cost borne i.e. mental energy expended searching. 
Sperber and Wilson (1986) suggest that the· search starts from the basis of an initial, 
logical utterance interpretation, and that the extent of processing resources (Le. 
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working memory) available, determines the relative processing effort deployed. This 
is thought to establish the degree of search motivation experienced, ascertaining the 
level of contextual enrichment achieved through successively more extensive searches 
for cognitive effects/further information. According to Sperber and Wilson's account, 
interpretation of the phrase "Can you pass the salt?" in the dinner-time context, will 
start with an initial logical reading: Do I possess the physical ability to move the salt? 
However the possession of sufficient processing resources will enable inference 
concerned with the relevance of the question in the context it's given: the speaker 
wants to know because they would like to have the salt and so would like me to pass 
it to them if I am able. Such inferences enable enrichment of the message 
interpretation. 
Studies with adults provide support for the Relevance account of CU. Bott and 
Noveck (2004) found that for French speakers, the production of requested, 
contextually enriched message interpretations took longer and was less reliable than 
the production of requested decontextualised interpretations. Moreover, they found 
that limiting the amount of time in which interpretations could be made, increased the 
proportion of decontextualised interpretations made. 
Noveck and Posada (2003) reported analysis ofERP data for French adults in line 
with this in their investigation of immediate reactions provoked by underinformative 
sentences such as "Some elephants have trunks" (English translation). Such sentences 
are true in their decontextualisedl logical form but give rise to false contextually 
enrichedlCU interpretations e.g. that not all elephants have trunks. The enriched 
interpretation emerges out of the conversational convention that the use of weak terms 
such as "some" implies the inapplicability of stronger, related terms, such as "all" in 
this case. This conversational technique is known as a scalar implicature (SI) and can 
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be explained in relation to Grice's Maxim of First Quantity which demands that 
speakers say as much as is necessary. The listener can use this maxim to infer that if a 
stronger, more informative term applied, the speaker would have used it. It can 
therefore be deduced that the speaker does not consider that a stronger term applies. 
As well as presenting adult participants with underinformative SIs, Noveck and 
Posada (2003) also presented SI sentences which were true on both decontextualised 
and contextually enriched levels such as "Some houses have bricks" (English 
translation) and SI sentences which were false on both decontextualised and 
contextually enriched levels such as "Some crows have radios" (English translation). 
In their analysis of ERP data, Noveck and Posada focused on the N400 wave which 
typically peaks approximately 400 msec after the presentation of contextually 
inappropriate words. They found that not only were the N400 waves for the 
underinformative sentences flatter than those produced for the sentences which were 
true or false on both decontextualised and contextualised levels, but that this was the 
case whether or not participants produced contextually enriched interpretations of the 
underinformative sentences, indicated by whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
underinformative sentences. This suggests that the weak SI term was not processed as 
inappropriate immediately, but only became recognised as such later on. Therefore, it 
would seem that the inference that the stronger related term "all" did not 
apply/contextualised enrichment, was a time-consuming procedure. Indeed in 
correspondence, the reaction time data that Noveck and Posada collected revealed that 
the processing of contextually enriched message interpretations took longer than the 
processing of decontextualised interpretations. The time demanding nature of arriving 
at contextually enriched interpretations, supports the suggestion that effortful 
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processing is involved in deriving such meanings, rather than that they become 
directly accessible following a conceptual change. 
However, even stronger evidence in favour of the effortful, Relevance account is 
provided by a report that depleting the amount of available processing resources 
decreased the proportion of contextually enriched message interpretations produced. 
De Neys and Schaeken (2007) gave Dutch-speaking participants a spatial storage 
task: the Dot Memory task, which required memorization of patterns of dots within a 
2D matrix to enable later pattern replication. De Neys and Schaeken found that when 
working memory resources were engaged in this storage task, participants gave less 
contextually enriched interpretations and provided more decontextualised readings. 
1.4 Cognitive development and the conceptual change approach 
In line with Relevance Theory, work with adults appears to support the proposal. 
that CU reflects the availability of processing resources (working memory). It thus 
seems plausible that the emergence of CU reflects the maturation of processing 
abilities. However, early research with young children seemed to support a conceptual 
change model of CU. 
Jean Piaget advanced a theory that cognitive development is underpinned by a 
number of processing revolutions in which the nature of the mechanisms involved in 
cognition drastically alters as a result of conceptual change. His ideas led the way for 
much conceptual change research, a substantial amount of which provided apparent 
support for such an account. Piaget (1975) proposed that cognitive development could 
be divided into four main stages. He suggested that a dominant factor characterised 
each stage: understanding through action, understanding through perception, logical 
thought restricted to reality and logical thought unbound by reality. Piaget held that 
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transition from one stage to another occurred in a set sequence, and resulted from a 
dramatic restructuring of thoughts/concepts of the world: a conceptual change. 
Studies were conducted to investigate whether children did indeed demonstrate 
dominant patterns of thought at various stages in development. A not B error research 
seemed to indicate that young infants failed to conceive of objects existing 
independently of their own behaviour, consistent with the view that their 
understanding was based on their action on the world (e.g. Butterworth, 1977; 
Landers, 1971; Piaget, 1954). The traditional A not B error paradigm involves infants 
observing an object being hidden in Location A multiple times, and being allowed to 
recover the object each time, before observing the object being hidden in Location B. 
Below around 11 months, infants typically search in Location A for the object in 
Location B. The standard Piagetian interpretation was that the infants conceptualised 
the object in terms of their actions at Location A. Older infants however, typically 
search correctly in Location B, which was taken to indicate that they had restructured 
their thoughts and now conceived of objects independently of their actions at past 
locations. 
Conservation research appeared to indicate that superficial factors constrained 
the way young children conceptualised the world, consistent with the view that they 
understood the world in terms of their perception (Dodwell, 1960; Elkind, 1961; 
Hood, 1962; Piaget, 1952; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969; Smedslund, 1964). One variety of 
task presents children with a set amount of substance e.g. water in a jar, buttons set 
out in a row, whose presentation is subsequently altered: the water would be poured 
into a taller, narrower jar, the buttons would be spread out in the row. Below around 7 
or 8 years of age, children typically declare that there is more water in the taller, 
narrower jar than in the original jar despite witnessing that only the water from the 
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original jar is poured into the taller jar, and that there are more buttons in the spaced 
out row than in the unspaced row despite having witnessing the experimenter merely 
spreading the buttons in the spaced out row. Older children however, typically declare 
correctly, that the amount of water and number of buttons is unaffected by their 
altered presentation. This was taken to indicate that the children had restructured their 
thoughts so that they were no longer completely bound by perception. 
In line with Piaget's account of cognitive development, Beal and Flavell (1984) 
and Robinson and Whittaker (1986) put forward a conceptual change account of CU. 
Young children's apparent inability to consider the logical elements ofa message in 
light of contextual factors was used to support the suggestion that young children fail 
to differentiate between that which is said: the logicallliteral meaning (LM) and that 
which is meant: the intended meaning (1M). It was argued that children conceived of 
LM as equivalent to 1M, with the consequence that if they were provided with one of 
these types of meanings, they thought it a reflection, and so an acceptable expression, 
of the other. Thus it could be argued children who had been made aware of the 
intended referent of the speaker's ambiguous instructions in Beal and Flavell (1984) 
consequently conceptualised the instructions in terms of this intended referent, and so 
could not conceive of the instructions as pertaining to identify any other referent. 
Similarly, it could be argued that the 4- and 7-year-olds who more heavily relied upon 
the words the speaker used than the tone of voice in which the words were produced 
to identify the speaker's emotion in Friend and Bryant, (2000), were conceptualising 
the intent to express these emotions with the words used, and so could not appreciate 
the expression of any other emotions. Apparent inappropriate preference for one over 
the other could be explained in terms of the comparative explicitness of the 
presentation of the two meanings within a particular study. Grice (1975) had argued 
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that the use of conversational maxims hinged on the ability to apply the maxims to 
LM to draw inference about 1M. Since this would be an impossible feat for children 
failing to distinguish the two concepts of meaning, adherence to the conceptual 
change account entailed that CU emerged as a result of a radical shift in thinking, one 
that resulted in the conceptual differentiation of LM and 1M. 
Robinson and Whittaker (1986) noted the similarity between apparent 
difficulties with the LM-IM distinction and problems reported with appearance-reality 
(AR) understanding. Comprehension of the AR distinction indicates an appreciation 
that identity is not determined by what something looks like just as the intended 
meaning of communication is not determined by the words used to communicate. 
Furthermore, mastery of the AR distinction indicates acceptance that it is quite 
possible for something to look like one thing, but actually be something else, 
knowledge vital to the development of accurate means of identification. This can be 
seen as a parallel to the mastery of the LM-IM distinction which enables appreciation 
that it is acceptable for communication to have a certain LM, but actually express a 
different 1M, knowledge central to the development of CU. 
Pioneered by John Flavell, traditional tasks assessing appreciation of the AR 
distinction present participants with deceptive objects (such as a sponge that looks 
like a rock). Flavell (1988) noted that in these conventional tasks, prior to object 
presentation, participants would be given brief instruction on the meaning of the AR 
distinction and explanation of the terms used to express the distinction in the task 
questions: "looks like" relating to appearance and "really and truly" relating to reality. 
A deceptive object would then be presented and the participant asked questions in a 
counter-balanced order concerning the object's appearance: "When you look at this 
with your eyes right now, does it look like a rock or does it look like a sponge?" and 
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its identity: "What is this really and truly - is it really and truly a sponge or is it really 
and truly a rock?" On such tasks 4-year-olds tend to succeed whereas 3-year-olds 
typically demonstrate considerable difficulty, a behaviour differentiation which 
Flavell et al. (1986) attributed to the emergence of a conceptual change: the 
appreciation of representational mental states. This capacity was thought to enable 
children to differentiate between the nature of an object/reality and their perceptual 
representation of the object/object appearance. 
Robinson and Whittaker (1986) suggested that the early difficulty observed 
with the LM-IM distinction, arose from trouble conceptualising the nature of the 
relationship between the LM and 1M elements. Robinson and Whittaker (1986) 
argued that a message needed to be understood "as a stimulus to be interpreted in its 
own right and also as a representation" (p43) of an 1M, providing only indirect access, 
the accuracy of which could be variable. They likened such a relationship to that of 
the partnership of appearance and reality. Portrayed in such a way, appearance would 
be conceived both as an independent element, and as a representation of reality 
(enabling indirect and thus potentially inadequate access). Difficulties in appreciating 
the AR distinction could thus be understood in terms of trouble conceptualising the 
differentiated relationship between appearance and reality, and the acquisition of 
competency in this area characterised in terms of a conceptual shift reflecting 
appreciation of this distinction. 
However, evidence has been produced more recently which suggests that poor 
performance on AR assessments cannot be attributed to difficulty in conceptual 
differentiation, but seems instead representative of the child's developing acquisition 
of discourse. Gauvain and Greene (1994) used a modified AR task, in which children 
were presented with standard test questions, but were additionally permitted to 
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express identity knowledge/reality appreciation through illustration of item function 
in a show-and-tell task. For example children were presented with a pencil shaped 
like a toothbrush: deceptive item, alongside a real toothbrush: true item, and 
questioned as to what they thought each item looked like and what they thought each 
item really was. They were also asked to describe the function of each item. Children 
were then presented with suitable props to support function demonstration: a piece of 
blank paper for writing and a doll with exposed teeth for teeth brushing, and asked to 
show what each item could be used for. Gauvain and Greene reported that English-
speaking children as young as 2 years, who demonstrated poor performance on 
standard AR task questions: more specifically problems were encountered with object 
identity/reality questions, displayed improved performance in the modified task. 
Having revealed appreciation of appearance during the standard AR task questions, 
they were able to express a differentiated conception of reality during the function 
demonstration phase. 
Sapp, Lee, and Muir, (2000) produced concordant findings. However they 
asked children to demonstrate both the function and the appearance of deceptive 
objects to indicate that children had similar representations of both properties. In the 
Gauvain and Greene (1994) study, knowledge of the properties of appearance and 
reality was ascertained through different means: children were only asked to 
demonstrate functional properties relating to identity, knowledge of appearance was 
assessed via verbal response. Sapp, Lee and Muir presented English-speaking 
children with an array of objects including a deceptive object such as a candle which 
looked like a crayon and asked the children to pass them objects which looked like 
particular items. The initial request was for a non-deceptive item, but following this, 
the deceptive item was requested e.g. "I want to take a picture of Teddy with 
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something that looks like a crayon. Can you help me?" Following this children were 
asked to pass items which served particular functions. Again, the initial request was 
for a non-deceptive item, but following this, the deceptive item was requested e.g. "I 
want a candle to put on Bart's birthday cake. Can you help me?" Sapp, Lee and Muir 
found that 3-year-olds who were performing poorly on standard AR tasks performed 
competently on the demonstration trials. 
Similarly, Rice et al. (1997) found that adaptations to task methodology 
improved performance. In one condition AR questions were posed in the context of a 
deceptive scenario: tricking the other experimenter, to emphasise the role of 
representational mental states in object perception. In another condition, a deceptive 
object such as a sponge that looked like a rock was presented alongside an exemplar 
item of appearance e.g. a rock and an exemplar item of reality e.g. a sponge, to reduce 
the need for independent mental representation of the different dimensions. Both 
manipulations were found to have a positive effect on the production of correct AR 
task responses by English-speaking 3-year-olds. 
Deak, Ray, and Brenneman (2003) noted the similarity of response patterns 
for questions in a standard AR task to patterns for questions in a control task 
presented within a similar discourse structure but not focused upon the AR 
distinction. English-speaking 3-, 4- and 5-year old children were presented with a 
traditional AR task in which they examined a deceptive object and answered the 
standard AR questions "Does it look like a rock or does it look like a sponge?" and 
"Is this really and truly a sponge or really and truly a rock?" However, a control task 
was also delivered, in which children viewed pictures of animals wearing or holding 
familiar items e.g. a monkey was shown holding a cookie, and asked questions in the 
following format: "Does it look like a monkey or does it look like cookies?" "Does it 
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have a monkey or does it have cookies?" Deak, Ray, and Brenneman found that 
children's tendency to perseverate when responding to AR task questions i.e. answer 
"rock" to both appearance and reality questions, could be predicted from their 
tendency to peserverate when responding to control task questions, along with their 
vocabulary level. This prompted the suggestion that the poor performance of young 
children on standard AR tasks might actually be reflecting their inability to recognise 
that successive forced choice questions providing identical response options require 
independent evaluation. Thus the findings of Deak, Ray, and Brenneman provide 
support for the suggestion that the standard AR task might be more representative of 
the ability to identify speaker intentions than knowledge of an AR distinction. This 
mirrors claims made across the developmental literature. 
In such disparate areas of proficiency as number conservation, false-belief 
appreciation and cosmology, investigators have successfully shown that adapting 
tasks to make the experimenter's intentions more explicit, enhances children's 
performance on a range of cognitive developmental tests. For example, by refraining 
from question repetition (Rose & Blank, 1974) and using a "naughty" teddy to 
transform task materials (McGarrigle & Donaldson, 1974), investigators have 
managed to substantially improve performance in Piagetian number-conservation 
tasks, though age differences still persist. It has been argued that such task 
manipulations prevent children from introducing mistaken interpretations concerning 
the experimenter's question intentions. For example, a child might decide that they 
are being asked the same question a second time because their first response to the 
question had been wrong, indicating that they should now change their response, or 
they might think that the question was being asked a second time because something 
had now changed, so conclude again that they should alter their response. 
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In a like manner, performance on tests gauging false-belief understanding has 
been found to improve following the incorporation of a minor modification to task 
presentation. False-belief tasks assess appreciation that someone can possess a mental 
representation of a situation (a belief) which conflicts with the reality of the 
circumstances. In an "unexpected-locations" false-belief task, a character places an 
object in one location (A) and is unaware of its subsequent transfer to another location 
(B). They should thus hold a false belief regarding the whereabouts of the object, 
which should be manifest in a search for the object in its original (and now vacated) 
location. Siegal and Beattie (1991), and more recently Yazdi et aI., (2006), have 
demonstrated that altering the standard question in this task, from "Where will [the 
character] look for ...... ?" to "Where will [the character] look first for ....... ?", 
substantially improves children's performance. It is thought that the "look first" 
instruction clarifies the experimenter's 1M in the task by denying the interpretation 
"Where should she look to find ..... ?" The inability of young children to derive the 
intended interpretation in the original task can be considered attributable to a failure 
to recognise the Gricean dictum that speakers are obliged to not say more than is 
necessary. Using the Gricean maxim to relate the experimenter's instructions to the 
task context should result in an emphasis of the character's ignorance and so direct 
interpretation towards the restricted look first reading. However, the response of 
young children appears to be more context-focused, leading them to interpret the 
instructions in terms of where the character should look to find the object. 
More explicit framing of the 1M behind questions used to assess children's 
cosmological knowledge has also been found to enhance performance. Siegal, 
Butterworth, and Newcombe, (2004) investigated the knowledge that children 
possessed concerning the shape of the earth and the day-night cycle. In their second 
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experiment they presented English speaking 4- and 5-year-olds with two sets of 
questioning formats, one of which presented children with generative questions such 
as "What is the shape of the earth? Where is the sun at night?" and the other of which 
delivered forced-choice questions such as "Is the world round or flat? When the sun 
shines on this part of the earth, is it day or night on the other part?" Siegal, 
Butterworth, and Newcombe found that reducing the potential ambiguity surrounding 
the desired response promoted the demonstration of accurate knowledge. 
In line with the above findings highlighting the impact of discourse structure 
on the task responses obtained from children, Fritzley and Lee (2003) report the 
unsuitability of yes-no questions such as "Is this red?" in reference to a red cup, for 
children below the age of 4 years, based on data from English-speaking 3-, 4- and 5-
year-olds. 4- and 5-year-olds failed to demonstrate any response bias to such 
questions when they were found to be comprehensible i.e. when they did not 
incorporate nonsense words, although a negative response bias was demonstrated for 
incomprehensible questions such as "Is this yint?" However, 2-year-olds were found 
to have an affirmation bias (tendency to respond ''yes'') to both comprehensible and 
incomprehensible questions and 3-year-olds were shown to be inconsistent and often 
biased in their response frame, varying the bias when demonstrated, between 
affirmation and negation. 
Additionally, a recent though controversial analysis has claimed that even 
infants' performance on A-not B tasks is powerfully influenced by pragmatic factors 
(Topal, et aI., 2008). It would seem that performance on cognitive developmental 
measures is to some substantial extent reflecting children's ability to determine 1M 
rather than the conceptual deficits the tasks are seeking to assess. 
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If, as the evidence suggests, developmental tasks are misrepresenting 
conceptual competence, and children don't in fact experience difficulty distinguishing 
appearance from reality, it is plausible that they are actually able to conceive of a 
message as a stimulus to be interpreted in its own right and also as a representation of 
the speaker's 1M. This conflicts with Robinson and Whittaker's (1986) proposal that 
children possess confused representations in which LM and 1M are indistinct. 
1.5 Recent directions in conversational understanding research 
1.5.1 Explicit vs. implicit conversational understanding 
More recent research into the emergence of CU has indicated that young 
children in fact do possess early LM-IM differentiation. However, appreciation of this 
distinction seems to be restricted with regard to the contexts and response modalities 
through which it's demonstrated, suggesting that the understanding is less likely to be 
the potentially conscious, explicit appreciation of adults, but rather, an unconscious, 
implicit knowledge. Ackerman (1993) reports evidence suggesting that, when 
provided with contextual information indicating the 1M of a message, English-
speaking children as young as 5 years can take this information on board and 
represent it separately from information gleaned from a message: LM. This is 
indicated by the fact that they can appreciate the sufficiency of their knowledge and 
that of others as shown by judging their ability to identify a story referent, despite 
recognising the insufficiency of an actual utterance to provide such knowledge as 
revealed by denying that a story character's utterance had sufficiently provided this 
knowledge. 
For example, in one experiment Ackerman (1993) presented a third of 
children with an informative utterance version of a story in which Nancy's utterance 
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enabled Janice to identify which type of apples she wanted: "I want the small yellow 
apples." Another third of the children were given an ambiguous utterance version of 
the story in which Nancy's utterance helped Janice to narrow down the selection of 
apple varieties she could choose from but did not enable her to identify the exact type 
of apple wanted: "I want the small apples" indicated that Nancy didn't want large 
apples but didn't reveal which colour apples she wanted The remaining third of 
children received a contextually informative utterance version in which information 
provided in the context of the story: reference of the recipe to yellow apples, 
complimented ambiguous information provided in the utterance "I want the small 
apples" to enable identification of the small yellow apples Nancy wanted. 
In one condition the experimenter identified the type of apple Nancy wanted, 
but in another condition the type of apple was not indicated. Ackerman (1993) then 
asked the children whether they knew exactly which type of apple was right (children 
in the experimenter identification condition were asked if they had known before they 
had been shown) and whether what Nancy had said at the very end of the story was 
enough alone to know which type of apple was right. 
Children as young as 5-years-old were significantly more likely to claim 
knowledge of the type of apple Nancy wanted when presented with the informative 
and contextually informative utterance versions of the story than when presented with 
the ambiguous utterance version. Furthermore, analyses indicated that children were 
not significantly likely to attribute this knowledge to the utterance alone in the 
contextually informative and ambiguous versions of the story. Such reasoning would 
seem to require clear distinction of 1M from LM. 
Moreover, Ackerman (1993) demonstrated that misattribution of the source of 
referent knowledge to the utterance occurred significantly more frequently following 
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experimenter identification of the correct meaning/object referents. He interpreted this 
result to indicate that the confusion in development lies not in differentiating 1M from 
LM, but in relating the message to reality. He suggested that early on, children tend to 
treat messages as reflective of 1M, and to judge the consistency of messages and 
referents rather than their sufficiency, so that a message which precludes specific 
identification of, but nonetheless allows interpretation in terms of, its intended 
referent (i.e. an ambiguous utterance), is deemed adequate. However, he proposed 
that the focus on message and referent consistency can be disrupted, so that the 
absence of independent referent identification or the use of a deceptive context can act 
to direct attention away from the external referent to an internal representation. He 
proposed that the relation between internal representations and messages are judged in 
terms of sufficiency, thereby revealing children's conceptual competence. 
The suggestion that children possess early LM-IM differentiation, sits well 
with Reid's (1996) report on the investigation of ambiguity sensitivity in English-
speaking 5- to 6-year-olds. Recognition of ambiguity requires appreciation that the 
meaning of a message is consistent with multiple IMs. It thus requires differentiation 
of LM and 1M. Reid argued that emphasising the need to evaluate messages, rather 
than to merely base judgements on them, improved ambiguity detection, suggesting 
that past task demands had previously obscured the true extent of competency 
children possessed. Reid provided evidence supporting the proposal that children 
possess an early appreciation of ambiguity. Participants were presented with a 
selection of stimuli: pictures of clown faces, differing with relation to some attributes: 
emotion expression, hat-shape, presence of freckles, and consistent with respect to 
others: possession of one nose and two eyes. They were asked to select a message 
referent if it could be identified from the message, or to pick up a card with a large 
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"X" on it if the referent could not be determined. If, for example, the set from which 
participants were asked to select consisted of a happy clown with a square hat and no 
freckles, a sad clown with a square hat and freckles and a happy clown with a round 
hat and no freckles, a message referring to "A happy clown with a square hat" would 
be unambiguous, consistent with only one of the clown faces. However a message 
referring to " a clown with a nose and two eyes" would be ambiguous, consistent with 
all of the clown faces. 
Reid (1996) found that despite demonstrating difficulty in determining the 
adequacy of ambiguous messages, indicated by whether they attempted to identify 
referents, children took longer to respond and did so with less certainty when a 
message was ambiguous than when it was unambiguous. This was the case even when 
the intended referent was in fact known to them. These findings suggest, as do those 
of Ackerman (1993) that children are, to a degree, aware of the LM-IM distinction. 
Sekerina, Stromswold, and Hestvik (2004) drew similar conclusions. They 
investigated picture selection in an ambiguous pronoun task. The following sentence 
provides an example of an ambiguous pronoun: "The boy has placed the box behind 
him". In this example, the term "him" could either refer back to the sentence subject: 
interpreted as an internal referent -the boy, or to an unidentified agent: denoting an 
external referent - another character. Sekerina et aI., created pairs of pictures, so that 
in each couplet one scene favoured interpretation in terms of the sentence-internal 
referent: An image depicted two agents, a boy and a man and a box could be seen 
behind the boy, and the other scene promoted interpretation in terms of an external 
referent: An image depicted two agents, a boy and a man, and a box could be seen 
behind the man. 
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Sekerina, Stromswold, and Hestvik (2004) found that when using messages 
containing such ambiguous pronouns to select between picture pairs: an explicit 
response, English-speaking 4- to 7-year-olds failed to demonstrate appreciation of 
alternative meanings. The overwhelming selection of pictures representing the 
sentence-internal referent (93% responses), was only countered by a selection of 
pictures representing the sentence-external response equal to that of the error response 
rate in the control sentence-internal referent selection task. The control task was 
identical to the task just described, except that the ambiguous pronouns used in the 
messages were replaced with reflexives (such as himself or herself), in this way 
providing unambiguous identification of the sentence-internal referent. However, 
when Sekerina et aI., used patterns of eye gaze to investigate the allocation of 
attention to the two referents in the pronoun task, they found a substantial increase in 
looks to the external referent (relative to the internal referent reflexive control task), 
indicating the presence of implicit (non-conscious) sensitivity to alternative 
interpretations and so the LM-IM distinction. 
Eskritt, Whalen and Lee (2008) provide even further evidence of early implicit 
appreciation of the meaning differentiation. As mentioned earlier, Grice (1975) held 
that an understanding of his conversational maxims required application of the 
maxims to LM to draw inference about 1M. It thus necessitates appreciation of the 
distinction between the two meanings. Eskritt, et aI., presented English-speaking 3-, 
4- and 5-year-olds with a conversational violations task (CVT) consisting of a series 
of trials in which they were asked to locate a sticker hidden under one of four pots. 
Each time they could seek helpful information from one puppet regarding the 
whereabouts of the sticker, and each time they were presented with the same two 
puppets to choose from. One of the puppets always provided appropriate information 
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regarding the location of the sticker e.g. if the sticker was under the orange cup, this 
puppet would tell the child that the sticker was under the orange cup. However, the 
other puppet consistently produced a response which violated a specific 
conversational maxim. The conversational maxim violated, varied across participants, 
and was concerned either with the truthfulness, informativeness or relevance of 
communication. To illustrate, if the puppet was violating the maxim concerned with 
the relevance of communication, and the child asked for help locating the sticker, this 
puppet would produce a response such as "I like these cups". 
If children had appreciation of the conversational maxims, they should 
recognise the maxim violations, and over the course of the trials, associate them with 
the particular puppet who was consistently producing them. They should then develop 
a preference for requesting help from the other non-violating puppet. Eskritt, Whalen 
and Lee (2008) reported that from the age of 3 years, children developed a preference 
for the non-violating puppet when violations pertained to the maxim concerned with 
the relevance of communication. From the age of 4 years, they found that children 
also demonstrated preferences for the non-violating puppet when violations pertained 
to the maxims concerned with the informativeness and truthfulness of 
communication. Recognition of these maxims provides support for the argument that 
children have appreciation of the LM-IM distinction at this early age. 
It could be argued that children might have simply learnt that asking for help 
from the violating puppet did not aid them in locating the sticker, and that it did not 
require conclusions to be drawn regarding intended meanings such as deception, 
purposeful vagueness or deliberate irrelevance. If this was true, success on the task 
would not require and so reflect appreciation of the meaning distinction. Such a 
criticism certainly limits the conclusions which can be drawn from success on this 
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task. However, even the weakest interpretation of the task supports the conclusion 
that children of this age are capable of learning about redundancy in communication, 
which provides the basis for drawing implicatures about intended as distinct from 
logical meanings. 
1.5.2 The role of informational processing 
It could be that information processing limitations prevent implicit knowledge 
from being exploited during explicit (conscious) response consideration. Such 
information-processing limitations may be masking implicitly revealed CU to 
preclude explicit demonstration, in line with a performance account of CU 
development (Surian, 1995). Corroboration of this analysis appears to be provided by 
Musolino and Lidz (2003). These authors investigated the phenomenon of 
isomorphism - the tendency to interpret ambiguous sentences with negation and 
quantified noun phrases, such as "every horse didn't jump over the fence", in a 
manner consistent with their superficial syntactic structure. Such a strategy is 
typically employed by young children, in that they will use the surface syntactic 
position of elements to determine the scope of their application. Thus in the example 
given above, the quantified expression "every", in preceding "didn't", will take scope 
over this negation, producing the "wider" interpretation that no horse jumped over the 
fence. This contrasts with the non-isomorphic interpretation of such sentences 
typically given by adults. They will normally attribute scope to the negation "didn't" 
over the quantified expression "every" resulting in the "narrower" reading that not 
every horse jumped over the fence so giving rise to the implication that some in fact 
did. 
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Musolino and Lidz (2003) demonstrated that the isomorphic tendency of 
children actually reflects an attenuated processing preference present in adults rather 
than a conceptually immature representation. They achieved this by revealing that 
adults can form isomorphic interpretations in certain circumstances, and by further 
establishing that the incorporation of a manipulation to reduce processing demands, 
reduced the extent of isomorphic construal, replicating the effect reported with 
children (Musolino & Lidz 2006). 
Musolino and Lidz (2003) established that English-speaking adults 
overwhelmingly interpret the ambiguous phrase "Two frogs didn't jump over the 
rock" isomorphic ally, in accordance with its syntactic structure. In such an 
interpretation, the quantification term "two" takes scope over the negation term 
"didn't", giving rise to the "wider" reading that two (particular/definite) frogs didn't 
jump over the rock. The wider interpretation can be contrasted with an alternative 
interpretation in which the negation term "didn't" takes scope over the quantification 
term "two". This interpretation would give rise to the "narrower" reading that it was 
not the case that two frogs jumped, and hence the implication that less than two frogs 
jumped. Musolino and Lidz then demonstrated that the creation of a positive 
expectation against which the negative quantified noun phrase could be starkly 
contrasted, as in "Two frogs jumped over the fence but two frogs didn't jump over the 
rock" vastly enhanced the extent of non-isomorphic interpretation. The use of an 
affirmative statement with which to contrast negation is thought to reduce the 
demands incurred in processing the negation (Hom, 1989). Evidence that processing 
resource manipulation affects the isomorphic interpretations of adults in a manner 
consistent with its effects upon the isomorphic interpretations of children, would seem 
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to provide strong support for a continuity account of CU competency, indicating early 
conceptual masking induced by processing demands. 
Investigations focusing on the appreciation of SIs also indicate that reducing 
processing requirements lowers the age at which CU is demonstrated. Noveck (2001) 
studied the appreciation that English-speaking children between the ages of 5- and 10-
years-old and adults have of the SIs arising from the weak scalar terms "might" and 
"some". To examine whether children understand that the conversational use of 
"might" implies "not necessarily", Noveck presented participants with 2 open boxes, 
one of which contained a parrot and a bear and one of which contained just a parrot, 
and a closed box which they were told had the same contents as one of the open 
boxes. A puppet then proceeded to deliver a series of statements to the children 
concerning the contents of the closed box and the children were asked to evaluate 
these statements. The critical statement was "There might be a parrot in the box". If 
children derive the implicature that "might" entails "not necessarily" they should 
negatively evaluate the puppet's statement as there did have to be a parrot in the 
closed box. However, if they fail to compute the SI, they should interpret "might" 
logically to be consistent with the reading that there must be a parrot, and so 
positively evaluate the puppet's statement. Noveck found that despite demonstrating 
accurate evaluation of control statements provided by the puppet, 7- and 9-year-olds 
produced significantly more logical interpretations of the critical SI statement than 
adults. 
Noveck (2001) also investigated the ability of French speaking children to 
understand that the conversational use of the French term for "some": certains, 
implies "not all": pas tous. Children were presented with a series of control assertions 
such as the phrases "All dogs have spots" and "Some birds live in cages" (English 
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translations) which varied in terms of their logical truth. However, underinformative 
statements which were logically true but which gave rise to false SIs were also 
presented, for example "Some giraffes have long necks" (English translation). 
Noveck discovered that despite demonstrating accurate evaluation of control 
statements, 10-year-olds were significantly more likely than adults to incorrectly 
accept the underinformative statements indicating that they were interpreting the term 
"some" logically. Thus, Noveck provided evidence of a clear preference for the 
logical interpretation of weak scalar terms across languages and terms. 
However Chierchia et aI., (2001), and more recently, Papafragou and 
Musolino (2003), Papafragou and Tantalou (2004), Feeney, Scrafton, Duckworth, and 
Handley (2004) and Guasti et aI., (2005) have reported that adapting tasks to lessen 
processing requirements, substantially enhances the ability of children, some of whom 
are as young as 3 years of age, to compute SIs. 
Chierchia et al. found that presenting a description containing a SI alongside a 
description without the SI enabled English-speaking children between the ages of 3-
and 6-years old to compute the SI that "or" implies "not and". Chierchia et al. 
presented children with a scenario for which the strong descriptive term "and" was 
appropriate: A story was told about some farmers who wanted to clean their animals, 
and who eventually decided to clean both a horse and a rabbit. The children then 
listened as 2 puppets provided descriptions of the farmers' actions, one of which gave 
rise to a false SI: Every farmer cleaned a horse or a rabbit, and the other of which did 
not evoke an SI: Every farmer cleaned a horse and a rabbit. Children were found to 
display a strong preference for the description which did not evoke the false SI. It 
appeared that presenting children with a choice of statements to choose between, 
reducing the need for independent representation of a contrasting interpretation to the 
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SI, promoted children's ability to demonstrate SI appreciation through avoidance of 
the false SI. 
Papafragou and Musolino (2003) found that emphasising the relevance of 
contextually driven meanings by presenting SIs as descriptions of goal attempts, and 
using a training phase to highlight experimenter intentions, also helped young 
children to compute SIs. Papafragou and Musolino provided Greek-speaking 5-year-
olds with training trials which emphasised the need to focus on the 
felicity/appropriateness of statements rather than their logical truth. Children watched 
the experimenter ask a puppet to identify items in front of them and then heard the 
puppet give responses which were either both logically true and felicitous/appropriate 
e.g."This is an elephant" in reference to an elephant, or both logically true but 
infelicitous/inappropriate e.g. "This is a little animal with four legs" in reference to a 
dog. After each response, children were asked if the puppet answered well, and if 
there was a better answer. If children failed to correct a puppet's inappropriate 
response, the Experimenter told them that the puppet did not answer well and 
indicated what a better response would have been, e.g. "This is a dog" in reference to 
the dog. 
Children were then presented with test trials in which they were again asked to 
evaluate puppet statements which this time contained SIs. The relevance of SIs was 
emphasised by indicating that story characters were attempting to achieve goals e.g. 
Mickey was challenged to put hoops on a pole, and that the puppet statements were 
performance descriptions which should reflect whether or not the goal had been 
achieved. A typical trial consisted of Mickey being shown to place all 3 available 
hoops on a pole and the puppet describing Mickey as having put 2 hoops on the pole. 
Papafragou and Musolino found that 5-year-olds were significantly more competent 
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at computing the "some implies not all", "start implies did not finish" and "two 
implies not three" SIs when given the felicity training phase and presented with a high 
relevance SI context than when asked to compute the SIs in a less relevant context 
without training. 
Papafragou and Tantalou (2004) built on the findings ofPapafragou and 
Musolino by enhancing the ability of young children to compute SIs. Although 
Papafragou and Musolino had found that training and a high SI relevant context 
enhanced SI computation, SI computation for two of the scalar terms did not rise 
above chance-levels with 5-year-olds only computing the "some-all" and "start-not 
finish" SIs half of the time. However, Papafragou and Tantalou heightened the 
accessibility of contextually driven meanings, by presenting SI statements as 
responses to questions inducing glaring expectations regarding situational 
notification. Rather than just forming descriptions of what happened, as in Papafragou 
and Musolino, the SI statements in Papafragou and Tantalou's study were produced as 
answers to queries regarding the satisfaction of specific criteria e.g. Did you eat the 
sandwich? I ate the cheese. Papafragou and Tantalou's SI task was also more 
naturalistic because children were encouraged to derive implicatures instinctively, as 
a sincere response to hearing directed communication, rather than in the explicit 
context of evaluating utterance felicity. The sincerity of SI computation was attained 
by asking the children to assign prizes on the basis of achievement as indicated by 
answers to queries regarding the satisfaction of specific criteria. Computation of an SI 
that for example, "not all" of a task was achieved, should thus have directly impacted 
on assignment of a reward. 
Papafragou and Tantalou (2004) investigated computation of the "some-all" 
quantificational SI, encyclopaedic SIs requiring world knowledge e.g. that a sandwich 
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comprises more than just cheese as relevant to the SI mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph, and ad hoc SIs requiring situational knowledge e.g. that there are 2 gifts 
comprising a parrot and a doll to be wrapped in relation to the SI: Did you wrap the 
presents? I wrapped the parrot. Greek-speaking 4- and 5-year-olds were found to 
compute all the SIs at significantly above chance levels on Papafragou and Tantalou's 
more naturalistic and direct task, in support of the suggestion SI computation can be 
promoted by reducing the processing load introduced through incorporation of 
unnecessary task demands. 
Feeney et al. (2004) also reported that increasing the accessibility/relevance of 
enriched contextual meanings improved children's SI performance. Feeney et al. 
contrasted the ability of English-speaking 8-year-olds to compute "some-all" SIs 
when the SIs were presented in English translations of the contextually thin 
statements used by Noveck (2001) Experiment 2 e.g. "Some giraffes have long 
necks" with their ability when the SIs were delivered via contextually thick 
storyboards in which pictures and text were used to depict the actions and interactions 
relevant to the SIs. For example, one storyboard presented a series of photographs and 
text showing a child discovering and then consuming, in a one by one fashion, all of 
the sweets she had found. The child was then shown facing an angry mother who asks 
"Charlotte what have you been doing with the sweets?" Charlotte is shown to reply 
"I've eaten some of them". Feeney et al found that the 8-year-olds performed well in 
the contextually thick condition, computing 79% of SIs and produced significantly 
more SIs in the contextually thick condition than in the contextually thin condition. 
Guasti et al. (2005) shed further light on factors affecting children's ability to 
compute the some-all SI by considering the effects of felicity training separately from 
the effects of enhanced accessibility/relevance of enriched contextual meanings. In 
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one experiment, felicity training was introduced which consisted of drawing 
children's attention to the fact that logically true descriptions are not necessarily the 
best. Italian-speaking children saw a set of objects and were asked to choose between 
two labels for each object e.g. a grape was presented and children were asked to 
identify the better description from the Italian translations of the terms "grape" and 
"fruit". SI appreciation was then assessed using Italian translations of the test 
statements used by Noveck (2001) Experiment 2. In a separate experiment, the 
accessibility of enriched contextual meanings was enhanced by embedding SIs in 
descriptions of events provided by an observing puppet, inline with the SI test 
presentation of Papafragou and Musolino (2003). For example, a puppet watched five 
soldiers discuss whether they would go in search of treasure by motorbike or horse, 
and then all choose to travel by horse. The puppet was then asked what was 
happening in the story and replied using the description "Some soldiers are riding a 
horse". 
Guasti et al. found that training improved the ability of Italian-speaking 7-
year-oIds to compute SIs, although this enhanced ability was still below adult levels 
and did not persist over time (1 week) to a second testing session. However, 
enhancing the accessibility of enriched contextual meanings was found to raise 
performance to adult levels. It is noticeable that Papafragou and Musolino reported 
that the combined effects of training and enhancing the accessibility of enriched 
contextual meanings only raised performance to chance levels. However, the children 
tested by Papafragou and Musolino were younger by 2 years. This indicates that there 
is more to the emergence of SI appreciation than increased access to enriched 
contextual meanings, at least to the extent that it was enhanced in this study and by 
Papafragou and Musolino. This additional factor could perhaps relate to the ability to 
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independently represent contrasting interpretations to SIs, which Chierchia et al. 
(2001) found led to strong SI appreciation among children as young as 3- to 6-years 
old. 
The report of Pouscoulous, Noveck, Politzer, and Bastide (2007), lends 
additional weight to the suggestion that processing costs mask early appreciation of 
SIs. Pouscoulous et al. found that the complexity of linguistic material incorporated 
and context and nature of the task used, impacted on children's computation of SIs. In 
an initial experiment, French-speaking 9-year-olds were presented with a set of 
puppet statements as descriptions of a scene in front of them. The scene comprised a 
set of boxes which were surrounded by toy elephants: no elephant was inside a box, 
and which contained toy turtles: no turtle was outside a box. Additionally, toy 
dolphins were scattered both in and around boxes. The critical false SI statement was 
a French translation of the phrase "Some turtles are in the boxes" using the term 
"certains" to express the meaning "some". As expected, the 9-year-olds incorrectly 
agreed with the critical SI statement more than adults, revealing a greater tendency to 
interpret SIs logically, despite demonstrating adult-like performance on control items 
such as the translated "Some dolphins are in the boxes". 
However, the processing demands of the task were reduced in a subsequent 
experiment. The linguistically complex French term "certains" was replaced with the 
more simplistic French term "quelques". Furthermore, distractor items: attention-
attracting items that are irrelevant to the SI statement, were removed. Participants 
were presented with a basic scene comprising boxes containing tokens, in which no 
token was placed outside a box. Additionally, rather than truth evaluation, 
Pouscoulous et al. (2007) used an action response to ascertain SI computation. Rather 
than asking participants to agree or disagree with a scene description, Pouscoulous et 
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al. asked them to make sure a scene satisfied a statement such as the translated "I 
want all the boxes to contain a token", modifying the scene if required. Such changes 
were found to promote the ability of young children to compute SIs, so that only 32% 
of 4-year-olds, 27% of 5-year-olds and 17% of 7-year-olds responded logically to an 
SI. That is to say that as well as demonstrating competence in restraining themselves 
from making inappropriate scene modifications in response to control statements, e.g. 
in response to the translated statement "I would like some boxes to contain a token" 
given during a scene in which some, but not all of the boxes contained a token, the 
majority of children correctly modified a scene in which all the boxes contained a 
token upon hearing the translated SI statement "I want some boxes to contain a 
token". The low rate of logical response in this experiment can be contrasted with the 
rate of 91 % produced by the 9-year-olds in Pouscoulous et. al.' s initial experiment. 
Pouscoulous et al. also considered the effect of computing SIs in a negative 
context e.g. "I want some boxes NOT to have a token". Negative contexts are more 
difficult to process than their corresponding positive contexts i.e. "I want some boxes 
to have a token" (Hom, 1989, Prado & Noveck in press). In line with the masked 
competence account, the authors found that presenting SIs in more processing-
intensive negative contexts appeared to make them significantly more difficult for 
children to compute. In contrast to the 17% of 7-year-olds responding appropriately to 
SIs in the standard positive context described above, 40% of7-year-olds incorrectly 
neglected to modify a scene in which no boxes contained tokens in response to the 
negative context SI statement translated as "I would like some boxes to not contain a 
token". This was the case, despite demonstrating appropriate responses to the same 
statement in control scenes e.g. in which all the boxes contained a token. 
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The analysis of personal reference pronoun reversals conducted by Dale and 
Crain-Thoreson (1993) lends further support to the suggestion that children possess 
early proficiency in deriving pragmatic interpretations in discourse, but that this is 
susceptible to masking by processing demands. Personal reference pronouns are 
special in that their object of reference is not fixed, so that the term "you" can be used 
to refer to different people in different contexts and even during simple conversational 
exchanges in which the speaker and listener exchange roles. Correct production of 
personal reference pronouns such as "I" , "You", "he" or "she" is performed in 
accordance with Grice's maxims of Quantity. However, sometimes reversals occur, in 
which the pronouns are incorrectly applied so that the speaker might use the term "I" 
to refer to the listener or "you" to refer to himlherself. 
Dale and Crain-Thoreson (1993) established that reversal production within 
their sample of English-speaking 20-month-old children was unrelated to cognitive 
abilities such as vi suo-spatial skills (indicating they were not attributable to 
difficulties in perspective switching) and negatively associated with proportion of 
referential vocabulary (suggesting they were not a consequence of a bias to attribute 
speaker independent referential meanings). They also discounted effects of grammar 
(indicating reversals were not a consequence of lack of relevant linguistic knowledge) 
and imitation (suggesting they were not a consequence of blindly copying the 
application of others). This enabled rejection of an explanation in terms of conceptual 
difficulty. However, they observed that reversers failed to produce reversals 
consistently, and that the majority occurred in the context of relatively long or 
complex utterances. It was also noted that reversals were more likely to occur in 
imitation contexts and to involve reversal of the second person pronoun "you". 
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Bearing such description in mind, but also taking into account the fact that 
those children who actually produced reversals infact tended to produce more correct 
second person pronouns than non-reversers, Dale and Crain-Thoreson (1993) propose 
a processing complexity explanation of reversals. They suggest that the referential 
shift required to alternate pronoun direction "presents a substantial processing load" 
(Dale & Crain-Thoreson, 1993, p. 585), susceptible to impediment from long complex 
utterances and salient pronoun representations formed in memory during imitation 
episodes. Furthermore, the very fact that reversers produced more correct second 
person pronouns than non-reversers despite producing more incorrect pronoun 
reversals than the other group, is used to support a conception of reversers as 
competent "risk takers", taking chances with their application of pronouns rather than 
employing the alternative formulaic (thank-you), generic (non-specific application of 
a reference term to identify whomever appropriate in the circumstances), nominal 
(Daddy read) and third person (go away) reference strategies of non-reversers. This 
pattern of results strengthens the case for a theory of proficiency concealed by limited 
processing resources. 
Meroni and Crain's (2003) investigation of the "garden-path" effect in young 
children lends additional support to the theory that conversational understanding is 
present from an early age but is masked by a lack of processing power. These authors 
investigated the performance of children on "garden-path" sentences (in which 
transitory referential ambiguity can lead to ascription to an interpretation later 
discredited by analysis of further input). An example of a garden path sentence would 
be "Whilst Myrtle ate the chicken laid an egg". The referential ambiguity in this 
example is due to the phrase "the chicken", containing the second noun of the 
sentence. This noun could be interpreted as the object of the verb "ate" (indicating 
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that the chicken was eaten) or read as the subject of the verb "laid" (indicating that the 
chicken laid an egg). The "garden path" description of this sentence, is supported by 
evidence concerning the interpretation of similarly structured phrases, in which 
processing behaviour is consistent with the presence of an initial tendency to process 
the noun immediately following a verb as its object, superseded following the 
processing of the second clause of these sentences, by the need to assign a clausal 
subject (Mitchell, 1987; Van Gompel and Pickering, 2001). 
However, the idea that some sentences are inherently misleading presupposes 
the initial centrality of grammatical judgements to ambiguity resolution and language 
processing more generally. Although evidence has supported such a claim under 
restricted conditions (Britt, 1994), many findings support the suggestion that other 
factors such as semantic plausibility and referential context exert influence during the 
earliest stages of processing (Britt, 1994; Garnsey et aI., 1997; Trueswell, 1996). 
Nonetheless, when Trueswell et al. (1999) analysed eye-movements during sentence 
processing their findings appeared to indicate that unlike adults, 5-year-old children 
failed to use context to identify appropriate sentence referents, indicating a lack of CU 
proficiency in this area. However, Meroni and Crain (2003) reported that when given 
an opportunity to plan task responses before being allowed to initiate them, extending 
the processing period, English-speaking children between the ages of 3- and 6-years-
old produced more contextually appropriate responses, failing to be led down the 
garden path. 
Meroni and Crain (2003) asked children to "Put the frog on the red napkin into 
the box". The instruction IS logically ambiguous and could be read to require either 
moving a frog which is already on a red napkin directly into a box or to require 
\ 
moving a frog onto a red napkin and then into a box. However, children were 
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presented with a context comprising one frog sat on a blue napkin, another frog sat on 
a red napkin, a further "empty" red napkin and a box. Consideration of the scene 
should prompt interpretation of the phrase "on the red napkin" as a modifier of the 
sentence subject "the frog" and so lead children to select the frog sat on the red 
napkin and to move it directly into the box. However, when children were allowed to 
respond to the instruction immediately, they were equally likely to move the frog sat 
on the red napkin and the frog sat on the blue napkin. This suggests that they were 
unable to integrate contextual information in the scene with the logical information 
provided in the instruction. Nevertheless, when children experienced an enforced 
delay between hearing the instruction and responding, introduced by asking children 
to turn away from the scene whilst listening to the instruction and thus requiring them 
to turn back to face the scene before responding, children correctly selected the frog 
sat on the red napkin in 92% of the trials. A lengthier processing period appeared to 
improve contextually appropriate interpretations of instructions, providing further 
evidence that children possess CU masked by processing limitations. 
More recently, Beck, Robinson and Freeth (2007) investigated children's 
ability to delay interpretations to ambiguous instructions and provided evidence 
which indicates that apparent early difficulties with ambiguity detection might be 
more reflective of difficulties in decision-making. Beck, Robinson and Freeth 
compared the performance of English-speaking 5- to 6-year-olds and 7- to 8-year-olds 
on a task requiring children to make a choice between responding to ambiguous 
instructions or delaying an interpretation until further information had been provided. 
A doll's toy was hidden in 1 of 3 envelopes placed on a table and children were told 
that they would be provided with 2 clues to help the doll identify the envelope 
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contained the toy after the first clue was placed on the table, they could move the doll 
to stand by that envelope. However, children were told that if they wanted to wait 
until they heard the second clue before identifying the envelope, they could move the 
doll to stand next to the first clue. To assess children's ability to explicitly ascertain 
their knowledge of the toy's whereabouts, separate trials were given in which 
following the presentation of a clue, children were asked "Do you really know where 
it is or don't you really know?" 
Beck, Robinson and Freeth (2007) found that when given ambiguous clues 
regarding the toy's whereabouts e.g. if presented with 3 spotty envelopes and told 
"the toy is in the spotty envelope", 7- to 8-year olds found it easier to delay their 
identification of an envelope, indicating implicit recognition of the redundancy of the 
clue, than to explicitly acknowledge their ignorance. 5- to 6-year-olds however, were 
equally poor at delaying their identification and acknowledging their ignorance in 
response to ambiguous clues. Nevertheless, 5- to 6-year-olds appeared to demonstrate 
greater proficiency in delaying their response to ambiguous information when not 
required to make an explicit decision to do so. In a separate experiment, Beck, 
Robinson and Freeth presented English-speaking 5- to 6-year-olds with a continuous 
stream of information and simply asked children to indicate the identification of a 
picture which was slowly being uncovered, from a possible set of 4 options as soon as 
they could determine it. Some pictures could be identified early on, but some pictures 
revealed ambiguous details early on and so could only be identified following further 
unmasking. Beck, Robinson and Freeth reported that children demonstrated 
competence in delaying identification of a picture for which only ambiguous details 
had so far been revealed: 87% responded correctly on 5 or 6 out of 6 trials despite 
demonstrating poor ability to acknowledge their ignorance ofthe picture's identity: 
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only 39% children responded correctly on 5 or 6 out of 6 trials. This prompted Beck, 
Robinson and Freeth to suggest that it is the reduced decision-making ability of young 
children rather than an insensitivity to ambiguity which leads them to demonstrate 
poor performance in CU tasks. This is inline with a masked competence account of 
CU demonstrated. 
Furthermore, Nilsen and Graham (2008) found that children's ability to inhibit 
pre-potent responses was negatively related to their failure to take their conversational 
partner's perspective into account, providing even more direct evidence that 
children's processing ability is associated with their ability to demonstrate CU. Nilsen 
and Graham presented English-speaking 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds with a referential 
communication task in which the children had access to common ground information 
which was also available to an experimenter, and privileged ground information 
which was not shared by the experimenter. The information concerned the location of 
objects in a display case placed inbetween the children and the experimenter. 
Common ground information concerned objects which were visible from both sides of 
the display case and so visually accessible to both the children and the experimenter. 
Privileged ground information concerned objects which were only visible to the child 
due to an opaque screen blocking the experimenter's visual access to certain objects. 
Children were also presented with information processing tasks assessing their ability 
to inhibit pre-potent responses, their ability to manipUlate information in memory and 
their ability to demonstrate cognitive flexibility (shift between alternative 
representations of the world). 
Nilsen and Graham (2008) compared children's use of adjectives in 
instructions provided for the experimenter in the common ground condition, with 
their use of adjectives in instructions provided in the privileged ground condition. 
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Comparison focused upon instructions to pick one of two similar objects differing on 
one dimension e.g. the small duck in a display case containing both a large and a 
small duck, when both objects were visible to the child and the experimenter in the 
common ground condition, but only the object being described was visible to the 
experimenter in the privileged ground condition. Nilsen and Graham also assessed 
children's ability to identify one of two similar objects differing on one dimension 
from instructions provided by the experimenter which lacked reference to the critical 
dimension, in the privileged ground condition when both objects were visible to the 
child but only one of the objects was visible to the experimenter. 
Children's choice of, and looks to, the referential alternative i.e. the object that 
was hidden from the experimenter in the privileged ground condition and thus not 
relevant to her instructions, were found to negatively correlate with their ability to 
inhibit pre-potent responses when the effects of age and verbal ability had been taken 
into account. More specifically, children who were better able to perform correctly in 
an inhibitory control task requiring children to name dogs drawn in blue ink as "Red" 
and dogs drawn in red ink as "Blue", and who thus demonstrated their ability to 
inhibit the pre-potent tendency to use colour words to refer to visual colours, were 
more likely to take the speakers visual context into account when interpreting 
communication. This provides further evidence that information processing ability is 
associated with children's capacity to demonstrate CU, inline with the masked 
competence account of CU. 
A considerable amount of evidence thus appears to support the proposal that 
the emergence of conversational understanding is not so much a consequence of 
conceptual change, as a reflection of maturing processing abilities. This account is in 
line with Relevance Theory and the work with adults discussed in Section 1.3. 
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1.6 Theory of mind and conversational understanding 
As well as concentrating on more sensitive measures of children's 
appreciation of the message meaning-intended meaning distinction, recent research 
has also focused on the role of "theory of mind" (ToM) reasoning in CU. It is widely 
agreed that CU requires appreciation of the speaker's intended meaning: 
communicative intentions. Intentions are a type of mental state, so a listener's 
recognition of communicative intentions necessitates conceptualisation of the mental 
world, commonly referred to as ToM reasoning. However, whilst early research on 
CU had neglected to investigate whether ToM ability was actually involved, more 
recent research produced evidence of a relationship between the two factors. 
Many individuals with autism appear to suffer from a ToM deficit and also 
demonstrate impaired CU. Their CU difficulties are evidenced in a failure to take 
account of context when interpreting ambiguous terms and sentences, and to make 
bridging inferences which enable relation of communication to the context in which it 
is presented (Joliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). Problems are also encountered with 
understanding metaphors and producing speech acts (Dennis, Lazenby, & Lockyer, 
2001). Metaphors involve identification of one subject with another e.g. "You are a 
real rock", enabling implication that pertinent characteristics of the second subject can 
be seen in the first. Contextual inferencing is necessary for this to enable decisions 
regarding which characteristics are referred to. Speech acts are produced when 
communication is used to achieve a goal. For example, "Mary, this is Lisa, Robert's 
wife" is a speech act of introduction. Contextual knowledge is required to appreciate 
this as it enables identification of situation-appropriate speech goals. The poor CU of 
individuals with autism is also manifest in the problems they display in grasping word 
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connotations (Frith, 1989) i.e. the emotions and attitudes associated with the use of 
one particular term over another to express a common basic meaning. For example, 
the use of the term "paraded" rather than the term "walked" when discussing how 
someone moved along the street, has connotations of flamboyance and attention-
attraction. Appreciation of such connotations requires contextual knowledge to 
enables identification of these alternative attributions to words with the same basic 
meanings. 
Noveck, Guelminger, Georgieff, and Labruyere (2007) reported that like 
French-speaking 4-year-old children, French-speaking adults with autism failed to 
demonstrate the non-isomorphic tendency of typically developed adults, when 
interpreting ambiguous sentences with negation and quantified noun phrases, such as 
"every horse didn't jump over the fence" (see Section 1.5.2). Neither adults with 
autism, nor the children tested, were found to demonstrate a preference for attributing 
scope to the negation "didn't" over the quantified expression "every". Parsing in such 
a way, would result in the "narrower" reading that not every horse jumped over the 
fence, giving rise to the implication that some in fact did. However typically 
developed adults were found to demonstrate exactly this narrow parsing preference, 
indicating that the context warranted the inference of a narrower reading. A third of 
the participants with autism taking part in this study, were found to fail a standard 
first-order false-belief assessment of ToM, despite possessing chronological and 
mental ages considerably greater than those at which typically developing children 
usually pass these tasks. That is to say that a third of the participants with autism 
tested, demonstrated difficulty recognising that someone could hold a false belief 
about the physical world. This suggests that the autistic adult's lack of ToM might 
have played a role in the restriction of their CU. 
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In further accord with the proposal that CU requires mental state appreciation, 
Sodian and Frith (1992) reported that English- and German-speaking children with 
autism between the ages of 6- and 19-years-old demonstrated poor performance on 
tasks tapping deceptive ability, despite displaying competent performance on tests of 
sabotage. Deception involves intentionally communicating incorrect information to 
someone, requiring consideration of the message in light of its context, and thus 
reflecting CU. However sabotage merely requires the physical impediment of 
another's plans. The ability to conduct sabotage in the absence of ToM, indicates that 
the problem experienced was specific to the obstruction of another's goals through the 
use of communication and not a more general goal impediment difficulty. Moreover, 
the deception task performance of the children with autism was predicted by their 
performance on a first-order false-belief task assessment of ToM. This provides 
strong support for the argument that mental state reasoning is required for CU. 
Surian, Baron-Cohen, and van der Lely (1996) also found a direct relation 
between level of ToM and level of CU. Surian, Baron-Cohen, and van der Lely found 
that English-speaking children with autism with a mean chronological age of 12 years 
11 months performed at a much lower level than verbal IQ matched children with 
Specific Language Impairment with a mean chronological age of 11 years 10 months 
and verbal IQ matched typically developing children with a mean chronological age 
of 6 years 7 months, on a CVT task assessing appreciation of Gricean conversational 
maxims. The CVT presents a scenario in which a doll: Lucy, poses questions e.g. 
"Where do you live?" and 2 dolls: Tom and Jane, each provide a response e.g. Tom 
says "I live on the moon" and Jane says "I live in a town". One response to each 
question violates a Gricean maxim. In this example, Tom's response "I live on the 
moon" violates the Maxim of Quality as the answer is obviously untrue. Task 
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participants are told that for each question, one of the dolls will give a silly answer, 
and each time are asked to indicate which doll has given the silly answer. More 
significantly, the CVT performance of the children with autism was related to their 
performance on a fIrst-order false-belief task assessment of ToM. This provides 
further support for the conception of CU in terms of the recognition of intended 
meaning. 
Additionally, Tedoldi, Surian and Siegal (2005) found a relationship between 
CVT proficiency and performance on a fIrst-order false-belief task assessment of 
ToM in a sample of deaf children, comprising both native and late-signers. Late 
signing deaf children have been found to demonstrate similar difficulties with false-
belief tasks to those produced by children with autism, whereas native signing deaf 
children appear to perform at a level comparable with typically developing hearing 
children (Woolfe, Want, & Siegal 2002). These results lend further weight to the 
proposal that CU requires intention recognition. 
Additional support for the conceptualisation of CU in terms of the 
appreciation of intended meanings, is lent by Happe (1993). Happe considered the 
performance of typically developing English-speaking 4- and 5-year-olds on second-
order ToM tasks which assess the ability to appreciate that people can form false 
beliefs about other people's beliefs about the physical world. Second-order ToM tasks 
require more comprehensive mental world understanding than fIrst order tasks which 
only assess the ability to appreciate that people can form false beliefs about the 
physical world. Happe found that the performance of typically developing 4- and 5-
year-olds on second-order ToM tasks predicted their scores on a task assessing 
appreciation of irony. Irony arises when the speaker intends for the listener to 
recognise their intention to create a situation in which information drawn from the 
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context of a message is inconsistent with the message itself, with a view to generating 
humour. Thus, appreciation of irony requires consideration of the message in light of 
its context, and so reflects CU. To illustrate irony, Happe presented children with a 
story in which a boy: David, is left to make a cake on his own. However, when David 
adds the eggs to the rest of the ingredients he doesn't break the shells, adding the eggs 
to the ingredients along with their shells. Children are told that when David's father 
comes by and sees what David has done, he says "What a clever boy you are, David!" 
Children's appreciation of irony was examined by asking them "What does David's 
father mean? Does he mean David is clever or silly?" 
Martin and McDonald (2004) reported similar findings for English-speaking 
youths with Aspergers Syndrome (generally regarded as suffering from a ToM 
deficit). Martin and McDonald also reported that second order ToM appreciation 
predicted recognition of irony. Further, Langdon, Davies and Coltheart (2002) 
reported a relationship between first order ToM and the ability to appreciate irony in 
English-speaking patients with schizophrenia. They found that first order ToM 
predicted appreciation of irony, even when other factors such as difficulties with 
inhibition, were taken into account. 
The role of ToM in CU is also indicated by the findings of Winner et al. 
(1998). They investigated the ability of English-speaking patients with right 
hemisphere damage (ToM impairments are common in this population), to distinguish 
lies from ironic jokes. As outlined above, ironic jokes arise when the speaker intends 
for the listener to recognise their intention to create a situation in which information 
drawn from the context of a message is inconsistent with the message itself. However, 
lies occur when the speaker doesn't intend for the listener to recognise their intention 
to create a situation in which information drawn from the context of a message is 
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inconsistent with the message. Appreciation of ironic jokes and lies, and the 
difference between them, thus requires consideration of messages in light of their 
context, and so reflects CU. Winner et al. found that their patients with right 
hemisphere damage indeed demonstrated impaired ToM ability, and that their 
performance on second order ToM tasks predicted their ability to distinguish ironic 
jokes from lies. The relationship between second order ToM and the ability to 
distinguish ironic jokes from lies was also demonstrated by the typically developed 
controls employed in this task. 
However, Hadwin et al. (1997) found that training English-speaking children 
with autism who were between the ages of 4- and 14-years-old, to pass tests assessing 
ToM, did not improve CU. CU was gauged in terms of story narration ability, which 
requires consideration of the previous story context in which current storylines are 
being presented, or the conversational use of mental state terms which requires 
consideration of the context in which the terms are being presented. However, it is 
likely that the training scheme used, bestowed only a shallow, narrow focus of mental 
state understanding, insufficient to supply the insight into communicative intentions 
required for CU. 
Sperber and Wilson (2002) propose that that the part of the brain responsible 
for processing the meaning of communication is actually a sub-module of the area in 
the brain concerned with ToM. They point out that the demands communication 
makes on ToM are different to those made by other types of human behaviour, noting 
that the range of possible intentions behind communication is vast compared to the 
scope for physical actions, the latter restricted by practical constraints on activities 
which do not apply to communication. This leads Sperber and Wilson to suggest that 
there is a submodule of the area of the brain concerned with ToM, dedicated to the 
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specific inference of communicative intentions, employing unique processing 
mechanisms to achieve this aim. 
Happe and Loth (2002) point out that the suggestion that ToM works differently 
in the communicative domain to elsewhere, sits well with findings indicating its early 
demonstration in communicative contexts (e.g. Baldwin, 1993, 0 Neill, 1996) despite 
its apparent absence in other domains (children standardly fail false-belief tasks 
before 4 years of age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001)). Indeed, Happe and Loth's 
discovery that English-speaking children failing a standard Sally-Anne unexpected 
location false-belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) were demonstrating 
false belief understanding in the context of establishing effective communication, 
lends further support to Sperber and Wilson's account. The idea that ToM might 
come online in the communicative domain prior to its appearance elsewhere, would 
also concur with a longitudinal study of conversational perspective-taking (CPT) and 
first-order false belief understanding. 
Bernard and Deleau (2007) presented French-speaking 3- and 4-year-olds with a 
CPT task assessing their ability to match promissive speech acts e.g. "I will .... ", 
directive speech acts e.g. "You will .... " and assertive speech acts e.g. "This is .... ", 
with social relationships. For example, children were required to indicate the assertive 
speech act "My drawing is nicer than yours" (English translation) would be spoken by 
a baby to an older child, by a girl to a boy or by a woman to a man. Children were 
also given a CPT task examining their ability to relate communication to the physical 
context from which it emerged. Scenes were presented which provided details of a 
previous event and the characters involved e.g. 3 boys playing football. A further 
scene was then presented in which 1 of the characters involved in the previous scenes 
produced a communication e.g. "Why don't you want to play with us anymore" 
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(English translation) in a situation in which either 1 more character from the previous 
scene was present and a further 2 new characters were shown, as for this example, or 
2 more characters from the previous scene were present and a further 1 new character 
shown, as for an example where 3 children had been reading, 1 of whom later said 
"It's a pity you didn't come and read with us" (English translation). Children were 
required to identify which of the characters present in the communication scene, the 
communication had been directed at. The CVT was used as a further CPT task. 
Bernard and Deleau (2007) found that CPT scores summed across the 3 tasks, 
predicted false belief appreciation, but that the reverse relation did not hold. It could 
well be, that activity in a relatively autonomous communication submodule of the 
region of the brain concerned with ToM, nevertheless promotes activation elsewhere 
in the surrounding region. 
1.7 Summary 
CU refers to the ability to appreciate how language is adapted in accordance with the 
context in which it is used. However, whilst adults appear proficient in this area, 
children below around 7 years of age fail to spontaneously demonstrate CU 
competency. Early research supported the idea that CU emerged as a result of a 
radical shift in the way that language was viewed - a conceptual change. However, 
more recent findings have supported the proposal that children in fact possess CU 
from early on, with some studies suggesting that children as young as 3-years-old 
possess CU, but that this proficiency is masked by restricted information processing 
resources. Recent research has also provided evidence to endorse the suggestion that 
ToM plays a role in CU. This supports the conceptualisation of CU as a process 
involving the appreciation of communicative intentions. 
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Chapter 2: Executive functions and conversational understanding 
2.1 Elucidating the concept of "executive functioning" 
The previous chapter examined evidence suggesting that even young children possess 
considerable CU. However, their proficiency appears to be masked by restricted 
information processing resources which require investigation. Information processing 
resources are commonly conceptualised in terms of cognitive mechanisms involved in 
the integration, manipulation and interpretation of input from the environment. 
However. such mechanisms are dependent upon executive functioning (EF) to 
provide processing direction. EF can be broadly defined as a group of skills which 
"control and regulate thought and action" (Friedman et al., 2006). It is therefore 
plausible that limitations in EF are responsible for the "masking" of early CU. 
EF is an "umbrella" term, used to refer to a multitude of abilities related by their 
common goal of enabling flexible, goal-directed behaviour (Hughes & Graham, 
2002). Zelazo and Muller (2002) highlight a number of different approaches to the 
precise conceptualisation ofEF. For example, it has been portrayed as a collection of 
multiple sensory-driven abilities impaired by damage to the prefrontal cortex (Tranel, 
Anderson, & Benton, 1994), but also as a unitary sensory-driven ability from which 
all apparent EF deficits can be thought to derive (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998). EF 
has additionally been conceptualised as a higher order (Le. involving conscious 
reasoning) processing ability (Baddeley, 1996; Norman & Shallice, 1986) which 
Miyake et al. (2000) point out had "at least in the early stages of development. .. a 
unitary flavor" (p. 51). However, EF has also been considered as a problem solving 
function in which differentiable EF abilities are conceptualised not as independent 
faculties separable from the context in which they are applied, but rather in terms of 
their contribution to the acquisition of problem solving goals (Zelazo, Carter, Reznik 
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& Frye, 1997). 
Miyake et al. (2000, p. 49) focus on the debate within the literature concerning 
the "unity and diversity" of EF. They note support for the proposal that there is a 
common element underlying EF, such as goal neglect (Duncan et aI., 1997), 
diminished associations among working memory representations of objectives, the 
items/agents involved and relevant knowledge (Kimberg & Farah, 1993) or even an 
area of the brain such as the pre-frontal cortex (Engle. Kane, & Tuholski, 1999). 
However to contrast this position, they highlight neuropsychological and correlational 
evidence pointing towards the contrary view that EF is fractionated rather than 
unitary, a stance also considered by Zelazo and Muller (2002). 
Studying the underlying neural basis of cognitive abilities can shed some light 
on the constitution of the core concepts involved·. Dissociations manifest in the neural 
correlates/representations of cognitive processes, are thought to reflect core concept 
dissociations. The majority of investigations into the neural correlates of EF have 
focused on the prefrontal cortex area, a direct consequence of the fact that the very 
construction of the concept of EF appears to have emerged from the study of the 
behavioural effects of damage to this region. However, Zelazo and Muller (2002) 
draw attention to evidence indicating that EF is not entirely independent of areas 
outside the prefrontal cortex. They note that EF also seems reliant on the normal 
functioning of additional regions such as those involved in the limbic system. Further, 
they observe that some people with damaged prefrontal cortex regions fail to 
demonstrate impaired EF, whilst conversely other people display executive deficits in 
the absence of injury to this area. Such findings indicate that studies focusing on the 
prefrontal cortex cannot provide a fully comprehensive account of EF. Additionally, it 
has to be recognised that the assumption that neural organisation is reflective of 
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cognitive structure, which provides the rationale for applications of dissociationist 
methodology to investigations of cognition, is not uncontested (Ellis & Young 1988). 
Therefore, caution is encouraged in drawing conclusions from neuropsychological 
findings centring on the prefrontal cortex. Nonetheless, such data could still prove 
useful in suggesting possible conceptual distinctions. 
In support of a non-unitary/multifactorial conception of EF, Zelazo and Muller 
(2002) suggest that neuropsychological studies focusing on the functions of two 
different regions within the prefrontal cortex - the orbitofrontal cortex and the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, would appear to necessitate appreciation of a 
conceptual distinction between "hot" versus "cool" EF. The authors contrast findings 
which seem to indicate that damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs the 
ability to demonstrate adequate EF in traditional, unnatural experimental scenarios 
they conceive of as "cool"/detached, with data which appears to suggest that damage 
to the orbitofrontal cortex impairs the ability to demonstrate adequate EF in more 
involved, naturalistic circumstances which they conceive of as "hot"/emotionally-
engaging. More specifically Zelazo and Muller (2002, pA55) propose that "whereas 
cool EF is more likely to be elicited by relatively abstract, decontextualised problems, 
hot EF is required for problems that are characterised by high affective involvement 
or demand flexible appraisals of the affective significance of stimuli". 
Additional support for a compound view of EF would appear to be provided by 
observations highlighted by Miyake et al. (2000), of patients with brain-damage. 
These studies appear to indicate an independence of performance on alternative EF 
tasks in that the same individual will perform poorly on one task thought to tap EF, 
whilst performing well on a different task also thought to tap EF (Godefroy, Cabaret, 
Petit-Chenal, Pruvo, & Rousseaux, 1999; Shallice, 1988). Such task independence 
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would appear to indicate the tapping of alternative differentiable EF skills. 
The conception of a multi-faceted EF structure would seem to be lent further 
credence by the small degree of correlation typically found between different EF 
tasks, when presented to participants in batteries (Miyake et aI. 2000). Low 
correlations would appear to indicate a lack of common function involved across the 
various EF tasks. Building on the correlational data, further support for a compound 
view of EF is provided by the application of factor analytical statistical procedures 
(Miyake et aI., 2000; Zelazo & Muller, 2002). Such techniques exploit inter-task 
correlations. Zelazo and Muller note that developmental studies employing such 
procedures (e.g. Levin et aI., 1991; Welsh, Pennington, & Grossier, 1991; Hughes, 
1998a; Espy et aI., 1999; Carlson & Moses, 2001; Pennington, 1997) typically 
identify three to four distinguishable abilities with various labels such as Motor 
Inhibition, Set Shifting, Verbal Working Memory (Pennington, 1997) or Attentional 
Flexibility, Inhibitory Control, Working Memory (Hughes, 1998a). 
However, like the neuropsychological method, the application of the factor 
analytic approach to the study ofEF is subject to criticism. The validity of the inter-
task correlational relationships, on which factor analysis depends, has been called into 
question. Concerns have been raised about the confounding role of performance 
factors such as language and visuo-spatial abilities (Miyake et aI., 2000; Zelazo & 
Muller, 2002). For example, it could be that low correlations between performance on 
EF tasks are more reflective of differences between the language demands of the tasks 
rather than differences in the nature of EF required by these tasks. Further, Miyake et 
aI. point out that many EF tasks demonstrate low reliability, a factor they suggest 
might arise as a result of participants employing alternative tactics to solve tasks on 
different occasions, or as a reflection of the finding that EF is invoked more strongly 
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in unfamiliar contexts. Miyake et al point out that the significance of this lies in the 
fact that variables which demonstrate poor reliabilities necessarily yield low 
correlations, since any relationship with another variable will be inconsistent and so 
cannot be strong. Additionally, questions have been raised regarding the 
conceptualisation of the constructs emerging through the process of factor analysis 
(Miyake et aI., 2000; Zelazo & Muller, 2002). For example, since consensus is 
lacking regarding the abilities tapped by the individual EF tasks employed in the 
batteries in the first place, from whose data the factors are abstracted, it would seem 
that there can be little sense in which the factors abstracted can be noncontentiously 
identified. 
To overcome some of these problems, Miyake et al. (2000) focused on latent 
variables in their factor analysis of EF abilities. The individual tasks employed in the 
EF battery used for their study were carefully selected with 3 literature-informed, 
theoretically distinct EF abilities in mind: the ability to inhibit dominant or pre-potent 
responses, the ability to shift between mental representations and the ability to update 
mental representations. The commonality among the collection of tasks selected to 
reflect/measure each ability was then extracted as a latent variable, and the relation of 
each latent variable to the other latent variables examined to investigate 
variable/factor differentiation. By opting for a number of battery tasks which reflect 
the same specific pre-selected ability, and extracting the commonality amongst them, 
Miyake et al. reduced, although by no means removed, the extent of performance 
factor confounding. Further, participants were also presented with additional complex 
EF tasks in which the specific EF abilities being tapped was less transparent. 
Examination of the relationships between the latent variables and performance on 
these complex EF tasks, enabled Miyake et al. to provide some clarification regarding 
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the abilities tapped by these more controversial EF tasks. 
Miyake et al. reported that inhibition, shifting and updating EF abilities 
correlated reasonably with each other, supporting the idea of an underlying 
unification ofEF. However, in support of the multifactorial view ofEF, confirmatory 
factor analyses indicated that these abilities were plainly distinguishable. A CF A 
model which did not constrain the correlations between the 3 EF latent variables was 
found to provide a better fit for the data than models which assumed perfect 
correlations among 2 or 3 of these variables. Furthermore, the differential contribution 
of these variables to the more controversial, complex EF tasks presented, lends 
additional support to a compound EF construct. Friedman et al. (2006) replicated 
Miyake et aI.' s findings, although they neglected to investigate the contribution of the 
3 latent EF variables to more contentious EF tasks. Thus, strong support has been 
provided for a model of EF reflecting both a common and a differentiated structure. 
However, much of the research mentioned so far has focused on the adult rather than 
the child population. 
2.2 Development of executive functioning in young children 
Hughes and Graham (2002) suggest that the traditional adult-focus of EF 
research can be attributed to: initial beliefs concerning the late maturation of the EF-
associated prefrontal cortex, original indications that the deficits resulting from 
childhood prefrontal lesions did not become evident until adulthood, and the 
complexity of standard adult tasks reSUlting in floor performance during childhood. 
However, they note that reports that EF deficits are associated with developmental 
disorders such as Autism and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) have 
encouraged investigation into EF in atypically developing child populations, which 
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have in tum spurred EF research in typically developing children. Hughes and 
Graham also point out that investigation of EF in young children reduces the effects 
of some of the confounds thought to affect research in the adult population. They 
argue that the problem of performance factors which reflects the fact that many adult 
EF tasks present considerable non-EF demands is diminished by the task 
simplification, necessary for presentation to a younger, less competent child audience. 
Furthermore, Hughes and Graham suggest that the issue of low task reliability, which 
it is thought might reflect the fact that EF is invoked more strongly in unfamiliar 
contexts, is less likely to be a problem for children. This is because children tend to 
take longer to become accustomed to task frameworks and so will usually require 
more presentations of a task than adults before they cease to classify the task as 
novel/unfamiliar. The development of EF during childhood is thus currently a thriving 
research topic (Zelazo, Carlson & Kesek, in press). However, Hughes and Graham 
acknowledge that research with young children presents its own set of problems, such 
as those stemming from language limitations. 
EF research with young children has often employed simplified versions of 
adult EF tasks such as the Stroop task and the Wisconsin Card Sort task. The Stroop 
task (Stroop, 1935) requires suppression of an automatic response, so that response 
instructions can be obeyed. This enables assessment of the inhibition EF component, 
which is indicated by response error and response time. When the Stroop task is used 
with adults, the automatic response that is commonly evoked involves the reading of 
word stimuli, whilst response instructions require labelling of the ink colours in which 
the stimuli are printed (e.g. McKenna & Sharma, 1995). Correct responses are thus 
thought to require inhibition of automatically accessed lexical information. However. 
by evoking an alternative automatic response, this task has been adapted for use with 
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young children, many of whom cannot read. Wright et aI. (2003) have modified the 
task by presenting animal stimuli in which the body and head either belong together 
(e.g. a cow's body with a cow's head) or are mismatched (e.g. a cow's body with a 
duck's head). The use of facial information in identification is thought to be the 
automatic response evoked (Quinn & Eimas, 1996), whilst the response instructions 
require identification on the basis of the body presented. Correct responses are thus 
thought to require inhibition of automatically processed facial information. 
The Wisconsin Card Sort task (Grant & Berg, 1948) requires moving between 
different mental representations of the same stimuli. This task has been used to assess 
what has come to be termed as the shifting component of EF. The standard adult task 
presents participants with a selection of target cards depicting stimuli differing in 
dimensions e.g. colour, shape and quantity (as in 1 green star, 2 yellow circles, 3 red 
squares). Participants are required to sort a set of cards depicting the same dimensions 
but in conflicting arrangements (e.g. 1 yellow square, 2 red stars, 3 green circles), in 
accordance with the target cards. They are not explicitly told the sorting rule (e.g. 
shape, colour or number), and so must infer it from feedback on previous sortings. 
After a set number of correct sorts (e.g. 10), the sorting rule is changed and the 
participant must attempt to infer the new sorting rule. Rule change is not announced, 
but must be inferred from negative feedback in response to sorting in line with the 
previous rule. Sorting rules are changed a number of times (e.g. colour to shape to 
number to colour to number to shape), to enable assessment of the ease with which 
participants can shift their focus from one sorting dimension to another. Shifting 
ability is indicated by the number of perseverations following change of the sorting 
rules. One commonly used adaptation of this task for children is the Dimensional 
Change Card Sort task (DCCS) of Zelazo et aI., (1996). Children given the DCCS are 
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explicitly told a sorting rule and are alerted to a rule change. They are still required to 
shift between their mental representations of the stimuli (in terms of shape, colour or 
number), so the adapted task remains a measure of shifting ability. However, explicit 
instruction of the sorting rules reduces the inferential demands of the task, to 
accommodate childhood limitations in inferential processing (Casteel & Simpson, 
1991). 
However, other tasks used to assess EF in childhood are often created 
expressly for this younger population. The A not B error task (Piaget, 1954), which is 
noW commonly regarded as one of the earliest measures of EF (Lehto et at, 2003), 
was created specifically to address a problem with object permanence demonstrated 
by infants between 7 and 12 months of age. In the standard version of this task, 
infants watch whilst an object is hidden under an opaque cover at Location A. 
Following a short delay, they are encouraged to retrieve the object. The hiding 
process is repeated, a number of times, with infants retrieving the object each time 
from its hiding place at Location A. Following several successful retrievals from 
Location A, the object is then hidden under an opaque cover at Location B. 
Piaget originally designed the task to demonstrate that young infants fail to 
create adequate mental representations of objects. He suggested that infants failing to 
locate the object in Location B were doing so because their reaching to Location A 
formed part of their mentiil representation of the object. However, looking preference 
data indicates that young infants can locate the object in Location B when the 
reaching motor response requirement is removed (Baillargeon et aI., 1989). Such 
findings suggest that the standard reaching task does not accurately assess children's 
ability to form adequate object representations. Nevertheless, the task would appear to 
tap the updating and inhibition EF components as it requires infants to update their 
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mental representation of the object's changing location, and inhibit their pre-potent 
Location A expectations. 
The Freeze Frame task (Holmboe et al., 2008) was created with the specific 
intention of measuring inhibitory ability in 9-month-olds. In this task, infants have to 
learn to selectively inhibit attention to distractors in their peripheral vision, to retain a 
stimulus in the centre of their vision. Inhibition must be selective, and so must not 
applied when boring stimuli are presented in the centre of the infant's visual field, to 
ensure that it is self-controlled rather than a passive habituation effect. Furthermore, 
inhibition must be learned across the course of trials, rather than demonstrated in the 
early trials, to indicate that it is self-controlled rather than the result of an automatic 
competition between the central stimulus and distractors. Performance on the Freeze 
Frame task at 9 months is correlated with that on another inhibitory measure at 24 
months: the Spatial Conflict task. This result suggests that the Freeze Frame task is 
tapping the inhibition EF component. 
EF performance appears to improve with age during childhood (Gerstadt, 
Hong, & Diamond, 1994; Zelazo, Frye, & Rapus, 1996; Luciana & Nelson, 1998; 
Rueda et al., 2005), as one might expect given the development of the EF associated 
prefrontal cortex occurring during this stage of life (Huttenlocher, 1979; Huttenlocher 
& Dabholkar, 1997). However the nature of this development is open to dispute. 
Whilst evidence in the adult population appears to support a fractionated view of EF, 
it could be that EF in early childhood is a unified construct, only becoming 
dissociable into components at a later stage. Furthermore, if EF does appear to consist 
of independent components in childhood, the separable abilities might mature at the 
same rate or follow independent trajectories. 
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There is considerable evidence to support the conceptualisation of EF as a 
fractionated construct during childhood. Factor analytic studies have used patterns of 
shared variance within data drawn from task batteries to identify separable conceptual 
components. Espy, Kaufman, McDiarmid and Glisky (1999) employed an exploratory 
factor analysis to construct an EF model, with children aged between 2- and 5 and 
II2-years-old. Their findings led them to conclude that EF could best be 
conceptualised as a differentiable 4 factor construct at this stage in development. 
Following Miyake et. al (2000), Lehto, Juujarvi, Kooistra and Pulkkinen (2003) 
investigated childhood EF using a confirmatory latent variable factor analytic 
approach. An exploratory factor analysis was used initially to establish a 3 factor 
model ofEF. The shared task variance reflecting each factor formed latent variables 
which were then investigated using a confirmatory factor analysis. The analysis 
compared the fit of the 3 latent variables/factors to the data, with alternative EF 
models. Lehto et al. concluded that EF in children aged between 8- and I3-years-old 
could best be viewed as a separable but interrelated 3 factor construct resembling the 
updating, inhibition and shifting model proposed by Miyake et al. (2000). 
Furthermore, the suggestion that separable EF components may follow diverse 
developmental trajectories provides support for the view that EF manifests a 
differentiated structure during childhood. Hongwanishi, Happaney, Lee and Zelazo 
(2005) found evidence of the distinction between "hot" affective and "cool" 
decontextualised EF, found in adults, in 3- to 5-year-olds. Hongwanishi, et al. 
presented children with tasks selected to tap either "cool" or "hot" EF. Cool EF tasks 
comprised the DCCS sorting task and a Self-Ordered Pointing task requiring children 
to avoid pointing to stimuli they had previously pointed to. Hot EF tasks comprised a 
delay of gratification task assessing children's ability to delay receiving an immediate 
Chapter 2: Executive functioning and conversational understanding 64 
reward to achieve a greater reward at a later time-point and a gambling task 
measuring their ability to recognise that long-term prosperity was more likely to 
follow from smaller short-term gains and losses than greater immediate gains and 
losses. Simple correlational analyses revealed that performance on "cool" EF tasks 
was strongly positively related to verbal and perfonnance mental age. The 
relationship with verbal mental age remained even when chronological age was 
partialled out. Furthermore, performance on "cool" tasks appeared to be related to 
temperament. However, performance on the "hot" EF tasks did not appear to be 
related to mental age or temperament. The difference in the relationships that the two 
EF components demonstrated with mental age and temperament, supports the 
conceptual differentiation of "hot" and "cool" EF. Moreover, the finding that only 
"cool" abilities were related to mental age, suggests that "hot" abilities might emerge 
earlier than "cool" abilities. 
Espy and Bull (2005) also used simple correlational analyses to investigate a 
different potential EF division in 3- to 6-year-olds: the relationship between the 
ability to inhibit prepotent responses and the ability to shift between active and 
inactive mental rules/response sets. Espy and Bull reported that performance on tasks 
reflecting the ability to inhibit was unrelated to working memory span, whereas 
performance on tasks tapping the ability to shift was better in children with greater 
memory spans. Since memory span is known to improve with age (e.g. Dempster, 
1981) Espy and Bull' s findings suggest that the ability to inhibit prepotent responses 
might developmentally precede the ability to shift mentally (Blair, Zelazo & 
Greenberg, 2005). 
Huizinga, Dolan and van der Molen (2006) subjected childhood EF to a 
confirmatory latent variable factor analysis. The results of Huizinga et a1. 's 
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investigation indicate that not only can childhood EF be differentiated into 2 
separable constructs corresponding to updating and shifting but that these component 
parts mature at different rates. Huizinga et al. examined EF in a sample aged from 7-
to 21-years-old. They found that whilst the ability to shift peaked during the teenage 
years, updating ability continued to improve past this age, with the updating ability of 
the 21-year-olds eclipsing that of the 15-year-olds. 
However, a more recent latent variable factor analysis has indicated that 
contrary to the findings reported above, childhood EF can best be modelled by a 
single factor construct. Wiebe, Espy, and Charak (2008) examined EF in children 
aged between 2 and 6 years. They found that multifactor models did not account for 
significantly more variance in EF score, than a univariate model. Preference for 
parsimony led them to conclude that a univariate model provides the best account of 
childhood EF. Latent variable factor analyses provide more stringent assessments of 
conceptual structure than standard correlational or factor analyses, providing a 
possible explanation for the discrepant findings of Espy et al. (1999), llongwanishi, et 
al. (2005) and Espy and Bull (2005). However, this explanation cannot extend to the 
work of both Lehto et a1. (2003) and Huizinga et a1. (2006) who employed latent 
. variable factor analyses. A possible explanation for the discrepancy between the 
models of Wiebe et a1. and Huizinga et al. is that the children in the Huizinga et al. 
study were considerably older: between 7 and 21 years, than were the children in 
Wiebe et aI., who were between 2 and 6 years of age. It could thus be that EF initially 
emerges as a unified construct that only later fractionates following the selective 
taxation of particular functions. Wiebe et al. suggest that Lehto et a1.'s use of the 
same data set to both derive and confirm the conceptual structure of EF severely 
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weakens the validation of their 3 factor model, providing a plausible account for the 
discrepancy between the models of Wiebe et al. and Lehto et. al. 
Thus, although it has been established that children's performance on EF tasks 
improves with age, the nature of the construct emerging is very much a current matter 
of debate, with both fractionated and unified stances receiving strong support. Indeed, 
support for a fractionated account provokes an additional concern regarding the 
independent development of the component parts. In their review of research into 
childhood EF, Garon, Bryson, and Smith (2008) investigated the development ofEF 
components based upon the 3-factor framework presented by Miyake et al. (2000). 
Garon et al. concluded that there were two main stages of EF development. The first 
stage was seen to comprise an initial period before 3-years-of-age, during which the 
skills reflected in the component parts (inhibition, working memory and shifting) 
emerged. The second stage, after 3-years-of-age, was thought reflect a period of 
integration, during which the different component parts begin to establish connections 
between themselves, allowing children to coordinate the differentiated abilities. 
Furthermore, the driving force behind development, also requires 
consideration. Rueda et al. (2005) looked at the effects of age, genetics and training 
on EF in children aged between 4 and 6 years. Cheek swabs were used to collect 
DNA samples which were examined with regard to the length of the alleles present in 
the DATI gene. Training was conducted over the course of 5 days and comprised 
computer tasks honing children's ability to anticipate, discriminate stimuli and resolve 
conflict. Results confirmed that EF improves naturally with age, and can be improved 
by using specialised training techniques, a procedure employed in Experiment 4 of 
this thesis. However the results also revealed that genetic factors played a prominent 
role in determining the progression ofEF. Children whose DATI genes were made up 
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of 2 long alleles were better able to resolve conflict that those whose DATI genes 
comprised 1 long and 1 short allele or 2 short alleles. 
2.3 Executive functioning and theory of mind 
It has been proposed that the development of EF might account for the 
emerging expression of CU in childhood. However, there is also evidence that EF 
development is linked to the expression of ToM ability, which may be seen as integral 
to CU. Many studies appear to support the suggestion that ToM is typically related to 
EF (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Davis & Pratt, 1995; Frye et aI., 1995; Bala, Bug, & 
Henderson, 2003; Hughes, 1998b). Although, evidence that impairments in one 
ability do not inevitably lead to impairments in the other has cast doubt on the 
necessity of the association (Bach, Happe, Fleminger, & Powell, 2000; Rowe, 
Bullock, Polkey,' & Morris, 2001; Pickup, 2008). Hughes and Graham (2002) have 
proposed that research supporting the EF-ToM relationship, can be divided into three 
main categories. One such category comprises studies indicating that populations who 
suffer a deficit in either EF or ToM tend to be impaired in the other. For example, 
Ozonoff et aI. (1991) and Zelazo et aI. (2002) reported this type of association in 
cases of children with autism. Another category consists of studies which show that 
typically developing children demonstrate improvements in both EF and ToM within 
the same time period: between 3 and 5 years of age (e.g. Diamond & Taylor, 1996; 
Frye et aI., 1995; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). A final category put forward, 
consists of studies in which individual differences on measures of EF and ToM appear 
to be correlated (e.g. Carlson & Moses, 2001; Davis & Pratt, 1995, Hughes, 1998a). 
However, as Hughes and Graham (2002) point out, there is considerable 
contention regarding the causal player in the EF-ToM relationship. One major 
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argument is that EF promotes ToM. This view is supported by evidence that reducing 
the salience of reality, and so the inhibition required to overcome it, improves ToM in 
three-year-olds (Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991). Such a stance is also lent support by 
studies demonstrating that increasing the inhibitory demands of false belief tasks, 
dramatically reduces the percentage of 4-year-olds passing them (Leslie & Polizzi, 
1998), and that the inhibitory ability of 3- and 4-year-olds predicts their ToM a year 
later, but the reverse relation does not hold (Hughes, 1998b). However, Hughes and 
Graham point out that implicit ToM, as evidenced by anticipatory eye movements 
concordant with expectations of false belief (Clements & Perner, 1994), and 
demonstrated by children as young as IS-months-old (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), 
proves problematic for an account which holds that inhibition is first applied to 
deliberate action and verbal description (Perner & Lang, 1999). Nevertheless, they 
concede that inhibition may well initially develop at a more basic motor level, or may 
even have a more indirect impact on ToM by allowing access to situations which 
support ToM development such as pretend play. 
Another view discussed by Hughes and Graham (2002), holds that ToM 
promotes EF. According to this account, the appreciation of one's own mental states 
afforded by ToM, promotes greater self-awareness and so enables better self-control. 
Such a position is used to account for the EF deficits observed in populations 
associated with impaired ToM such as the stereotypical behaviours displayed by 
people with autism (Carruthers, 1996), and the lack of self-control demonstrated by 
people with schizophrenia (Frith, 1992). However, such a proposal is weakened by 
the reported failure of early ToM to predict later EF. Hughes, (1998b) presented EF 
and ToM tasks to 3- and 4-year-olds at Time 1 and then represented the tasks to the 
same children a year later at Time 2, along with additional measures of EF and ToM. 
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EF at Time 1 was found to predict ToM at Time 2, suggesting that EF affects ToM 
development. However, ToM at Time 1 did not predict EF at time 2, indicating that 
ToM does not playa role in EF development. 
Hughes and Graham (2002) note that a further account proposes that a third, 
external factor, explains the link between EF and ToM. According to this view, EF 
and ToM are similarly bound by restricted access to embedded rules of reasoning, in 
line with cognitive complexity and control theory (Zelazo, 1999), as both abilities 
require appreciation of "if-then" reasoning. For example, IF Sally is looking for her 
displaced marble in a false belief task, the displacement of which she failed to 
witness, THEN she will look in the location where she originally left it. Similarly, IF 
a lexical stimulus is seen in a stroop task, THEN the colour of the ink it is printed in 
should be identified, but the word spelt out by the stimulus should not be read. 
Three recent studies sought to test the role ofEF in ToM reasoning. Sabbagh, 
Shiverick and Moses (2006) compared the relation of EF to performance on tasks 
assessing appreciation of false beliefs, false photographs and false signs. Measures of 
false belief appreciation reflect an understanding of mental representation and so ToM 
proficiency. Tasks assessing appreciation of false photographs are framed in a similar 
presentational format to false belief tasks, but require only an understanding of 
photographic and so non-mental representation. Thus, false photograph tasks do not 
reflect ToM proficiency. Tasks assessing appreciation of false signs are also framed 
in a similar presentational format to false belief tasks. Furthermore, like the false 
photograph task, false sign tasks require only appreciation of non-mental 
representation and thus do not reflect ToM proficiency. However, like false belief 
tasks but unlike false photograph tasks, measures assessing appreciation of false 
signs are concerned with representations which purport to reflect the current state of 
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reality. EF was found to predict performance on tasks assessing appreciation of false 
beliefs and false signs but not on tasks assessing appreciation of false photographs. 
This was taken to indicate that the relationship between EF and ToM was not 
exclusive but reflected a more general role which EF plays in reasoning about 
representations which purport to reflect the current state of reality. 
Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses and Lee (2006) used samples of American and 
Chinese children to investigate the predictive accuracy of EF in relation to ToM. 
Batteries of both EF and false-belief tasks were presented to the children. Sabbagh et 
al. found that EF predicted false-belief appreciation within the American and Chinese 
samples, but failed to predict performance across groups. Most interestingly, Chinese 
children were found to display superior executive abilities compared to American 
children. However, although Chinese 3- and 112-year-olds demonstrated the same 
level of EF as that shown by American 4-year-olds who performed competently on 
the false-belief battery, these younger Chinese children failed to demonstrate a similar 
false-belief proficiency. Such results appear to indicate that whilst important and 
seemingly necessary for mature false belief reasoning, accounting for the within 
group association, EF is not sufficient. The across group disparity would seem to 
indicate that additional input is required to supplement ToM development. Sabbagh 
et. al. point out that the early experience of conflicting mental states thought to be 
promoted by sibling interactions, could form such additional input, given the 
contrasting prevalence of sibling experiences across America and China. 
Such an account might also help to explain the findings of Oh and Lewis 
(2008), who investigated the relationship between EF and ToM in Korean 3- and 4~ 
year-olds. Oh and Lewis found that Korean children performed at ceiling on EF tasks 
assessing inhibitory and switching ability, demonstrating greater competence than 
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displayed by Western children of the same age. However, despite this, the working 
memory of the Korean children i.e. their ability to update and store mental 
representations, and their ToM performance were found to be on par with that of 
Western children of the same age. In other words the ToM performance of the Korean 
children was lower than expected given their inhibitory and shifting superiority. 
Closer examination of the relationship between the different components of EF and 
ToM, conflrmed the failure to reveal strong EF-ToM links in the Korean sample. No 
EF-ToM relationship remained signiflcant once language and age were accounted for. 
However, a significant correlation between ToM and shifting ability: indexed by 
performance on the DCCS task, remained after language and age had been taken into 
account, in the English comparison sample. It might well be that with adequate 
supplementary input such as suffIcient experience of mental state conflicts, EF 
promotes ToM, as suggested by the EF-ToM relationship found in Sabbagh et al. 's 
Chinese and English samples and Dh and Lewis's English sample. However, it could 
be that without this input, the role ofEF becomes redundant as in Dh and Lewis's 
Korean sample. In such instances, the emergence of ToM might be more dependent 
on alternative resources such as mental state language. 
2.4 Conversational understanding and executive functioning: A working model 
Relationships between CU and ToM, CU and EF and EF and ToM have been 
discussed, but it remains to present a unifying framework. It could be that a true 
appreciation of the masking effects of processing resources on CU during childhood, 
requires consideration of an interplay between the ToM skill of intention appreciation 
and EF. In young children, processing restrictions might affect the ability to reason 
about the mind, impairing children's ability to follow speakers' intentions. However, 
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with increasing age, these restrictions could be overcome by the development of EF 
abilities. Indeed, Scholl and Leslie (1999) conceive of ToM as the product of a 
specialised module built into the brain which confers processing biases that 
predispose children to express a ToM understanding. However, they do not propose 
that children immediately display ToM proficiency. Rather, they argue that the 
mechanism used to identify the appropriate module-generated behaviour 
interpretation: the Selection Processor, establishes a default preference for true-belief 
interpretations. This is quite possibly because of the lower processing load associated 
with true belief interpretations: true beliefs directly correspond to reality and so can 
be represented in terms of reality, however false beliefs do not correspond to reality 
and so must be represented separately (Apperley, Back, Samson, & France, 2008). 
The development ofEF might enable children to overcome the true-belief preference 
and so demonstrate false-belief appreciation. 
Siegal and Surian (2004, 2007) suggest that something similar might be 
happening in the case of interpretation of speaker intentions. It might be that the 
evolutionary pressure for rapid language development has created a processing bias to 
select logical, linguistically determined speaker intentions in situations where words 
are made salient, such as when presented with directed communication (Friend & 
Bryant, 2000) or a rhyming context is used (Lee, Torrance & Olson, 2001). However, 
there might be an alternative bias to focus on contextual information in other 
instances where the context becomes salient, such as in story presentations (Olson & 
Hildyard, 1981; Lee, Torrance & Olson, 2001) or when the intended meaning is 
revealed directly (Robinson, Goelman & Olson 1983; Beal & Flavell, 1984). CU tasks 
in which children perform at chance levels, neither demonstrating CU nor an 
interpretation bias (e.g. Dews et al. 1996) might be explained in terms of an equal 
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salience of words and context, provoking switches in bias between the two 
components of communication. Both biases are thought to be overcome as processing 
resources increase with age. More specifically, Siegal and Surian suggest like Leslie, 
that it is the development of an EF system that enables the child to overcome such 
processing biases. Such a resource is thought to enable the child to inhibit default 
interpretations, to allow access to contextually enriched but logically supported 
interpretations. 
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Chapter 3: Experiment 1 - Investigating the relationships between executive 
functioning, a narrow scalar implicature measure of conversational 
understanding and theory of mind. 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature review in Chapters 1 and 2 considered the CU of young children 
and focused on two conflicting models of emergence proposing to explain the 
expression of such knowledge. According to one account, the expression of CU 
results from a conceptual change reflecting the development of a metareprescntational 
ability: the capacity to represent messages as representations of a speaker's 
communicative intentions (Seal & Flavell, 1984; Robinson & Whittaker, 1986). This 
metarepresentational ability is thought to enable differentiation of the logical meaning 
(LM) of the message from the intended meaning (1M). Such differentiation is 
considered to give rise to the appreciation that the LM does not provide direct access 
to the 1M and so prompt consideration of the LM in light of the context in which it is 
presented. This is a competence account, because it attributes the expression of CU to 
the development of a conceptual competence: metarepresentational ability. 
However, studies indicate that reducing processing demands improves 
children's performance on tasks assessing CU (e.g. Papafragou, & Musolino, 2003; 
Beck, Robinson, & Freeth, 2008). This pattern of results supports a masked 
competence account that children possess the necessary conceptual competence for 
CU, i.e. the LM-IM distinction, from an earlier age than they typically demonstrate 
this ability. This account attributes the expression of CU to the application of EF 
abilities. EF is thought to enable the overpowering of processing restriction induced 
interpretation biases focusing on either LM or 1M. This is a performance account, 
because it suggests that children have already acquired the conceptual competence 
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necessary for CU, but that the expression of CU is attributable to a performance-
enhancing factor: EF, permitting access to this knowledge. This account proposes that 
removing interpretation biases allows consideration of the logical information in 
communication, in light of the context in which it is presented. 
To assess evidence for these alternative accounts, Experiment 1 investigated 
the relationship between developing EF abilities as conceptualised according to the 
structure proposed by Miyake et al. (2000), and a measure of CU. Furthermore, since 
both competence and performance accounts conceptualise CU in terms of the 
recognition of communicative intentions, invoking a role for ToM, a ToM measure 
was also included. 
Nilsen and Graham (2009) found that children's ability to inhibit prepotent 
responses was related to their CU, but did not find a relationship between CU and 
their cognitive flexibility. Furthermore, the aspect of CU investigated by Nilsen and 
Graham was communicative perspective taking. Experiment 1 examined the EF-CU 
relationship further by considering the relationship between EF and another aspect of 
CU: the appreciation of SIs, and by using alternative EF tasks to examine the 
relationship between CU and cognitive flexibility and the ability to inhibit prepotent 
responses. 
Experiment 1 was concerned with establishing the nature of the relationship 
between a developing awareness of SIs, appreciation of false beliefs, and proficiency 
in inhibiting attention and shifting between alternative mental representations. These 
variables represent a measure ofCU, the predominant gauge of ToM ability, and two 
of Miyake et aI's three EF components, respectively. In line with the general 
consensus regarding the development of competencies during childhood, it was 
expected that all abilities would improve with age. In accordance with a masked 
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competence/performance account of CU, it was also hypothesised that appreciation of 
false beliefs, and both inhibitory and shifting abilities, would be related to awareness 
of SIs. Indeed, a relationship was expected between appreciation of false beliefs and 
both EF abilities themselves (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002). 
Furthermore, it was expected that the relationship between awareness of SIs and both 
inhibitory and shifting EF abilities, would be mediated by appreciation of false 
beliefs, as argued in the masked competence account. According to this account, the 
application ofEF contributes to children's ToM performance as required for the 
recognition of others' mental states. It is thus through its effect on ToM that EF 
promotes CU. The use of two separate EF measures assessing the skill to inhibit and 
shift between mental representations, was undertaken to allow more refined 
conclusions to be drawn regarding the role ofEF abilities in the development of both 
CU, and more general ToM appreciation. 
Both the ability to inhibit, and the ability to shift between mental 
representations, could be implicated in more general ToM reasoning, with default true 
belief representations of situations being inhibited where necessary and shi fting 
between true and false belief representations occurring when required. Similarly, CU 
could also draw on both skills, to enable the inhibition of default literal or context-led 
readings of the communication when needed and shifts between alternative 
interpretations as required (Siegal & Surian, 2004). Therefore, performance on both 
EF measures was expected to be related to false-belief appreciation and to awareness 
of SIs. 
By adding new control conditions to the SI trials used in Papafragou and 
Musolino's (2003) Experiment 2, this study was also able to examine the validity of 
the SI trials employed in the earlier study. In the SI trials of the second experiment in 
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Papafragou and Musolino's study, children were introduced to a puppet, and watched 
with the puppet as a character completed a task such as a bear putting all of the 
available hoops on a pole and a girl putting all four pieces of a jigsaw puzzle together. 
The puppet then described the character as having completed "some" of the task, e.g., 
"the bear put some of the hoops on the pole", or "the girl put some of the pieces in the 
puzzle" and children had to evaluate the puppet's descriptions. The reasoning behind 
this task was that if children were computing the SI "some = not all", they should 
have negatively evaluated the puppets' descriptions in these SI trials, because each 
time the character completed all of the task, but each time the puppet only described 
them as having completed some of the task. However, if children were failing to 
compute this pragmatic implicature, and were interpreting the meaning of "some" as 
compatible with the meaning of "all", they would have been expected to have 
positively evaluated the puppets' descriptions. 
Apparent CU competency in the SI trials used in this task could result from a 
negative response bias. Thus there might have been chil~ren who were failing to 
compute SIs, but who appeared to demonstrate conversational competency, merely 
due to a tendency to respond negatively in such contexts. Fritzley and Lee (2003) 
suggest that when presented with comprehensible statements, 4- and 5-year-olds fail 
to demonstrate a response bias. However they do contend that, when faced with 
incomprehensible queries, 4- and 5-year-olds in fact demonstrate a negative response 
bias. Although one would normally expect children of this age to understand the 
puppet descriptions given in Papafragou and Musolino's (2003) task (and indeed the 
findings in Papafragou and Musolino (2003), Experiment 1 support such a 
suggestion), the specific sample of children who participated in their Experiment 2 
may have experienced difficulty in comprehending the SI descriptions. It might be 
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that the sample in Papafragou and Musolino's Experiment 2 experienced an enhanced 
difficulty comprehending the SI descriptions compared to the sample in Papafragou 
and Musolino's Experiment 1. If so, a negative response bias rather than the 
difference in the presentation context, may have resulted in negative evaluations of 
the puppets' descriptions. 
Papafragou and Musolino (2003) attempted to control for the possibility of a 
negative response tendency by employing control descriptions which required 
positive evaluation. For example, a puppet would describe a situation in which a little 
girl jumped over a fence, with the statement "The little girl jumped over the fence". 
Such an approach can highlight response biases, because many factors are held 
constant across SI and control trials. Thus if children are simply responding 
negatively to SI descriptions due to an irrelevant aspect of the task (e.g. the fact that 
the agent giving the descriptions is a puppet), they might also respond negatively and 
so inappropriately in the control trials, highlighting the irrelevance of their responses 
to the task purpose. Papafragou and Musolino found that children were able to 
demonstrate response flexibility by evaluating negatively in the SI trials as required, 
but also positively in the control trials as appropriate. They argued that this supported 
their claim that performance on the implicature trials reflected a genuine ability to 
compute SIs. 
However the control trials differed from the SI trials in Papafragou and 
Musolino'S (2003) second experiment in their linguistic content. Whilst the SI trials 
used the implicature-relevant term "some", the control trials of the second experiment 
neglected to incorporate this term. It could have been that something specific to the 
term "some" was provoking children to evaluate the puppet's description negatively. 
Papafragou and Musolino incorporated the term "some" in the control conditions for 
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the SI trials in their first experiment, and found children able to evaluate felicitous 
descriptions using the term "some", appropriately. However the context in which the 
puppet descriptions were presented was modified for Experiment 2, to promote 
attention to SIs, and this dramatically increased children's negative evaluation of 
descriptions incorporating the term "some" during the SI trials. It is feasible that the 
change of presentation context could have had a similar impact on the evaluation of 
descriptions incorporating the term "some" during control trials as the children may 
have had some awareness of the unusual nature of the SI terms as highlighted in the 
new presentation context. It might have been that the SI nature of the "some" term 
was prompting children to evaluate its use negatively, regardless of the context in 
which it was used. 
Experiment 1 sought to rule out this possibility by employing control trials 
which required children to positively evaluate descriptions incorporating the term 
"some". These trials presented scenarios in which a character only completed some of 
their task, for example a bear put only three of five available hoops on a pole, and the 
puppet described the character as having "put some of the hoops on the pole." 
positive evaluation of suc~ control descriptions, in the face of negative evaluations of 
statements given during scalar trials, would support Papafragou and Musolino's 
suggestion that children rejecting "some" descriptions in the scalar trials, were 
actually doing so on the basis of having drawn implicatures which made their 
meaning inconsistent with the situation they were supposed to be reflecting. 
Additional sets of control trials were incorporated, which required positive and 
negative evaluation of descriptions using the term "all" instead of "some". For 
example, the description "The bear put all of the hoops on the pole" was used in a 
situation in which the bear had put three of five available hoops on the pole and also 
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in a situation in which the bear had put all five available hoops on the pole. These 
were employed to ascertain children's understanding of the term implicated as not 
applicable in the descriptions of the scalar trials - the term "all". By adding these 
additional control trials, children's understanding of both quantity terms relevant to 
the "some implies not all" SIs employed in this study was investigated. In addition, 
this procedure allowed for an examination of response flexibility so that children 
receiving the SI test trials and three sets of control trials were presented with two sets 
of trials requiring positive evaluations and two sets requiring negative evaluations. 
Furthermore, if performance on the SI trials was really reflective of children's ability 
to compute SIs, and not instead indicative of the demands of more general processing 
costs, children could be expected to perform significantly better in all of the control 
trials than in the SI trials. This is because the scalar trial processing demands 
attributable to the linguistic content of puppet descriptions, the situations they were 
supposed to be reflecting and the children's evaluative responses were shared with the 
control trials. The only notable difference between the scalar and control trials arose 
from the cross-matching ofthe term "some" with a context in which the term "all" 
would have been more appropriate, which emphasised the significance of drawing the 
"some-not all" SI. 
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3.2 Method 
Participants. These were 75 children aged between 4- and 6-years-old split 
into three age groups: 25 4-year-olds (M = 54.88 months, range = 48-59 months), 27 
5-year-olds (M = 66.44 months, range =60-71 months) and 23 6-year-olds (M = 75.13 
months, range = 72-78 months). These children were predominantly white and middle 
class, and were recruited from a nursery and a primary school in Sheffield. All 
children spoke English as their first language, and none were known to have any 
specific language impairment. 
Procedure. Children were tested individually, in a quiet area of their school, 
and all took part in five tasks. Testing was conducted over the course of two sessions 
(each lasting approximately 15-20 minutes), and the order of task presentation fixed. 
The first session commenced with the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) 
Shifting EF task followed by the Day-Night, Inhibitory EF task and two Unexpected 
Location False-Belief ToM tasks. The second session consisted of the presentation of 
the SI task. 
DCCS Task. The DCCS Task described by Zelazo (2006) was used to assess 
the ability to shift between mental representations, conceptualised as an EF ability by 
Miyake et al. (2000). This task required the child to alter their focus between the 
object depicted on a set of cards and the colour of ink used to depict it, in accordance 
with sorting instructions. Focus alternation is thought to enable the appropriate re-
categorisation of cards thereby permitting correct sorting in accordance with 
instruction. Two trays, each displaying a target card cross-matched with the test cards, 
were used for this task. One target card displayed a blue bird and the other, a red car 
(see Appendix Ja). 
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Fourteen test cards were employed in this task (see Appendix Ib), two of 
which were used in a demonstration phase. Seven of the test cards depicted a blue car 
and seven depicted a red bird. Preliminary questioning requiring animal and colour 
labelling was used to establish that the children could appropriately distinguish 
between the two colours and the two objects depicted. In the demonstration phase, the 
experimenter introduced the task by labelling the target cards "Here is a blue bird and 
here is a red car." The experimenter then proceeded to encourage the child to sort 
either by colour or by shape, the choice of which was counterbalanced across 
children. The experimenter told the child, "Now we're going to playa card game. 
This is the colour/shape game. In the colour/shape game all the blue oneslbirds go 
here" (pointing to the tray with the blue bird target card) and all the red ones/cars go 
here" (pointing to the tray with the red car target card). Only the relevant dimension 
of the picture on the card was labelled. The experimenter then proceeded to sort one 
type of test card, e.g., a card displaying a blue car, by the relevant dimension saying 
"See, here is a blue one/car. So it goes here", placing the card face down in the tray 
with the blue/car target card. The rules were then repeated. The child was then shown 
the other type of test card, e.g., a card displaying a red bird, and the experimenter 
said, "Now here is a red one/a bird. Where does this one go?" If the child took the 
card and sorted it correctly, or simply indicated the correct tray by pointing, the 
experimenter gave positive feedback. If they pointed, the experimenter asked, "Can 
you help me put this red onelbird down?" The experimenter ensured that the card was 
placed face down in the appropriate tray, turning the card over if necessary. If the 
child sorted incorrectly, the experimenter gave negative feedback, and again ensured 
that the card was placed face down in the appropriate tray. The experimenter then 
proceeded to the pre-switch phase. 
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On the first pre-switch trial, the child was told it was their turn to sort, and the 
previous rules were repeated. The experimenter then randomly selected a test card 
(e.g. displaying a red bird), showed it to the child, and labelled it by the relevant 
dimension only. The child was asked to place the card in the appropriate tray. No 
feedback was given following sorting and the experimenter moved onto the next pre-
switch trial. There were six pre-switch trials in total. Cards were selected for sorting, 
ensuring that two identical test cards were not presented on more than two 
consecutive trials. When the pre-switch trials had been completed, the experimenter 
told the child that they were going to playa new game, and introduced them to the 
rules of the game they hadn't play before. "We are not going to play the colour/shape 
game anymore. We are going to play the shape/colour game. In the shape/colour 
game, all the birdslblue ones go here" (pointing to the tray with the blue bird target 
card) "and all the cars/red ones go here" (pointing to the tray with the red car target 
card). The child was then presented with cards which the experimenter identified 
using only the label relevant to the new sorting rules, and asked to sort cards which 
had been again selected to ensure that the same type of test card was not presented on 
more than two consecutive trials. There were six post-switch trials, and as in the ore-
switch trials, no feedback was given following sorting. 
Children needed to sort correctly in at least five pre-switch trials in order for 
their post-switch performance to be included (all children achieved this). The total 
number of cards correctly sorted in the post-switch phase was recorded as the score to 
be used in later data analysis with a possible range of 0-6. 
Day-Night Task (D-N inhib). The Day-Night Task of Gerstadt, Hong and 
Diamond (1994) was used to assess attentional inhibition. This was also 
conceptualised as an EF ability by Miyake et al (2000). This task required inhibition 
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of the standard labelling of pictures depicting the sun as "day", and pictures depicting 
the moon as "night", to allow converse labelling i.e. a picture of the sun labelled as 
"night". A set of two training cards and sixteen testing cards was used for this task. 
Half of these cards displayed a white crescent moon and stars on a black background, 
and half displayed a yellow sun and white clouds against a light blue background (see 
Appendix II). Children were shown a card with the moon on and told, "We're going 
to playa funny game. When you see this card I want you to say "day"," and asked to 
repeat the word "day". They were then shown a card with the sun on and told, "When 
you see this card I want you to say "night"," and asked to repeat the word "night". 
Following this, children were shown a card with a sun on and if they fail to respond 
appropriately, prompted with "What do you say when you see this card?" If children 
responded correctly they were praised and presented with a card with the moon on it. 
If children responded correctly again, they were again praised and these t~o trials 
were counted as trials 1 and 2 of the test phase, and testing continued from there. 
The test phase involved presentation of cards in the following pseudorandom 
order sun(s), moon (m), m,s,m,s,s,m,m,s,m,s,s,m,s,m. No feedback was given during 
the testing phase. If a child got either of the first two trials wrong or failed to respond, 
these two trials were counted as practice and the child reminded of the rules and then 
presented with a sun card followed by a moon card. If the child responded correctly, 
these were then counted as trials 1 and 2 of the test phase, and testing continued from 
there; otherwise these trials were counted as further practice trials and the child 
reminded of the rules again. The total numbers of correct "day" or "night" responses 
were recorded as the score to be used in later data analysis with a possible range of 2-
16. 
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Unexpected locations false belief tasks. Two unexpected locations false belief 
tasks were used to assess ToM based on the Sally-Anne task of Baron-Cohen, Leslie, 
and Frith (1985). The tasks were presented in a fixed order (the Sally-Anne task 
followed by the Max-Tom task). Each task involved two characters, two potential 
object locations and one object to be hidden, and was presented using small-world 
people and objects to re-enact story scenarios (see Appendix IlIa). In the Sally-Anne 
task, children were introduced to Sally, whom they were told had a basket and a 
marble, and Anne whom they were told had a box. Children then watched as Sally put 
her marble in a covered basket and left the scene. When Sally had disappeared from 
view, children were shown Anne taking the marble out of the covered basket and 
placing it inside a covered box. Children were then asked the test question "When 
Sally gets back, where will she look first for her marble?" and a control memory 
question "Where is her marble really?" in that order. 
The Max-Tom task was similar to the Sally-Anne task, except that Max and 
Tom replaced Sally and Anne respectively, Max had some drawers and Tom a 
covered pot instead of Sally and Anne's basket and box, and Max hid a crayon instead 
of a marble (see Appendix BIb). In the Max-Tom task, children were asked where 
Max would look first for his crayon, and where his crayon was really. Incorrect 
response to a control question meant the response to the test question in that task was 
automatically recorded as incorrect. The total number of correct responses to the two 
test questions was recorded as the score to be used in later data analysis, with a 
possible range of 0-2. 
Scalar Implicature (SI)Task. An adaptation of the Some-All SI Task of 
Papafragou and Musolino (2003) was used to assess CU. Children were introduced to 
five hand puppets called: Ellie the Elephant, Harry the hedgehog, Suzy the Squirrel, 
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Barry the Badger and Felicity the Fox, whom they were told "sometimes say some 
silly things". Children were told they were going to playa game with the puppets to 
"help them say things better". In an initial training phase with Ellie the Elephant, 
children were presented with four warm-up trials to encourage them to pragmatically 
assess the puppet's language. 
The first warm up scenario presented a truthful and pragmatically felicitous 
(appropriate) statement - Ellie was shown a toy lion and asked "What is this Ellie?" 
to which the puppet gave a truthful, and pragmatically felicitous rcply- "It is a lion." 
Children were asked if Ellie "answered well" and if they failed to reply or negatively 
judged the puppet's performance, the experimenter would comment that "Ellie did 
answer well because it is a lion". The second warm up statement presented children 
with a truthful but pragmatically infelicitous (inappropriate) statement - Ellie was 
shown a toy pig and asked "What is this Ellie?" to which the puppet gave a truthful, 
but pragmatically infelicitous reply, "It is an animal with four legs." Children were 
again asked if Ellie "answered well" and if they failed to reply or positively judged 
the puppet's performance, the experimenter would comment, "Ellie did not answer 
well because she could have said it was a pig." If children negatively evaluated the 
puppets responses to the infelicitous statement, they were asked, "How could she 
have said it better?" Two further warm up trials were given, presenting children with 
a further felicitous and an infelicitous statement, in that order. The details of these are 
given in Table 1. The felicity of the warm-up trial statements varied, whilst their 
logical value remained a constant: true, to indicate to the children that they needed to 
focus on the conversational appropriateness of statements rather than their logical 
value. The complete set of warm-ups is shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Warm up trials for the Sf items in Experiment 1 
Puppet statements on warm up scenarios Scenario 
Felicitous statements 
It's a lion 
It's a duck 
Infelicitous statements 
It's an animal with four legs 
It's a yellow thing you eat 
pointing to a toy lion 
pointing to a toy duck 
pointing to a toy pig 
pointing to a toy banana 
Following the wann-up statements, children were presented with the test 
scenarios. In each of the test scenarios a puppet watched whilst a toy character 
performed a task. For example, the experimenter would say, "This is Teddy. He 
thinks he is very good at putting the hoops on the pole. Shall we see how he docs?" 
Then the experimenter manipulated the toy character to attempt a task. After watching 
the task attempt, the puppet would be asked how the character did, "Lets ask Harry 
how Teddy did. Harry, how did Teddy do?" The puppet would then provide a 
statement containing either the descriptive term "all" or "some", and children would 
be asked whether the puppet answered well. If children indicated that the puppet had 
not answered well, they would be asked how the puppet could have "said it better", 
All children were presented with four different types of test trials. Sets 1-3 were 
control trials, used to establish response flexibility, and to gauge whether performance 
on the SI trials in Set 4 was truly reflective of the ability to compute SIs, or arose 
from more general processing difficulties. Set 4 was the critical set, containing the SI 
trials. In Set 1 trials, the puppet used the tenn "all" in a semantically true and 
pragmatically appropriate way: for example the bear would put all of the available 
hoops on the pole and the puppet would describe him as having put "all of the hoops 
on the pole" (see Appendix IVa). Children were expected to provide "Yes" responses 
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when asked whether the puppet described the characters' performances well in this sct 
of trials. In Set 2 trials, the puppet used the term "all" in a semantically false and 
pragmatically inappropriate way: for example the bear would put only some of the 
available hoops on the pole and the puppet would describe him as having put "all of 
the hoops on the pole" (see Appendix IVb). Children were expected to provide "No" 
responses when asked whether the puppet described the characters' performances 
well in this set of trials. 
In Set 3 trials, the puppet used the term "some" in a semantically true and 
pragmatically appropriate way: for example, the bear would put only some of the 
available hoops on the pole and the puppet would describe him as having put "some 
of the hoops on the pole" (see Appendix IVc). Children were expected to provide 
"Yes" responses when asked whether the puppet described the characters' 
performances well in this set of trials. In Set 4 trials, the puppet used the term "some" 
in a semantically true but pragmatically inappropriate way: for example the bear 
would put all of the available hoops on the pole and the puppet would describe him as 
having put "some of the hoops on the pole" (see Appendix IVd). These were the 
critical trials assessing the ability to compute SIs. Competent children who were 
computing the SI ("some implies not all") were expected to provide "No" responses 
when asked whether the puppet described the characters' performances well in this set 
of trials. Children who failed to compute the "some = not all" SI were expected to see 
the meaning of some as consistent with the meaning of all, and so provide "Yes" 
responses when asked whether the puppet described the characters' performances 
well in this set of trials. A complete list of these trial statements is presented in Table 
3.2. 
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The presentation of the four sets in the SI task was counterbalanced across 
children in the 24 possible orders. A different puppet was used to describe the 
character's performance in each set of trials within each sequence, and ascription of 
puppets to trial sets was counterbalanced across children. Only two different puppet 
ascriptions were applied, so for half of the children Harry the Hedgehog gave the 
descriptions in Set 1, Barry the Badger gave the descriptions in Set 2, Felicity Fox 
gave the descriptions in Set 3 and Suzy Squirrel gave the descriptions in Set 4. For the 
other half of the children, Suzy Squirrel gave the descriptions in Set 1, Felicity Fox 
gave the descriptions in Set 2, Barry the Badger gave the descriptions in Set 3 and 
Harry the Hedgehog gave the descriptions in Set 4. Presentation of the trials within 
each set was also counterbalanced using two different orders. For half of the children 
assigned to one version of the puppet ascriptions, the trials were presented as they 
read downwards in Table 3.2. For the other half of the children in this version of 
puppet ascriptions, the trials were presented as they read upwards in Table 3.2. 
Similarly, for half of the children assigned to the other version of the puppet 
ascriptions, the trials were presented as they read downwards in Table 3.2. For the 
other half of the children in that version of puppet ascriptions, the trials were 
presented as they read upwards in Table 3.2. 
The total number of correct responses to enquiries regarding whether the 
puppets answered well was recorded and translated into a score to be used in later 
data analysis with a possible range of 0-16. For Sets 1 and 3, each "Yes" response 
contributed I point to the final score and each "No" response was scored as O. For 
Sets 2 and 4, each "No" response in these sets contributed 1 point to the final score 
and each "Yes" response was scored as O. 
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Table 3.2: Test trials lor the Sf task in Experiment 1 
Puppet statements on test trials Scenario referred to 
Set/Control 1 
He put all of the hoops on the pole -Teddy bear puts all of the hoops on the 
pole 
He lifted all of the fishes 
She put all of the pieces in the puzzle 
He caught all of the horses 
Set/Control 2 
He put all of the hoops on the pole 
He lifted all of the fishes 
She put all of the pieces in the puzzle 
He caught all of the horses 
Set/Control 3 
-Tiger lifts all of the fishes up 
-The little girl puts all of the pieces of the 
puzzle together 
-The little boys catches all of the horses 
-Teddy bear puts some of the hoops on 
the pole 
-Tiger lifts some of the fishes up 
-The little girl puts some of the pieces of 
the puzzle together 
-The little boys catches some of the 
horses 
He put some of the hoops on the pole -Teddy bear puts some of the hoops on 
the pole 
He lifted some of the fishes -Tiger lifts some of the fishes up 
She put some of the pieces in the puzzle -The little girl puts some of the pieces of 
the puzzle together 
He caught some of the horses -The little boys catches some of the 
horses 
Set 4/Scalar Implicatures 
He put some of the hoops on the pole -Teddy bear puts all of the hoops on the 
pole 
He lifted some of the fishes -Tiger lifts all of the fishes up 
She put some of the pieces in the puzzle -The girl puts all of the puzzle pieces 
together 
.He caught some of the horses -The little boys catches all of the horses 
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3.3 Results 
Score means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Mean scores and standard deviations for EF, ToM and CU tasks employed in Experiment I. 
4-year-olds 5-year-olds 6-year-olds 
N 25 27 23 
Age in months 54.88 (3.00) 66.44 (3.32) 75.13 (2.16) 
D-N inhib EF/16 10.20 (3.55) 11.93 (3.49) 12.70 (3.82) 
DCCS shift EF /6 4.08 (2.86) 5.85 (0.77) 5.52 (1.59) 
FB ToMl2 1.24 (0.72) 1.52 (0.58) 1.91 (0.29) 
Set 4 SIs/4 1.84 (1.93) 2.04 (1.91) 2.96 (1.58) 
Set 1 Controll4 3.80 (0.50) 3.93 (0.27) 3.83 (0.49) 
Set 2 Contro14 2.72 (1.79) 3.07 (1.36) 3.17 (1.44) 
Set 3 Control4 3.48 (1.16) 3.67 (0.96) 3.70 (0.56) 
Note: D-N inhib-Day-Night task; DCCS Dimensional Change Card Sort task; FB-False belief tasks; 
Set 4 SIs= Set 4 Scalar implicature trials employed in the scalar implicature task, Set 1 Control= Set 1 
control trials employed in the scalar implicature task; Set 2 Control== Set 2 control trials employed in 
the scalar implicature task; Set 3 Control= Set 3 control trials employed in the scalar implicature task. 
Relationship between EF and SI computation 
Children's inhibitory EF was classed as strong if their scores on the Day-Night 
task were 12 or greater out of 16 and weak if these were 11 or less. The weak and 
strong division criteria were selected on the basis that they enabled as equal a split as 
possible in the number of children assigned to the two EF ability groups. A 2 
(inhibitory EF score: weak vs. strong) x 3 (age group: 4-year-olds vs. 5-year-olds vs. 
6-year-olds) factorial analysis of variance was conducted on SI scores. N was roughly 
equal for weak versus strong inhibitory ability respectively across the 4-year-olds, 
15: 1 0, 5-year-olds, 12: 15 and 6-year-olds, 8: 15. This analysis did not reveal a 
significant effect ofinhibitory EF ability on SI score, £(1,69) = 1.145,12>0.20 or an 
age interaction, E(2,69) = 0.995, 12>0.30. However, there was a significant main effect 
of age group, E(2,69) = 3.392, 12<0.05. Table 3.4 reports the means and standard 
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deviations of SI scores for the weak and strong inhibitors across the age groups and 
Table 3.5 reports the ANOV A summary data. One-tailed 1-tests revealed that the SI 
scores of the 6-year-olds were significantly greater than the SI scores of the 4-year-
oIds, 1(45.418) = 2.200, 12<0.05 and the 5-year-olds, 1(47.967) = 1.862,12<0.05. 
Table 3.4: Sf score means and standard deviations for the weak inhibitors (inhibitory EF score: < 12) 
and strong inhibitors (inhibitory EF score ~12) across the 4-year-old. 5-year-old and. 6-year-old age 
groups. 
Age group Inhibitory group Mean SI score Standard deviation 
4 Weak 2.13 1.96 
Strong 1.40 1.90 
5 Weak 1.83 1.85 
Strong 2.20 2.01 
6 Weak 3.63 1.06 
Strong 2.60 1.72 
Table 3.5: Summary table/or the 2 (inhibitory EF score: <12lweak vs. ~12Istrang) x 3(age group: 4-
year-olds vs. 5-year-olds vs. 6-year-olds) analysis a/variance o/SI scores. 
Source SS df MS E 12 Partial Eta a 
Within 229.675 69 3.329 
Inhibitory EF 3.810 1 3.810 1.145 0.288 0.016 
Age group 22.583 2 11.292 3.392 0.039 0.090 
Inhibitory EF x age group 6.622 2 3.311 0.995 0.375 0.028 
(corrected model) 26.512 5 5.302 1.593 0.174 0.103 
(corrected total) 256.187 74 
Children's shifting EF was classed as strong if their scores on the DCCS were 
6 out of6 and weak if these were less than 6. Again, the weak and strong division 
criteria were selected on the basis that they enabled as equal a split as possible in the 
number of children assigned to the two EF ability groups. A 2 (shifting EF score: 
weak vs. strong) x 3 (age group: 4-year-olds vs. 5-year-olds vs. 6-year-olds) factorial 
Chapter 3: Experiment 1 93 
analysis of variance could not be conducted on SI scores because there were not 
enough children with weak shifting EF in the 5- and 6-year-old age groups: the 5- and 
6-year-olds appeared to be scoring near ceiling. However, N was roughly comparable 
across the weak versus strong shifting groups, 8: 17 respectively for the 4-year-olds. 
Table 3.6 reports the means and standard deviations ofSl scores for the weak and 
strong shifters in the 4-year-old age group. A t-test did not reveal a significant effect 
of shifting ability on SI score, 1(23) = 1.051,12>0.30. 
Table 3.6: Sf score means and standard deviations/or the weak shifters ('\'hifling EF score: <6) and 
strong shifters (shifting EF score =6) across the 4-year-old age group. 
Age group Shifting group Mean SI score 
4 Weak 1.25 
Strong 2.12 




Children's ToM was classed as strong if their scores on the false-belief tasks 
were 2 out of 2 and weak if these were less than 2. The weak and strong division 
criteria were selected on the basis that they enabled as equal a split as possible in the 
number of children assigned to the two ToM ability groups. The 6-year-olds were 
performing at ceiling on the false-belief tasks so their data was excluded from 
analysis. A 2 (ToM score: weak vs. strong) x 2 (age group: 4-year-olds vs. 5-year-
oIds) factorial analysis of variance was conducted on SI scores. This did not reveal a 
significant effect of ToM on SI score, E(l,48) = 0.681, 12.>0.40, an age interaction 
effect, f(1,48) = 2.376, Q>O.lO or a main effect of age, E(I,48) = 0.029, 12.>0.80. N 
was roughly equal for weak versus strong ToM ability respectively across the 4-year-
old age group, 15:10 and the 5-year-old age group, 12:15. Table 3.7 reports the means 
and standard deviations ofSl scores for children with weak and strong ToM in the 4-
year-old and 5-year-old age groups. 
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Table 3.7: SI score means and standard deviations/or children with weak ToM (ToM score: <2) and 
strong ToM (ToM score =2) across the 4-year-old and 5-year-old age groups. 
Age group ToM group Mean SI score Standard deviation 
4 Weak 1.33 1.84 
Strong 2.60 1.90 
5 Weak 2.25 2.01 
Strong 1.87 1.89 
Relationship between EF and ToM 
A 2 (inhibitory EF score: weak vs. strong) x 3 (age group: 4-year-olds vs. 5-
year-olds vs. 6-year-olds) factorial analysis of variance was conducted on ToM 
scores. This analysis did not reveal a significant effect of inhibitory EF ability on 
ToM score, E(1,69) = 0.261, Q>0.60 or an age interaction, E(2,69) = 0.709, 12>0.40. 
However, there was a significant main effect of age group, E(2,69) = 6.965, 12<0.01. 
Table 3.8 reports the means and standard deviations of ToM scores for the weak and 
strong inhibitors across the age groups and Table 3.9 reports the ANDV A summary 
data. One-tailed i-tests revealed that the ToM scores of the 6-year-olds (M=1.91, 
SD=0.29) were significantly greater than the ToM scores of the 4-year-olds (M= 1.24 
,SQ=0.72): 1(31.952) = 4.296, Q<O.OOI and the 5-year-olds (M=I.52, SD=0.58): 
1(39.349) = 3.113, Q<O.01. 
Table 3.8: ToM score means and standard deviations/or the weak inhibitors (inhibitory EF score: 
<: 12) and strong inhibitors (inhibitory EF score ~12) across the 4-year-old. 5-year-old and. 6-year-old 
age groups. 
Age group Inhibitory group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
4 Weak 1.13 0.74 
Strong 1.40 0.70 
5 Weak 1.58 0.52 
Strong 1.47 0.64 
6 Weak 1.88 0.35 
Strong 1.93 0.26 
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Table 3.9: Summary table for the 2 (inhibitory EF score: <12lweak vs. ?12Istrong) x 3(age group: 4-
year-aids vs. 5-year-olds vs. 6-year-olds) analysis of variance of ToM scores. 
Source SS df MS E 12 Partial Eta a 
Within 22.592 69 0.327 
Inhibitory EF 0.085 1 0.085 0.261 0.611 0.004 
Age group 4.561 2 2.281 6.965 0.002 0.168 
Inhibitory EF x age group 0.464 2 0.232 0.709 0.496 0.020 
(corrected model) 5.995 5 1.199 3.662 0.005 0.210 
(corrected total) 28.587 74 
As with SI scores, a 2 (shifting EF score: weak vs. strong) x 3 (age group: 4-
year-olds vs. 5-year-olds vs. 6-year-olds) factorial analysis of variance could not be 
conducted on ToM scores because there were not enough children with weak shifting 
EF in the 5- and 6-year-old age groups. However, since N was roughly comparable 
across the weak versus strong shifting groups for the 4-year-olds, a t-test was 
performed to look at the difference in ToM scores for weak versus strong shifters in 
the youngest age-group. This did not reveal a significant effect of shifting EF ability 
on ToM score, 1(23) = 0.537, n>0.50. Table 3.10 reports the means and standard 
deviations of ToM scores for children with weak and strong shifting in the 4-year-old 
age group. 
Table 3.10: ToM score means and standard deviations for the weak shifters (shifting EF score: <6) 
and strong shifters (shifting EF score =6) across the 4-year-old age group. 








A 4 (SI task trial categories: 1 = Set 1 control trials vs. 2= Set 2 control trials 
vs. 3= Set 3 control trials vs. 4= SI trials) x 3 (age group: 4-year-olds vs. 5-year-olds 
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vs. 6-year-olds) factorial analysis of variance, with SI task scores as the dependent 
measure revealed a significant effect of task trial category on SI task score, E(3,288) = 
21.968,12<0.001. There was no main or interaction effect of age group. Table 3.11 
reports the means and standard deviations of SI task scores for Trial Sets 1-4 across 
the age groups and Table 3.12 reports the ANOVA summary data. One-tailed 1-tests 
revealed that the scores in the SI trials were significantly lower than the scores in the 
Set 1 Control trials, 1(74) = 7.364, g<O.OOI, Set 2 Control trials, 1(74) = 4.182, 
12<0.001 and the Set 3 Control trials, 1(74) = 6.020, 12<0.001. Two-tailed t-tests 
revealed that only the 6-year-olds were performing above chance on the SI trials, 
1(22) = 2.902,12<0.01. 
Across the age groups, 26 children scored poorly (i.e. achieved a score of 2 or 
below) in at least one control condition in the SI task (Trial Sets 1-3). Of these 
children, 22 performed poorly in the SI trials (Trial Set 4), so only 4 children 
performed well in the SI condition whilst performing poorly in the control conditions. 
Binomial analyses indicated that the proportion of children scoring poorly on a 
control condition who also scored poorly on the SI trials, differed significantly from 
chance, g<O.OOI. In fact of these 22 children, 1 scored poorly in Set 1, 18 in Set 2 and 
5 in Set 3. Of the overall number of 2 children who performed poorly in Set 1, 1 child 
performed poorly and 1 child performed well (i.e. achieved a score of 3 or more) in 
the SI trials, a proportion not differing from chance expectations, 12>0.40. Of the 
overall number of 6 children who performed poorly in Set 3, 5 children performed 
poorly and 1 child performed well in the SI trials. This proportion did not differ from 
chance expectations either, 12>0.09. However, of the overall number of20 children 
who performed poorly in Set 2, 18 children performed poorly and 2 children 
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performed well in the SI trials, a proportion which did differ significantly from 
chance, 12<0.001. 
Table 3.11: SI task score means and standard deviations/or the SI task trial sets (Sefs 1-3: Controls 
and Set 4: SI trials) across the 4-year-old. 5-year-old and. 6-year-old age groups. 
Age group SI task trial set Mean SI task score Standard deviation 
4 1 3.80 0.50 
2 2.72 1.79 
3 3.48 1.16 
4 1.84 1.93 
5 1 3.93 0.27 
2 3.07 1.36 
3 3.67 0.96 
4 2.04 1.91 
6 1 3.83 0.49 
2 3.17 1.44 
3 3.70 0.56 
4 2.96 1.58 
Table 3.12: Summary table/or the 4 (task trial categories: I = Control 1 vs. 2 = Control 2 vs. 3=Control 
3 vs. 4=SI trials) x 3(age group: 4-year-olds vs. 5-year-olds vs. 6-year-olds) analysis o/variance o/SI 
task scores. 
Source SS df MS E Partial Eta 2 
-Within 485.741 288 1.687 
Task trial category 111.155 3 37.052 21.968 0.001 0.186 
Age group 9.835 2 4.917 2.916 0.056 0.020 
Task trial category 10.770 6 1.795 1.064 0.384 0.022 
x age group 
(corrected model) 135.895 11 12.354 7.325 0.001 0.219 
(corrected total) 621.637 299 
The effect of SI task set presentation order upon performance in the SI trials, 
was also assessed. Table 3.13 reports the means and standard deviations ofSI scores 
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when SI trials were presented before and after Control trial sets 1-3. A t-test revealed 
that performance in the SI trials altered according to whether these trials were 
presented before or after Set 1 trials, 1(73) = 2.113, 12< 0.05. Higher scores were 
achieved ifSI trials were presented after Set 1 than if they were presented before Set 
1. Performance in the SI trials was also influenced by whether they were presented 
before or after Set 2 trials, 1(73) = 2.112, 12<0.05. Higher scores were achieved if SI 
trials were presented after Set 2 than if they were presented before Set 2. However 
performance in the SI trials did not appear to be affected by whether Set 3 was 
presented before or after the SI trials, 1(73) = 0.572,...n>0.50. 
Table 3.13: SI score means and standard deviations when the SI trials were presented before and after 
Control trial sets 1-3. 
SI trial presentation order Control trial set Mean SI score Standard deviation 
Before 1 1.68 1.93 
2 1.82 1.86 
3 2.13 1.85 
After 1 2.60 1.75 
2 2.70 1.77 
3 2.38 1.89 
Excluding poor controls 
Some earlier analyses of SI performance were then repeated excluding 
children performing poorly in 1 or more of the control trials. Because of the low 
numbers of children in some age groups, age effects were no longer examined. 
As in the main sample, children's inhibitory EF was classed as strong if their 
scores on the Day-Night task were 12 or greater out of24 and weak if these were 11 
or less on the basis that this enabled as equal a split as possible in the number of 
children assigned to the two EF ability groups. N was roughly equal for weak versus 
strong inhibitory ability, 24:25. Concordant with the earlier analysis, a 2 (inhibitory 
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EF score: weak vs. strong) analysis of variance, with SI scores as the dependent 
measure did not reveal a significant effect of inhibitory EF ability on SI score, }:(1,47) 
= 0.133, IPO.70. Table 3.14 reports the means and standard deviations of SI scores for 
children with weak and strong inhibitory EF. 
Table 3.14: SI score means and standard deViations/or the weak inhibitors (inhibitory EF score: <12) 











Also as in the main sample, children's shifting EF was classed as strong if 
their scores on the DCCS were 6 out of 6 and weak if these were less than 6 on the 
basis that this enabled as equal a split as possible in the number of children assigned 
to the two EF ability groups. However, a 2 (shifting EF score: weak vs. strong) 
analysis of variance could not be conducted on SI scores because there were not 
enough children with weak shifting EF: they appeared to be scoring near ceiling. N 
was 5 :44 across the weak versus strong shifting groups. 
Children's ToM was classed as strong if their scores on the false belief tasks 
were 2 out of 2 and weak if these were less than 2 with the weak and strong division 
criteria chosen to enable as equal a split as possible in the number of children 
assigned to the two ToM ability groups. N was roughly comparable for weak versus 
strong ToM, 14:35. In line with earlier findings, a 2 (ToM score: weak vs. strong) 
analysis of variance, with SI scores as the dependent measure, did not demonstrate a 
significant effect of ToM on SI scores, }:(1,47) = 0.265, n>0.60. Table 3.15 reports 
the means and standard deviations of SI scores for children with weak and strong 
ToM. 
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Table 3.15: Sf score means and standard deviationsforchildren with weak ToM (ToM score: <2) and 











A 4 (SI task trial categories: 1 = Set 1 control trials vs. 2= Set 2 control trials 
vs. 3= Set 3 control trials vs. 4= SI trials) analysis of variance, with SI task scores as 
the dependent measure again revealed a significant effect of task trial category on SI 
task score, E(3,192) = 12.408, n<O.OO1. Table 3.16 reports the means and standard 
deviations of SI task scores for Trial Sets 1-4 and Table 3.17 reports the ANOV A 
summary data. As before, one-tailed t-tests demonstrated that the scores in the SI 
trials were significantly lower than the scores in the Set 1 Control trials, 1(48) = 3.897, 
~<0.001, Set 2 Control trials, 1(48) =3.648, n<O.OOI and the Set 3 Control trials, 1(48) 
= 3.634, n<O.OO1. 
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Table 3.17: Summary table for the 4 (task trial categories: ]=Control ] vs. 2=Control2 vs. 3=Control 
3 vs. 4=SI trials) analysis of variance ofS] task scores when poor controls were excluded. 
Source SS df MS E 12 Partial Eta a 
Within 133.551 192 0.696 
Task trial category 25.893 3 8.631 12.408 0.001 0.162 
(corrected model) 25.893 11 8.631 12.408 0.001 0.162 
(corrected total) 159.444 195 
EF 
Correlations partialling out age revealed that there was no relationship 
between performance on the inhibitory and shifting EF measures in the whole sample 
of 75 children, r=0.133, 12>0.10. Performance on the inhibitory EF task did not appear 
to improve significantly with age, f.(2,72) = 3.047, 12>0.05. However, there were 
significant age differences in performance on the shifting EF task, E(2,72) = 6.080, 
12<0.01. Table 3.18 reports the means and standard deviations of inhibitory and 
shifting EF scores across the 4-year-old, 5-year-old and. 6-year-old age groups. Table 
3.19 reports the ANOV A summary data for the age-shifting EF analysis. One-tailed t-
tests revealed that the 5- and the 6-year-olds had significantly higher scores for the 
shifting EF task than the 4-year-olds, 1(27.223) = 3.002, 12<0.01 and 1(38.188) = 
2.182,12<0.05, respectively (see Table 3.3 for means and standard deviations). 
Table 3.18: Inhibitory and shifting EF task score means and slandard deviations across the 4-year-old, 
5-year-old and. 6-year-old age groups. 
EF component Age group Mean EF task score Standard deviation 
Inhibitory EF 4 10.20 3.55 
5 11.93 3.49 
6 12.70 3.82 
Shifting EF 4 4.08 2.86 
5 5.85 0.77 
6 5.52 1.59 
Chapter 3: Experiment 1 102 
Table 3.19: Summary table for the 3 (age group: 4-year-olds vs. 5-year-olds vs. 6-year-olds) analysis 
of variance of shifting EF task scores. 
Source SS df MS .E Partial Eta a 
Within 266.987 72 3.708 
Age group 45.093 2 22.547 6.080 0.004 0.144 
(corrected model) 45.093 2 22.547 6.080 0.004 0.144 
(corrected total) 312.080 74 
ToM 
Correlations partialling out age revealed that there was no significant 
relationship between performance on the two ToM tasks either, r=0.167, 12>0.07. 
Performance on the first ToM task did not appear to improve significantly with age, 
E(2,72) = 0.843, 12>0.40. However, age did appear to have a significantly improve 
performance on the second ToM task, E(2,72) = 10.143,12<0.001. Table 3.20 reports 
the means and standard deviations of scores on the first and second ToM tasks across 
the 4-year-old, 5-year-old and. 6-year-old age groups. Table 3.21 reports the ANOV A 
summary data for the analysis of scores on the second ToM task. One-tailed t-tests 
revealed that the 6-year-olds had significantly higher scores for the second ToM task 
than the 4-year-olds, 1(32.658) = 5.1 04,12<0.00 I and the 5-year-olds, 1(36.214) = 
3.137,12<0.01. 
Only 8 of the 75 children receiving the false belief tasks failed the first false 
belief task presented: 4 of whom were 4-years-old, 3 of whom were 5-years-old and 1 
of whom was 6-years-old, whereas 26 failed the second task presented: 15 of whom 
were 4-years-old, 10 of whom were 5-years-old and 1 of whom was 6-years-old. At-
test indicated that the difference in the scores for attained for the first and second false 
belief tasks presented, (M=0.89, SD=0.31) and (M=0.65, SO=0.48) respectively, was 
significant; 1(74) = 4.030, 12<0.001. Whereas 5 of the children who failed the second 
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task presented, also failed the first task, 21 children passed the first false belief task 
but failed under further testing. Only 3 children showed the reverse pattern - failing 
on the first task presented but passing the second. 
Table 3.20: Score means and standard deviations for the ToM tasks presentedjirst and second across 
the 4-year-old. 5-year-old and. 6-year-old age groups. 
ToM task presentation Age group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
First 4 0.84 0.37 
5 0.89 0.32 
6 0.96 0.21 
Second 4 0.40 0.50 
5 0.63 0.49 
6 0.96 0.21 
Table 3.21: Summary table for the 3 (age group: 4-year-olds vs. 5-year-olds vs. 6-year-olds) analysis 
a/variance a/scores on the second ToM task. 
Source SS df MS E Partial Eta 3 
-Within 13.253 72 0.184 
Age group 3.734 2 1.867 10.143 0.001 0.220 
(corrected model) 3.734 2 1.867 10.143 0.001 0.220 
(corrected total) 16.987 74 
3.4 Discussion 
This study was concerned with examining the relationship between EF and 
appreciation of the "some implies not-all" SI. It also served to investigate the validity 
of the SI task employed by Papafragou and Musolino (2003) Experiment 2. 
In contrast to expectations and the masked competence account of the 
emergence of CU, no relationship was revealed between EF assessed in terms of 
either inhibitory or shifting ability, and the demonstration of CU assed in terms of the 
computation of SIs. Although Nilsen and Graham (2009) reported a relationship 
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between EF and CU manifest in an association between inhibitory EF and 
communicative perspective-taking ability, so far no evidence has been produced to 
support a relationship between EF and the ability to compute SIs. 
Furthermore, support was not provided for expectations and standard accounts 
of CU which conceptualise CU in terms of the appreciation of the communicative 
intentions behind messages. Analyses did not indicate that ToM was significantly 
related to CU. Although previous studies have revealed relationships between ToM 
and other aspects of CU, such as the ability to detect violations of Gricean maxims 
(Surian, Baron-Cohen, & van der Lely, 1996) and the ability to appreciate irony 
(Martin, & McDonald, 2003), evidence has not been provided to support a 
relationship between ToM and the specific ability to compute SIs to date. 
Whilst the lack of association between EF ability and performance on the SI 
and false belief measures might at first seem problematic for a masked competence 
account of the development ofCU, its significance would seem to be undermined by 
weaknesses observed with the measures used to assess EF. For example, the older 
children: 5- and 6-year-olds, were performing at ceiling on the DCCS, precluding 
analysis of associations between their DCCS performance and responses on the SI 
task. Further, on the Day-Night task, some children responded very quickly with the 
required label when presented with a card, but the responses of others were often 
delayed. It could have been that reaction times during these trials reflected the ease 
with which children were inhibiting the standard labelling association, so that these 
times were indexing inhibitory ability. One might thus expect that if response times 
had been measured in the Day-Night task, they would have correlated positively with 
scores in the SI trials. Indeed, it might have been that reaction times would have 
proved similarly informative in the DCCS task. Diamond and Kirkham (2005) report 
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that when reaction times are examined, even adults reveal a cognitive cost when 
switching in the DCCS task, despite performing at near ceiling with regards to sorting 
accuracy. 
Moreover, in the Day-Night task, children were initially told the rules of the 
game, and then presented with trials requiring them to act in accordance with the 
instructions. However initial trials were only considered training trials (Le. 
performance on them was d;id not contribute to the task score) until the point at which 
two consecutive trials were passed. At this point children were considered to have 
demonstrated appreciation of the task rules, so these two consecutive trials and all 
trials presented thereafter were counted as test trials. However there appeared to be 
quite a large variation in the number of training trials children received before passing 
two consecutive trials. 
Moreover, it was noticed that some children who only required a few (e.g. 
three) training trials before proceeding to the test trials, often achieved moderate 
scores on the Day-Night task, whereas children who required a large number of 
training trials (e.g. 10) often achieved high scores. It is conceivable that because the 
training trials required demonstration of the inhibition rule, they actually served to 
hone inhibitory ability. Thus it might have been that children who received more 
training trials, were initially failing to pass two consecutive trials, not due to a failure 
to understand task rules, but due to a lack of inhibitory power. The additional training 
trials received could conceivably have provided more of a chance to practice and 
strengthen this skill before ability started to make a contribution to task scores. If this 
had been the case, the training trials would have been serving to diminish differences 
in inhibitory ability between children, reducing the likelihood that a relationship 
would be found between these differences and variation in the ability to compute SIs. 
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Therefore, the use of EF tasks which reduce the need for EF when initially 
establishing appreciation of task requirements, might increase sensitivity to individual 
differences in EF ability. For example, in the Simon task measure of inhibitory 
ability, participants can be asked to provide an initial demonstration of rule 
appreciation that does not require inhibition. The use of this task, and others which do 
not require EF during training trials, would enhance the likelihood that a relationship 
would be found between EF and the ability to compute SIs. 
Although the sensitivity of the EF tasks used may have been limited by the 
inclusion of EF dependent training trials and their failure to incorporate a reaction 
time performance measure, the differentiation revealed between the two EF measures 
is supported in the adult literature (Miyake et aL, 2000). Nonetheless, the absence of 
significant relationships between performance on either EF task and false belief 
understanding that have previously been reported in the literature (e.g. Carlson & 
Moses, 2001; Hala, Hug, & Henderson, 2003; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Perner, 
Lang & Kloo, 2002) further suggests that the EF measures should be improved. 
Although it is worth noting that the lack of a significant association between 
performance on the EF tasks and scores in the false-belief ToM tasks, might also be 
partially attributable to the unsuitability of the ToM tasks employed for the age of the 
children tested in Experiment 1. 
The literature indicates that the first order false-belief tasks employed in this 
study are typically passed by children as young as 3 to 4 years (Leslie, 1994; Surian & 
Leslie, 1995), whereas in this study they were given to children of up to 6 years. 
Indeed the 6-year-olds in this study were performing at ceiling on the false-belief 
tasks, precluding their ToM data from some analyses. Furthermore, even the score 
variation ofthe 4- and 5-year-olds who were not scoring at ceiling was questionable, 
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with analyses indicating that they were biased to pass the first task presented, over the 
second. Such a pattern would not be expected if passing only one of the two tasks was 
a genuine sign of a lack of ToM. This leaves open the suggestion that variation in 
ToM scores, which was calculated from the summation of scores across the two tasks 
and mainly reflected the performance of children passing either both or only one of 
the two tasks, revealed fatigue effects rather than genuine ToM difficulties. That 
performance on the two false belief tasks did not correlate significantly supports this 
argument. Studies which have reported relationships between performance on the 
Day-Night task and first-order false belief understanding, have tended to focus on 
younger children between 3 and 4 years of age (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hala, Hug, 
& Henderson, 2003). Although Pemer, Lang and Kloo (2002) found a relationship 
between the DCCS and first-order false belief performance of children aged between 
3 and 6 years of age, over two thirds of their participants were under 5-years-old and 
their oldest participant was 6 years 2 months. 
The use of second-order false belief tasks, which are more appropriate for use 
with the older children tested in this study (standard tasks are typically passed by 6-
year-olds; Baron-Cohen, Miller, 2009; O'Riordan, Stone, Jones & Plaisted, 1999; 
Pemer & Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994), might have 
enabled the demonstration of ToM-EF and ToM-SI associations. 
In accordance with hypotheses, performance on the SI trials of the CU task 
appeared to be significantly worse than performance in all of the control conditions. 
The fact that children performed better on the two control conditions requiring 
positive evaluations of the puppet's descriptions (Sets 1 and 3), than in the SI trials 
(Set 4), suggests that good performance on the SI trials was not simply reflecting the 
existence of a negative response bias. If children had been exhibiting a negative 
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response bias, it would have negatively affected their performance on these two 
control conditions. Additional enhanced performance (again relative to that in the SI 
trials), in the control condition requiring negative evaluation of the puppet's 
descriptions (Set 2), indicates further that performance in the SI trials did not simply 
reflect the ability to evaluate negatively. If this had been the case, one would have 
expected similar performance across these two sets. The fact that significantly more 
children who scored poorly in Set 2 control trials, performed poorly in the SI trials 
than performed well in the SI trials, but the same relationship did not hold for children 
who scored poorly in Control Sets 1 or 3, does however suggest that the demands of 
responding negatively to the puppet's descriptions, did indeed evoke an additional 
processing cost. 
Significantly better performance in all of the control conditions relative to the 
SI trials, suggests that performance in the latter condition reflected more than the 
general cost of processing associated with the linguistic content and context of the 
descriptions to be evaluated and responses to be produced. Although these general 
costs were also demanded in the control conditions, performance was significantly 
better in the control conditions than in the SI trials. Indeed, this differentiation 
between performance in the SI and control conditions, remained even when all 
children scoring poorly in the control trials (Le. only correctly rejecting or accepting 
descriptions 50% or less of the time), were removed from analyses, supporting the 
robustness of the finding. The difference between performance in the SI trials and 
performance in the control conditions suggests that the SI trials were also tapping a 
separate ability not evoked in the control trials. Given the nature of the SI trials, this is 
very likely to be the ability to compute SIs. This data thus serves to support the 
validity of the SI trials used in Papafragou and Musolino (2003) Experiment 2. As 
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discussed in Section 3.1, the control conditions used in this study were superior to 
those used by Papafragou and Musolino (2003) Experiment 2, because the linguistic 
content used in the SI trials was incorporated. This reduced the possibility that factors 
specific to the linguistic terms used, but not reflecting the actual computation of SIs, 
could account for the rejection of descriptions during the SI trials. 
Further, the considerable demands on response flexibility, invoked by the 
employment of three control conditions (two requiring responses conflicting, and one 
requiring responses consistent with those necessary for the SI trials) extended the 
degree of response alternation evoked in the processing of descriptions relevant to the 
some-all implicatures ofPapafragou and Musolino (2003) Experiment 2. Thus closer 
examination of the effect of response demands on performance in the SI trials was 
enabled. There were no significant relationships between poor performance in Control 
Sets 1 and 3, which required positive evaluation of the puppets' descriptions, and 
performance in the SI trials, which required negative evaluation of puppet 
descriptions. However, poor performance in Control Set 2, which required negative 
evaluation of the puppet's descriptions, was significantly related to poor performance 
in the SI trials, suggesting that performance in the SI trials might have been partially 
reflective of the processing demands evoked by responding negatively. The fact 
remains nonetheless that performance in the SI trials was significantly different from 
performance in Control Set 2, indicating that performance in the SI trials was not just 
reflecting response demands. This supports the suggestion that the SI trials were 
indeed, to some extent, assessing the ability to compute SIs. 
The idea that negative responding may make additional demands on 
processing resources is consistent with Fritzley and Lee (2003)'s report that, initially 
(around 2 years of age), children demonstrate a bias to respond positively to 
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questions. Fritzley and Lee argue that this response tendency disappears later on 
(around 4-5 years of age), provided the questions presented are comprehensible. 
Incomprehensible queries are thought to evoke a negative response bias from 4- to 5-
year-olds. If negative responses are more resource-demanding, it makes sense that 
younger children with under-developed processing systems should demonstrate a 
preference for a less taxing positive response. 
The suggestion that performance in the SI trials might have been partially 
reflective of the processing demands evoked by responding negatively, is lent further 
support by the finding that scores for the SI trials appeared to be significantly better 
when the trials were presented after rather than before the Control Set 2 trials. This is 
concordant with the idea that the practice of responding negatively in the Control Set 
2 trials was honing the ability to evaluate negatively, making it easier to then provide 
a similar response in the SI trials presented afterwards. However, performance in the 
SI trials also appeared to be significantly better when they were presented after rather 
than before the Control Set 1 trials, which demanded positive description evaluations. 
This suggests that presentation order effects were not just attributable to response 
training effects. The fact that performance in the SI trials did not seem to be affected 
by whether these trials were presented before or after Control Set 3, which was 
similar to Control Set 1 in providing appropriate scenario descriptions, indicates that 
the facilitatory effect of Control Set 1 was not due to more general task training 
effects either. However, by presenting children with "all" descriptions in appropriate 
scenarios, Control Set 1 might have served to remind children of the concept of "all" 
promoting their grasp of the comparative aspect of the concept of "some". 
The level of SIs drawn in this study, was compared to the proportion drawn in 
Papafragou and Musolino (2003) Experiment 2. Th~ir sample of 5- to 6-year-olds 
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(M= 67 months), correctly rejected 52.5 % descriptions in the SI trials, whilst the 5-
to 6-year-olds tested in this study (mean age 70.44 months) correctly rejected 61.5 % 
of descriptions in these trials. However, when the older 6-year-olds in the current 
study were excluded, to reduce the mean age of our sample to a level comparable to 
that ofPapafragou and Musolino's sample (new mean age of our sample being 67.16 
Months), the sample of 5- to 6-year-olds from this study were found to have rejected 
56.45 % of descriptions in the SI trials. This level is more in line with the findings of 
Papfragou and Musolino's study. 
With the exception of performance on the inhibitory EF task, all the abilities 
measured in this study improved significantly with age. This is in line with 
expectations. Concerns were raised previously in this section concerning the 
sensitivity of the inhibitory EF task which might also account for the lack of age 
effects found for this task. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Experiment 1 did not provide support for the masked competence account of 
CU as neither inhibitory nor shifting EF abilities were found to demonstrate relations 
to SI appreciation. Furthermore, it did not reveal a significant association between 
ToM and SI appreciation, in contrast to the conception of SIs in terms of the 
recognition of communicative intentions. However, comparison of performance on 
the SI control tasks incorporated in this study, provided support for the validity of the 
SI task employed by Papafragou and Musolino (2003). Experiment 2 was undertaken 
to investigate whether the use of different EF measures would allow demonstration of 
a relationship between EF and CU and whether the incorporation of more advanced 
ToM tasks would reveal that ToM plays a mediatory role in this relationship. 
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Chapter 4: Experiment 2 - Using new measures to investigate the relationships 
between executive functioning, scalar implicatures and theory of mind. 
4.1 Introduction 
Experiment 1 investigated whether EF abilities are related to measures of CU 
in young children aged between 4 and 6 years, and whether ToM ability plays a 
mediating role in this relationship. It also examined the validity of the SI task 
employed by Papafragou and Musolino (2003). Children performed significantly 
better in the control trials than in the SI trials of the SI task, supporting the proposal 
that the SI trials were genuinely reflective of the ability to compute SIs, rather than 
the more general processing costs demanded in the control conditions. However, the 
masked competence account of the emergence of CU was not supported, as EF 
abilities were not found to be related to computation of SIs. Furthermore, ToM ability 
was not found to be significantly associated with either appreciation of SIs or EF. 
possible reasons for these lack of associations were discussed, including the 
suggestion that EF tasks which placed training trial demands on the EF abilities 
assessed in proceeding test trials, worked to diminish initial individual differences in 
EF. The absence of significant relationships must also be seen in terms of 
performance of the children on the ToM and EF tasks that was often at a ceiling level, 
particularly for the 5- and 6-year-olds. 
The second experiment was conducted using alternative measures of EF and 
additional measures of ToM to further investigate the relationship of EF to CU and 
ToM. CU was assessed using the SI trials employed in Experiment 1. The control 
conditions of the conversational task were not used in Experiment 2 because the 
validity of the SI trials had already been established in the previous experiment. 
Furthermore, since only the 6-year-olds were found to demonstrate above chance 
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performance levels in the SI trials Experiment 1, indicating that SI appreciation 
emerges between 5 and 6 years, the age range of the participants in Experiment 2 was 
restricted to these ages. 
In place of the Day-Night inhibitory task used in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 
employed the Frog-Simon task to assess inhibitory ability. Unlike the Day-Night task, 
the Frog-Simon task did not require a pre-test trial training phase and so avoided the 
potential confound of inhibitory training affecting the day-night task in Experiment 1. 
In place of the DCCS shifting task, the Dibbets Updating task was used. Updating 
ability reflects another of Miyake et ai's proposed components of EF and is an EF 
competence that was not investigated in Experiment 1. This task was expected to be 
more age appropriate than the DCCS task, on which the older children had performed 
at ceiling in Experiment 1. Although the updating task did employ an updating 
training phase, this served as one of the two measures of updating ability. 
To assess ToM, Experiment 2 employed the first-order ToM tasks used in 
Experiment 1. These tasks are known as first-order ToM tasks because they assess the 
relatively basic ability to conceptualise that people merely represent (i.e. do not have 
direct access to) the physical world. However, as noted in Section 3.4, such tasks as 
usually passed by children aged 3-4 years. The relevance of variation in the 
performance of older children on such tasks is thus questionable. To strengthen 
conclusions drawn from analyses of performance on ToM measures, second-order 
ToM tasks were also employed in Experiment 2. Second-order ToM tasks are more 
difficult than first-order tasks, because they require the recognition that others 
appreciate that people merely possess representations of the physical world. Second-
order tasks are typically passed by 6-year-olds (Baron-Cohen, Q'Riordan, Stone, 
Jones, & Plaisted 1999; Miller, 2009; Pemer and Wimmer 1985; Sullivan, Zaitchik, & 
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Tager-Flusberg, 1994) and so variation in performance on this task is likely to reflect 
genuine differences in second order ToM appreciation rather than fatigue effects. 
However, first-order tasks were still included in this study, to gauge individual 
differences in the ToM of 5-year-olds who might be expected to perform at baseline 
on the second-order ToM tasks. 
In Experiment 2, it was again hypothesised that both EF and appreciation of 
false beliefs would be positively related to awareness of SIs. A relationship between 
appreciation of false beliefs and EF abilities was also expected. It was further 
anticipated that the relationship between awareness of SIs and EF abilities would be 
mediated by the appreciation of false beliefs. Additionally, all abilities were expected 
to improve with age. 
4.2 Method 
Participants. These were 62 children aged between 5 and 6 years, split into 
two age groups: a younger group (M=68.76 months, range =62-76 months) and an 
older group (M=79.79 months, range =77-83 months). The children were 
predominantly white and middle class, and were recruited from a primary school in 
Sheffield. All children spoke English as their first language, and none were known to 
have any specific language impairment. Two other children (both aged 77 months) 
were excluded for failing to participate in all the tasks presented (one was unable to 
perform the response action required in the inhibitory task due to a prosthetic arm, 
and the other declined to finish the updating task). 
Procedure. The children were tested individually, in a quiet area of their 
school, and all took part in seven tasks presented in a fixed order. Testing was 
conducted over the course of one session (lasting approximately 20-25 minutes). The 
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session commenced with the SI task followed by two first-order false-belief tasks, two 
second-order false-belief tasks, the Frog Simon Inhibitory task, and an Updating task. 
S! Task. This was the SI task employed in Experiment 1 that was administered 
without the control conditions used in Experiment 1, as the previous experiment had 
already established that performance in the SI trials was not simply reflective of a 
response bias or general processing demands. Children were introduced to two hand 
puppets - Ellie the Elephant and Harry the Hedgehog, and took part in warm-up 
statement training trials led by Ellie the Elephant, as in Experiment 1. Following the 
warm-up statements, children were presented with the four scalar implicature test 
scenarios comprising Set 4 in Experiment 1. The implicature descriptions were 
delivered by Harry the Hedgehog. Presentation of these trials was counterbalanced 
using two different orders. For half of the children the trials were presented as they 
read downwards in Set 4 of Table 3.2, Experiment 1. For the other half of the 
children, the trials were presented as they read upwards in Set 4 of Table 3.2, 
Experiment 1. The total number of correct responses to enquiries regarding whether 
the puppet had described the situation well, was recorded and translated into the SI 
score with a possible range of 0-4. As in Experiment 1, children were awarded 1 point 
for each "No" response they made, but were not awarded points for "Yes" responses. 
Children who correctly evaluated the puppet's statements negatively were asked how 
the puppet could have "said it better". Correct justifications (indicating the puppet's 
incorrect use of the term "all" and the better suitability of the term "some") were 
recorded and translated into the SI justification score with a possible range of 0-4. 
Although a conservative measure of the appreciation of SIs, appropriate justifications 
were used to support the validity of the SI score. 
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First-order false belief tasks. These were identical to the tasks used in 
Experiment 1. Each task score had a possible range of 0-1. 
Second-order false belief tasks. Two tasks were used to assess second-order 
theory of mind ability. One was based on the memory aid version of the second-order 
task of Pemer and Wimmer (1985), as used by Baron-Cohen (1989). Children were 
presented with four toy characters: a grandmother, a grandfather, a small boy 
(Johnny) and a baby in a pram along with a small wooden house containing a bed, and 
a wooden chair (see Appendix Va). The house was placed in the centre of an A3 
board, which had two rectangular strips of light green paper stuck to the surface, in 
front of and behind, where the house was positioned (representing the front and back 
gardens). A strip of dark green paper was attached to the surface of the board to the 
left of the front of the house (representing the park), and a strip of blue paper attached 
to the right of the front of the house (representing the sea). The children were 
introduced to the four toy characters and then were told the story below: 
One day Granny said, "I'm going to take the baby for a walk in the park. Do 
you want to come with us Johnny?" It was a hot day so Johnny said, "I'm too hot, I 
don't want to go for a walk!" So Granny went off to the park with baby, while Johnny 
went to play in the back garden, and Granddad sat at the front of the house. A little 
later Granddad saw Granny coming backfrom the park "Where are you going?" he 
asked Granny replied "The park was shut, so I'm going to take baby to the sea 
instead. " Granddad said "Ok, I'm going to have a little sleep. " Next, Granny and 
baby walked by the back of the garden. "Hello Granny, I'm up here!" waved Johnny 
from the tree. Granny told Johnny that she and baby were going to the seaside. 
Children were then asked two control questions to check that they were 
following the story: 
Chapter 4: Experiment 2 118 
_ Does Granddad know that Granny talked to Johnny? 
- Where are Granny and baby? 
If these questions were passed, the story continued as below. If they were failed, the 
relevant part of story was repeated and children were asked these questions again. No 
child failed the control questions a second time. 
A little later, Johnny was bored, and decided to go and find Granny and baby. 
He ran back through the house and called out "Granddad, I'm going off to play with 
Granny and baby. " 
Children were then asked two test questions: 
_ Where does Granddad think Johnny will go? 
_ Why does Granddad think Johnny will go there? 
Following this, two more control questions were presented: 
_ Where are Granny and baby? (reality control) 
_ Where did Granny go with baby first of all? (memory control) 
The other second-order task was based on that of Sullivan, Zaitchik and 
Tager-Flusberg (1994). Children were presented with five pictures (see Appendix 
Vb), using PowerPoint slides. These were shown in the sequence 1-5 on a laptop 
computer. The pictures were accompanied by the narration below: 
Picture 1 - Granddad has given Mary and Simon some chocolate to share. 
"Go and put it away now children", says Granddad, "you can have some when mum 
says so". 
Picture 2 - The children run into the kitchen and put the chocolate in the fridge. Then 
they go out to play. 
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Picture 3 -A little later, Simon comes infor a glass of water. He goes to the fridge 
and he sees the chocolate. He wants to keep the chocolate allfor himself, so he takes 
the chocolate out of the fridge and puts it in his bag. 
At this point children were asked two control questions to ensure that they had 
been following the story: 
- Where does Mary think the chocolate is? 
_ Where has Simon put the chocolate really? 
The test was discontinued if either control question was failed. No child failed these 
control questions. 
Picture 4 - Oh look! Mary is playing by the window; she can see everything 
that Simon is doing! She sees him put the chocolate in his bag! Simon is so busy 
hiding the chocolate he doesn't see Mary watching him! Later Mum calls Simon and 
Mary in for tea. She says they can have some of the chocolale. So Simon and Mary 
come running into the kitchen. 
Children were then presented with Picture 5 and asked two test questions: 
_ Where does Simon think Mary will look for the chocolate? 
_ Why does Simon think that? 
Children were asked two more control questions: 
_ Where is the chocolate really? (reality control) 
_ Where was the chocolate first of all? (memory control) 
The tasks were presented in a fixed order (the Perner task followed by the 
Sullivan task). As with the first-order false belief tasks, incorrect responses to the 
control questions presented after the test questions in a second-order task meant that 
responses to the test questions in that task were automatically recorded as incorrect. 
The total number of correct responses to the two test questions in each task was 
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recorded separately as the score for that task, with each task score having a possible 
range of 0-2. 
Frog Simon Inhibitory task .. This task was adapted from Simon and Small 
(1969). In the original task for adults, participants were asked to respond to high and 
low pitch tones using their left and right hands. Half of Simon and Small's sample 
were asked to press a key on their right when they heard a high-pitched tone but to 
press a key on their left when they heard a low-pitch tone. The instructions were 
reversed for the other half of the sample. Headphones were then used to deliver high 
and low pitch tones to the left and right ears of participants. Simon and Small found 
that responses were significantly faster when the ear to which a tone was played 
corresponded to the hand required to respond to that tone. The irrelevant presentation-
location of the target item appeared to interfere with processing the response required, 
suggesting that responding in accordance with presentation-location forms a prepotent 
response to be inhibited. The Simon task would thus seem to reflect a measure of 
inhibitory ability. 
The task was adapted for use with children by replacing high and low pitch 
tones with red and blue frogs, which were presented singly, on either the left- or right-
hand-side of a laptop computer screen using a series of Power Point slides. Half of the 
slides presented a frog on the left-hand-side of the screen, and of these slides, half 
presented a blue frog and half presented a red frog. The other half of the slides 
presented a frog on the right-hand-side of the screen and of these slides, half 
presented a blue frog and half presented a red frog. Children were asked to put a red 
bracelet on their right wrist and a blue bracelet on their left wrist and were instructed 
to tap the table with their red (right) hand when they saw a red frog, and to tap the 
table with their blue (left) hand when they saw a blue frog (see Appendix VI). The 
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colour of the frog was the only relevant piece of information from each slide. 
However, it was expected that the irrelevant left- or right-hand-side screen location of 
the frogs would bias children to respond with their respective hands, interfering with 
their ability to respond in accordance with the frog colour when the screen location 
and colour response conflicted. Response accuracy was used to assess inhibitory 
ability in this task and the total number of correct responses to the 20 stimulus slides 
presented was recorded as the score, with a possible range of2-20._This was because 
children had to respond correctly to the first two task slides, in which the frog location 
did not conflict with the colour response-hand instruction in order to show that they 
had listened to the task instructions. No child performed incorrectly on the first two 
slides. 
Updating task. This was based on the "Switch task for children" developed by 
Dibbets and Jolles (2006). Although the task was originally designed as a measure of 
the ability to switch between mental representations, it actually requires children to 
detect when these changes are required: in accordance with cueing stimuli. The task 
thus also involves the ability to update mental representations. 
Training phase -Sun: Children viewed a series of PowerPoint slides on a 
laptop accompanied by the experimenter's narration. They first viewed a slide 
showing a big cat asleep on a sofa, and a little kitten wide awake at her side. They 
were told: 
"Mummy cat has fallen asleep on the sofa. but her little kitten is feeling a bit bored 
and so he wanders off and goes outside. JJ 
At this point they were shown a slide of the kitten against a yellow background with a 
big sun in the middle of the sky. 
" But it's very hot outside so he starts to feel tired and takes a nap under a bush. JJ 
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They were then shown a slide with a purple bush on one side of the screen and a red 
bush on the other, again against a yellow background with a big sun in the middle of 
the sky. A lawnmower separated the two bushes. Children were asked: 
"Which bush do you think kitten's fallen asleep under? Just take a guess". 
The experimenter used the mouse to click on the chosen bush. If a child chose the 
purple bush, it would disappear to reveal the kitten and the experimenter would say 
"There he is, under the purple bush". If the red bush was chosen, it would disappear 
to reveal a big red cross inside a black square. The experimenter would say "He isn't 
under the red bush. So which bush do you think he's under?" The experimenter then 
told the child that she needed to check that they knew which bush the kitten was 
under and the process was repeated until the bush with the kitten had been identified 
on seven consecutive trials. The experimenter clicked on the lawnmower to move 
onto the next trial. In the sun slides, the kitten was always revealed when the purple 
bush was chosen. The positioning of the coloured bushes was counterbalanced across 
slides between the left and right side of the screen. When the criterion had been 
reached, the experimenter clicked on the sun, which ended that phase. 
Training phase -Rain: After the Sun training phase, the Rain training phase 
was presented. The experimenter opened up a new slideshow in which the purple and 
red bush were shown against a grey background. There was now a rain cloud in the 
sky where the sun had been in the previous slideshow. The lawnmower remained 
positioned between the two bushes. The experimenter said, "Well now it's raining! 
Now which bush do you think kitten is under? " The mouse was used to click on the 
chosen bush, but this time the kitten was revealed under the red bush. If the child 
chose the purple bush, it disappeared to reveal the red cross. The experimenter again 
told the child that she needed to check that they knew which bush the kitten was 
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under and the process was repeated until the bush with the kitten had been identified 
on seven consecutive trials. 
In the rain slides, the kitten was always revealed when the red bush was 
chosen. The positioning of the coloured bushes was counterbalanced across slides 
between the left and right side of the screen. When the criterion had been reached, the 
experimenter clicked on the rain cloud, which ended that phase. 
Training phase -Updating: After the Rain training phase, the Updating 
training phase was presented. The experimenter opened up a new slideshow in which 
the child was first shown a sun cue slide: sun in the centre of a yellow slide, followed 
by four slides from the Sun training phase. A sun was presented in the middle of the 
sky in these slides and the bushes were shown against a yellow background. Children 
were asked to identify which bush the kitten was under in each slide. Following the 
sun slides, children were presented with a rain cue slide: rain cloud in the centre of a 
grey slide, followed by four slides from the Rain training phase. A rain cloud was 
presented in the middle of the sky in these slides and the bushes were shown against a 
grey background. Again the children were asked to identify which bush kitten was 
under. Children were then presented with an updating cue slide: rain cloud and sun in 
the centre of a grey-yellow chequered slide, followed by four slides, two of which 
were from the Rain training phase and two of which were from the Sun training 
phase. These trials were presented in the order sun, rain, sun, rain. Following the first 
updating block, "pure" blocks of sun or rain slides (four slides in each block) were 
presented interspersed with updating blocks, in the order: rain, updating, sun, 
updating, sun, updating, rain, updating, sun, updating, rain, updating, rain, updating, 
sun, updating. 
Chapter 4: Experiment 2 124 
After the first updating block (Block 3) had been presented, passing criteria 
came into effect. These were identical to those applied in the previous two training 
phases. Children were required to identify the bush revealing the kitten on seven 
consecutive trials. When criterion had been reached, the experimenter ended that 
phase in the appropriate manner. The level of training reached during this phase was 
initially split into three categories for the purpose of identifying children suitable to 
move onto the switch test trials. Although all children demonstrated the ability to 
respond appropriately to location cues in the sun and rain training phases, some 
children completely lost this ability upon viewing the updating blocks. These children 
became unable even to respond appropriately during the pure blocks presented 
following the updating blocks in the updating training phase, and so could not pass 
even four consecutive trials. Such children were assigned to a "Poor Level of 
Updating Training" category. The "Intermediate Level of Updating Training" 
category comprised children who had a stable basic appreciation that the kitten could 
be found under the purple bush in the sun slides and under the red bush in the rain 
slides, and so could respond appropriately during the pure blocks presented in the 
updating training phase. These children could thus pass four consecutive trials. 
However, they were not good enough at attending to the sun/rain cues to demonstrate 
competence in the updating blocks and thus could not pass seven trials consecutively. 
Children who did well in both the pure and updating blocks and successfully 
identified the location of the kitten on seven consecutive trials were assigned to a 
"Good Level of Updating Training" category. 
Updating Test Trials: Children who were assigned to the Good Level of 
Updating Training or Intermediate Level of Updating Training categories in the 
training phase, moved onto the Updating test trials. For those children assigned to the 
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Poor Level of Updating Training category, the updating task ceased with the last 
training trial. The test trials comprised eight blocks often trials. Blocks were 
presented in the order - sun, updating, rain, updating, sun, updating, rain, updating. 
Each block was preceded by an appropriate cue slide. The total number of correct 
responses to the 80 test slides presented was recorded as the "Updating Test" score, 
with a possible range of 0-80. Correct responses required updating of slide 
representations, to denote the presence of the sun or of the rain cloud indicators of 
kitten location, and so the number of correct responses given was considered to reflect 
updating ability. 
However, the switch training phase also required children to constantly update 
their mental representations of the slides shown on screen. Thus the level of training 
reached (Updating Training level), could also be considered to reflect updating 
ability. Although children were initially split into three different groups, to identify 
children suitable to move onto the test trials of the Dibbets task, analyses of updating 
ability reflected in the updating training phase recognised only one level distinction. 
All children assigned to the Poor or Intermediate Level of Updating Training 
categories were considered together and put in a "weak updating training" category, 
which was assigned a score of O. All children assigned to the Good Level of 
Updating Training category were put in a "strong updating training" category, which 
was assigned a score of 1. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the slides shown and 
corresponding kitten locations for the different trials presented during the training and 
test phases of the Dibbets updating measure. 
Chapter 4: Experiment 2 126 
Table 4.1: Training and test trials employed in the Dibbets Task updating measure in Experiment 2 





Sun All with sun cue Always the purple bush 
Rain All with rain cue Always the red bush 
Updating Blocks of sun trials comprising 4 sun Always the purple bush in 
cue slides, and rain trials comprising 
4 rain cue slides, separated by blocks 
of updating trials comprising 2 sun 
and 2 rain cue slides presented in an 
interspersed order i.e. sun, rain, sun, 
rain. 
Updating Blocks of sun trials comprising 10 
sun trial blocks, always the 
red bush in rain trial 
blocks, half the time the 
red bush and half the time 
the purple bush in 
updating trial blocks. 
Always the purple bush in 
sun cue slides, and rain trials sun trial blocks, always the 
comprising lOrain cue slides, red bush in rain trial 
separated by blocks of updating trials blocks, half the time the 
comprising 5 sun and 5 rain cue red bush and half the time 
slides presented in an interspersed 
order i.e. sun, rain, sun, rain, rain, 
sun, rain, sun, sun, rain. 
the purple bush in 
updating trial blocks. 
The means and standard deviations of the task scores achieved by the 62 
participants are presented in Table 4.2. Since only 49 children satisfied the criterion 
for passing on to the test phase in the Dibbets updating EF task (23 children from the 
younger age group, 26 from the older age group), the means and standard deviations 
of the Dibbets updating EF task test scores were derived from this sub-sample of 49 
children~ 
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Table 4.2: Mean scores and standard deviations for EF. ToM and CU tasks employed in Experiment 2 
Age group Younger Older 
N 33 29 
Age (months) 68.76 (4.66) 79.79 (1.93) 
SI scores/4 2.24 (1.75) 2.76 (1.79) 
SI justifications/4 1.55 (1.82) 1.90 (1.86) 
First first-order FB/l 0.94 (0.24) 0.97 (0.19) 
Second first-order FB/l 0.82 (0.39) 0.90 (0.31) 
Perner second-order FB/2 0.52 (0.83) 0.48 (0.79) 
Sullivan second-order FB/2 1.33 (0.82) 1.48 (0.74) 
Frog Simon inhibition EF/20 18.52 (1.50) 18.66 (2.18) 
Dibbets updating EF test scores/80 69.87 (9.54) 75.08(5.69) 
Dibbets updating EF training scores EF/l 0.45 (0.51) 0.59 (0.50) 
Note: SI=scalar implicature task; FB-False belief task; EF-Executive functioning task. 
Relation between EF and SIs 
Children's updating EF training was classed as strong if their scores for the 
training phase of the Dibbets task were 1 and weak if these were O. The weak and 
strong division criteria were selected on the basis that they enabled as equal a split as 
possible in the number of children assigned to the two EF ability groups. A 2 
(updating EF training score: weak vs. strong) x 2 (age group: younger vs. older) 
factorial analysis of variance was conducted on SI scores. N was comparable for weak 
versuS strong updating groups across the age groups, 18: 15, and 12:17 for the younger 
and older age groups respectively. The effect of updating EF training score on SI 
score was significant, E(1,58) = 4.967, £<0.05. Children with strong updating training 
had greater SI scores (M=3.00, SD=1.61) than children with weak updating training 
(M=1.93, SD=1.80). There was no significant main or interaction effect involving age 
group. Table 4.3 reports the means and standard deviations of SI scores for the weak 
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and strong updating training groups across age groups and Table 4.4 reports the 
ANOV A summary data. 
Table 4.3: SI score means and standard deviations for the weak updaters (updating EF training score: 
<I) and strong updaters (updating EF training score =1) across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Updating group Mean SI score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 1.50 1.62 
Strong 3.13 1.51 
Older Weak 2.58 1.93 
Strong 2.88 1.73 
Table 4.4: Summary table/or the 2 (updating EF training score: O/weak vs. lIstrong) x 2(age group: 
younger vs. older) analysis a/variance o/SI scores. 
Source SS df MS E Partial Eta 2 
Within 164.915 58 2.843 
Updating EF 14.124 1 14.124 4.967 0.030 0.079 
Age group 2.621 1 2.621 0.922 0.341 0.016 
Updating EF x 6.734 1 6.734 2.368 0.129 0.039 
Age group 
(corrected model) 26.569 3 8.856 3.115 0.033 0.139 
(corrected total) 191.484 61 
A 2 (updating EF training score: O/weak vs. IIstrong) x 2 (age group: younger 
vs. older) factorial analysis of variance was also conducted on SI justifications. The 
effect of updating EF training score on SI justifications was also significant, E(l,58) = 
8.838,12<0.01. Children with strong updating training produced more SI justifications 
(M=2.38, SO=1.77) than children with weak updating training (M=1.00, SD=1.64). 
Again, there was no significant main or interaction effect for age group. Table 4.5 
reports the means and standard deviations of SI justifications for the weak and strong 
updating training groups across age groups and Table 4.6 reports the ANOVA 
summary data. 
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Table 4.5: Sl justification means and standard deviations for the weak updaters (updating EF training 
score: < J) and strong updaters (updating EF training score = J) across the older and younger age 
groups. 
Age group Updating group Mean SI justifications Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 0.67 1.41 
Strong 2.60 1.72 
Older Weak 1.50 1.88 
Strong 2.18 1.85 
Table 4.6: Summary table for the 2 (updating EF training score: O/weak vs. lIstrong) x 2(age group: 
younger vs. older) analysis of variance ofSl justifications. 
Source SS df MS .E Partial Eta 2 
Within 169.071 58 2.915 
Updating EF 25.763 1 25.763 8.838 0.004 0.132 
Age group 0.635 1 0.635 0.218 0.642 0.004 
Updating EF x 5.975 1 5.975 2.050 0.158 0.034 
Age group 
(corrected model) 35.704 3 11.901 4.083 0.011 0.174 
(corrected total) 204.774 61 
Children's updating EF test scores were classed as strong if their scores for the 
test phase of the Dibbets task were 76 or greater and weak if these were less than 76. 
Again, the weak and strong division criteria were selected on the basis that they 
enabled as equal a split as possible in the number of children assigned to the two EF 
ability groups. A 2 (updating EF test score: weak vs. strong) x 2 (age group: younger 
vs. older) factorial analysis of variance was conducted on SI scores, and was 
necessarily restricted to the sub-sample of children taking part in the updating EF test 
trials. For the weak versus strong updating groups respectively, N was 17:6 for the 
younger age group and 9: 17 for the older age group. This analysis did not reveal a 
significant effect of updating EF test score,..E(l ,45) = 1.317,12>0.20, and there was no 
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significant main or interaction effect involving age group. Table 4.7 reports the means 
and standard deviations of SI scores for the weak and strong updating test score 
groups across age groups. 
Table 4.7: Sf score means and standard deviations for the weak updaters (updating EF test score: 
< 76) and strong updaters (updating EF test score ~76) across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Updating group Mean SI score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 2.29 1.99 
Strong 1.67 1.51 
Older Weak 3.22 1.39 
Strong 2.53 1.94 
Similarly, a 2 (updating EF test score: <76/weak vs. ~76/strong) x 2 (age 
group: younger vs. older) factorial analysis of variance with SI justifications as the 
dependent measure, again restricted to the sub-sample of children taking part in the 
updating EF test trials, did not reveal a significant effect of updating EF test score, 
E(1 ,45) = 0.036, R>0.80. As before, there was no significant main or interaction effect 
for age group. Table 4.8 reports the means and standard deviations of SI justifications 
for the weak and strong updating test score groups across age groups. 
Table 4.8: Sf justification means and standard deviations for the weak updaters (updating EF test 
score: < 76) and strong updaters (updating EF test score ~76) across the older and younger age 
groups. 
Age group Updating group Mean SI justification Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 1.82 1.94 
Strong 1.83 1.72 
Older Weak 1.67 1.80 
Strong 1.88 1.90 
Children's inhibitory EF was classed as strong if their scores for the Frog 
Simon task were 19 or greater and weak if these were less than 19, with division 
criteria chosen on the basis that they enabled as equal a split as possible in the number 
Chapter 4: Experiment 2 131 
of children assigned to the two EF ability groups. A 2 (inhibitory EF score: weak vs. 
strong) x 2 (age group: younger vs. older) factorial analysis of variance with SI scores 
as the dependent measure was carried out. For the weak versus strong inhibitory 
groups respectively, N was 12:21 for the younger age group and 8:21 for the older age 
group. There were no significant main effects of either inhibitory EF, E(1,58) = 0.094, 
12>0.70, or age group, F(I,58) = 3.644, g>0.06. However, there was a significant EF 
ability-age group interaction effect, Eel,58) = 4.881,12<0.05 (see Figure 4.1). Table 
4.9 reports the means and standard deviations of SI scores for the weak and strong 
inhibitory groups across age groups and Table 4.10 reports the ANOVA summary 
data. T-tests revealed that weak inhibitory ability was associated with significantly 
greater SI scores in the older age group than strong inhibitory ability, 1(26.971) = 
2.379,12<0.05. There was no significant difference in the SI scores associated with 
weak and strong inhibitory ability in the younger age group,J(31) = 1.453,12>0.10. 
Table 4.9: Sf score means and standard deviations/or the weak inhibitors (inhibitory EF score: <19) 
and strong inhibitors (inhibitory EF score ~J 9) across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Inhibitory group Mean SI score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 1.67 1.83 
Strong 2.57 1.66 
Older Weak 3.63 0.74 
Strong 2.43 1.96 
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Table 4.10: Summary tablefor the 2 (inhibitory EF score: <19lweak liS. ?,19Istrong) x 2(age group: 
younger liS. older) analysis of variance ofSI scores. 
Source SS df M E Partial Eta2 
Within 172.827 58 2.980 
Inhibitory EF 0.280 0.280 0.094 0.760 0.002 
Age Group 10.857 10.857 3.644 0.061 0.059 
Inhibitory EF x 14.544 14.544 4.881 0.031 0.078 
Age Group 
(corrected model) 18.656 3 6.219 2.087 0.112 0.097 
(corrected total) 191.484 61 










Error bars: +1- I D 
Inhibitory Abi lity 
• Weak 
A 2 (inhibitory EF score: <19/weak vs. 2: 19/strong) x 2 (ag group: younger v . older) 
factorial analysis of variance with SI justifications as the dependent mea ure did not 
reveal a significant effect of inhibitory EF, fi l ,58) = 0.327, 2>0.50 or a ignificant 
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main or interaction effect involving age group. Table 4.11 reports the means and 
standard deviations of SI justifications for the weak and strong inhibitory groups 
across age groups. 
Table 4.11 : Sf justification means and standard deviations for the weak inhibitors (inhibitory EF score: 
<19) and strong inhibitors (inhibitory EF score ~19) across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Inhibitory group Mean SI justifications Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 1.08 1.78 
Strong 1.81 1.83 
Older Weak 2.00 1.93 
Strong 1.86 1.88 
Role o/ToM in the relationship between EF and CU 
Regressions were conducted on SI scores, using composite measures of ToM 
as regressors. These composite measures comprised total scores across just the first-
order ToM tasks, total scores across just the second-order ToM tasks, total scores 
across the first- and second-order ToM tasks and total scores across the first- and 
second-order ToM tasks not including points for appropriate second-order 
justifications (this last measure will be referred to as the total predictive scores across 
the first- and second-order ToM tasks). No ToM model proved a significant fit: when 
total scores across just the first-order ToM tasks were considered, .E(1,60) = 0.075, 
11>0.70, when total scores across just the second-order ToM tasks were considered, 
E(l,60)= 0.815, 11>0.30, when total scores across the first- and second-order ToM 
tasks were considered, I( 1,60)= 1.233, 11>0.20 and when only total predictive scores 
across the first- and second-order ToM tasks were considered, E(I,60)= 2.195, 
11>0.10. 
Regressions using composite ToM measures were then repeated on SI 
justifications. As before, no ToM model proved a significant fit: for total scores 
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across just the first-order ToM tasks, E(1,60)= 0.006, 12>0.90, for total scores across 
just the second-order ToM tasks, E(1,60)= 0.368, 12>0.50, for total scores across the 
first- and second-order ToM tasks, E(1,60)= 0.713, 12>0.40, for only total predictive 
scores across the first- and second-order ToM tasks, E(I,60)= 1.635,12>0.20. 
Regressions were conducted on SI scores next, using EF measures as 
regressors. Performance on the inhibitory EF task did not prove a significant fit: 
E(I,60)=0.327, 12>0.50, nor did the background variable of age: E(1,60)=1.278, 
WO.20. The best fitting model for the whole sample of SI score data thus employed 
only the updating EF training score. This model was a poor fit (R2adj = 7.7%), but the 
overall relationship was significant E(1,60) = 6.080, 12< 0.05. Table 4.12 reports the 
summary data for this regression. 
When the sample of SI scores was restricted to those provided by children 
who had taken part in the updating EF test trials, models employing composite ToM 
measures again did not provide a significant fit: for total scores on the first-order ToM 
tasks, E(I,47) = 0.002,12>0.90; for total scores on the second-order ToM tasks, 
E(1 ,4 7)= 2.248, !p0.l 0, for total scores across the first- and second-order ToM tasks, 
E( 1,47)= 1.605, 12>0.20; and for only total predictive scores across the first- and 
second-order ToM tasks, E(1,47)= 1.740,12>0.10. Performance on the inhibitory EF 
task did not prove a significant fit either, E(I,47)=0.268, 12>0.60, and neither did 
updating EF test scores, E(1,4 7) = 0.428, 12>0.50, nor the background variable of age, 
E(I,47)=1.034, 12>0.30. Thus, the best fitting EF model again consisted of a single 
measure, updating training EF score E(1,47) = 9.092, 12<0.01. However, the amount of 
variance accounted for by this factor doubled compared to the variance accounted for 
when analyses had included the whole sample ofSI data (R2adj = 14.4% for the 
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restricted sample compared to 7.7% for the whole sample). Table 4.13 reports the 
summary data for this regression. 
Table 4.12: Summary table o/regression analysis for variables predicting SI scores using data/or the 




Updating EF training scores 1.067 









Table 4.13: Summary table o/regression analysis/or variables predicting S1 scores using data/or the 




Updating EF training scores 1.529 








Regressions were also conducted in the main sample on SI justifications using 
EF measures as regressors. Again, performance on the inhibitory EF task did not 
prove a significant fit, E(1,60)=2.559, Q>O.1 0, and neither did the background 
variable of age, E(1 ,60)=0.631, Q>0.40. Thus, as before, the best fitting EF model for 
the whole sample of SI justification data employed only the updating EF training 
score. This model did not account for an impressive amount of variance (R2adj = 
12.9%), but the overall relationship was significant,j:O,60) = 10.008, Q<O.01. Table 
4.14 reports the summary data for this regression. When the sample of SI 
justifications was restricted to those provided by children who had taken part in the 
updating test trials models employing composite ToM measures again did not provide 
a significant fit: when total scores across just the first-order ToM tasks were 
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considered E( 1 ,47) = 0.177, pO.60, when total scores across just the second-order 
ToM tasks were considered E(1,4 7)= 1.131,12>0.20, when total scores across the first-
and second-order ToM tasks were considered E( 1,4 7)= 1.147, 12>0.20 and when only 
total predictive scores across the first- and second-order ToM tasks were considered 
E(1 ,47)=2.134, pO.1 O. This time however, although updating EF test scores did not 
prove a significant fit, E(1,47)=0.134, 12>0.70, and age did not account for a 
significant amount of variance, E(1,47)=0.001, 12>0.90, performance on the inhibitory 
EF task did prove a significant fit, E(1,47)=4.404, 12<0.05. Table 4.15 reports the 
summary data for this regression. Nevertheless, the best fitting EF model continued to 
consist ofa single measure, updating EF training score E(1,47) = 10.363,12<0.01. 
Table 4.16 reports the summary data for a regression including both inhibitory and 
updating EF variables and Table 4.17 reports the summary data for the single 
updating EF measure regression. As in the SI score analyses, the amount of variance 
in SI justifications accounted for by updating EF training score, increased slightly in 
the restricted sample compared to the variance accounted for when analyses had 
included the whole sample (R2adj = 16.3% in the restricted sample compared to 12.9% 
in the whole sample). 
Table 4.14: Summary table of regression analysis for variables predicting Sf justifications using data 
for the whole sample of62 children 
B SEB ! 
Step 1 
Constant 1.000 0.312 3.203 0.002 
Updating EF training scores 1.375 0.435 0.378 3.164 0.002 
Note:R' =O.143forstepl,p<O.Ol. 
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Table 4.15: Summary table of regression analysis for inhibitory EF variable predicting Sf justifications 
using data for the sub-sample of 49 children taking part in updating test trials 
B SEB ~ t 
Step 1 
Constant -3.106 2.359 -1.317 0.194 
Inhibitory EF scores 0.267 0.127 0.293 2.099 0.041 
Note: R' = 0.086 for step 1, p <.0.05. 
Table 4.16: Summary table of regress ion analysis for EF variables predicting Sf justifications using 
data for the sub-sample of 49 children taking part in updating test trials 
B SEB ~ t 
Step 1 
Constant -2.400 2.222 -1.080 0.286 
Inhibitory EF scores 0.178 0.123 0.196 1.448 0.155 
Updating EF training scores 1.418 0.512 0.374 2.770 0.008 
Note:R' =0.216 for step 1, P <.0.01 
Table 4.17: Summary table of regression analysis for updating EF variable predicting Sf justifications 





Updating EF training scores 1.610 
Note: R' = 0.181 for step 1, p <.0.01 









A 2 (inhibitory EF score: <19/weak vs. ~19/strong) x 2 (age group: younger 
vs. older) factorial analysis of variance was conducted upon composite predictive 
scores across the first- and second-order ToM tasks as the dependent measure. As 
indicated previously, the weak and strong division criteria were selected on the basis 
that they enabled as equal a split as possible in the number of children assigned to the 
two EF ability groups. For the weak versus strong inhibitory groups respectively, N 
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was 12:21 for the younger age group and 8:21 for the older age group. There was a 
significant main effect of inhibitory EF, E(1,58) = 4.441,12<0.05. Children with strong 
inhibitory ability produced greater predictive composite ToM scores (M=3.05, 
SD=0.73) than children with weak inhibitory ability (M=2.60, SD=0.82). There was 
no main or interaction effect of age group. Table 4.18 reports the means and standard 
deviations of composite predictive first- and second-order ToM scores for the weak 
and strong inhibitors across the age groups and Table 4.19 reports the ANOV A 
summary data. Nevertheless, given the uneven distribution of children across 
inhibitory groups, 20:42, the results of this analysis and the analyses immediately 
below, should be treated cautiously. 
Table 4.18: Composite predictive ToM score means and standard deviations across the flrst- and 
second-order ToM tasks for the weak inhibitors (inhibitory EF score: < J 9) and strong inhibitors 
(inhibitory EF score ~J 9) across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Inhibitory group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 2.13 1.96 
Strong 1.40 1.90 
Older Weak 1.83 1.85 
Strong 2.20 2.01 
Table 4.19: Summary table for the 2 (inhibitory EF score: <J9/weak vs. ~J9/strong) x 2(age group: 
younger vs. older) analysis of variance of composite predictive scores across the flrst- and second-
order ToM tasks 
Source SS df MS E 12 Partial Eta a 
Within 33.839 58 0.583 
Inhibitory EF 2.591 1 2.591 4.441 0.039 0.071 
Age Group 0.353 1 0.353 0.605 0.440 0.010 
Inhibitory EF x 0.196 1 0.l96 0.336 0.564 0.006 
Age Group 
(corrected model) 3.580 3 1.193 2.045 0.117 0.096 
(corrected total) 37.419 61 
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However, a 2 (inhibitory EF score: <19/weak vs. ~19/strong) x 2 (age group: 
younger vs. older) factorial analysis of variance with composite first-order ToM 
scores as the dependent measure did not reveal a significant effect of inhibitory EF, 
£(1,58) = 0.397, n>0.50 or a main or interaction effect of age group. Table 4.20 
reports the means and standard deviations of composite first-order ToM scores for the 
weak and strong inhibitors across the age groups. Similarly, a 2 (inhibitory EF score: 
<19/weak vs. ~19/strong) x 2 (age group: younger vs. older) factorial analysis of 
variance with composite second-order ToM scores as the dependent measure did not 
reveal a significant effect of inhibitory EF, £(1,58) = 1.828, n>O.1 0 or a main or 
interaction effect of age group. Table 4.21 reports the means and standard deviations 
of composite second-order ToM scores for the weak and strong inhibitors across the 
age groups. Further, a 2 (inhibitory EF score: <19/weak vs. ~19/strong) x 2 (age 
group: younger vs. older) factorial analysis of variance with composite first- and 
second order ToM scores as the dependent measure did not reveal a significant effect 
of inhibitory EF, £(1,58) = 2.676, n>O.l 0 or a main or interaction effect of age group. 
Table 4.22 reports the means and standard deviations of composite first- and second-
order ToM scores for the weak and strong inhibitors across the age groups. 
Table 4.20: Composite ToM score means and standard deviations across the first-order ToM tasks for 
the weak inhibitors (inhibitory EF score: </9) and strong inhibitors (inhibitory EF score ~/9) across 
the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Inhibitory group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 1.75 0.45 
Strong 1.76 0.54 
Older Weak 1.75 0.71 
Strong 1.90 0.30 
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Table 4.21 : Composite ToM score means and standard deviations across the second-order ToM tasks 
for the weak inhibitors (inhibitory EF score: <19) and strong inhibitors (inhibitory EF score ~/9) 
across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Inhibitory group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 1.67 1.37 
Strong 1.95 1.24 
Older Weak 1.50 0.76 
Strong 2.05 0.92 
Table 4.22: Composite ToM score means and standard deviations across theftrst- and second-order 
ToM tasks for the weak inhibitors (inhibitory EF score: <19) and strong inhibitors (inhibitory EF 
score ~/9) across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Inhibitory group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 3.42 1.56 
Strong 3.71 1.38 
Older Weak 3.25 0.89 
Strong 4.05 0.87 
A 2 (updating EF training score: O/weak vs. lIstrong) x 2 (age group: younger 
vs. older) factorial analysis of variance was conducted upon composite first-order 
ToM scores, with division criteria were selected on the basis that they enabled as 
equal a split as possible in the number of children assigned to the two EF ability 
groups. For the weak versus strong updating groups respectively, N was 18: 15 for the 
younger age group and 12: 17 for the older age group. Table 4.23 reports the means 
and standard deviations of composite first-order ToM scores for the weak and strong 
updaters across age groups. The ANOV A did not reveal a significant effect of 
updating EF, E(I,58) = 1.440, 1?0.20 or a main or interaction effect of age group. 
Neither did a 2 (updating EF training score: O/weak vs. lIstrong) x 2 (age group: 
younger vs. older) factorial analysis of variance with composite second-order ToM 
scores as the dependent measure. There was no significant effect of updating EF, 
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E(1 ,58) = 0.362, 2>0.50 or main or interaction effect of age group. Table 4.24 reports 
the means and standard deviations of composite second-order ToM scores for the 
weak and strong updaters across age groups. Similarly, a 2 (updating EF training 
score: O/weak vs. l/strong) x 2 (age group: younger vs. older) factorial analysis of 
variance with composite first- and second order ToM scores as the dependent measure 
did not reveal a significant effect of updating EF, E(I,58) = 0.545, Q>0.40 or a main 
or interaction effect of age group. Table 4.25 reports the means and standard 
deviations of composite first- and second-order ToM scores for the weak and strong 
updaters across age groups. Further, a 2 (updating EF training score: O/weak vs. 
l/strong) x 2 (age group: younger vs. older) factorial analysis of variance with 
composite predictive scores across the first- and second-order ToM tasks as the 
dependent measure did not reveal a significant effect of updating EF, E(1,58) = 0.727, 
2>0.30 or a main or interaction effect of age group. Table 4.26 reports the means and 
standard deviations of composite predictive ToM scores across first- and second-order 
ToM tasks for the weak and strong updaters across age groups. 
Table 4.23: Composite ToM score means and standard deviations across the first-order ToM tasks/or 
the weak updaters (updating EF training score: <I) and strong updaters (updating EF training score 
= I) across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Updating group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 1.78 0.43 
Strong 1.73 0.59 
Older Weak 1.67 0.65 
Strong 2.00 0.00 
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Table 4.24: Composite ToM score means and standard deviations across the second-order ToM tasks 
for the weak updaters (updating EF training score: <I) and strong updaters (updating EF training 
score =/) across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Updating group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 1.61 1.34 
Strong 2.13 1.19 
Older Weak 2.00 1.13 
Strong 1.82 0.73 
Table 4.25: Composite ToM score means and standard deviations across the first- and second-order 
ToM tasks for the weak updaters (updating EF training score: <I) and strong updaters (updating EF 
training score = /) across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Updating group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 3.39 1.34 
Strong 3.87 1.55 
Older Weak 3.83 1.19 
Strong 3.82 0.73 
Table 4.26: Composite predictive ToM score means and standard deviations across the first- and 
second-order ToM tasks for the weak updaters (updating EF training score: <I) and strong updaters 
(updating EF training score = /) across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Updating group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 2.72 0.75 
Strong 2.87 0.99 
Older Weak 2.92 1.00 
Strong 3.12 0.33 
A 2 (updating EF test score: <76/weak vs. :::76/strong) x 2 (age group: 
younger vs. older) factorial analysis of variance was conducted upon composite first-
order ToM scores. Again, the weak and strong division criteria were selected on the 
basis that they enabled as equal a split as possible in the number of children assigned 
to the two EF ability groups. For the weak versus strong updating groups respectively, 
N was 17:6 for the younger age group and 9: 17 for the older age group. The analysis 
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did not reveal a significant effect of updating EF, E(I,45) = 0.158, 12>0.60 or a main 
or interaction effect of age group. Table 4.27 reports the means and standard 
deviations of composite first-order ToM scores for the weak and strong updaters 
across age groups. Likewise, a 2 (updating EF test score: <76/weak vs. :::76/strong) x 
2 (age group: younger vs. older) factorial analysis of variance with composite second-
order ToM scores as the dependent measure did not reveal a significant effect of 
updating EF, E(1,45) = 0.786,12>0.30 or a main or interaction effect of age group. 
Table 4.28 reports the means and standard deviations of composite second-order ToM 
scores for the weak and strong updaters across age groups. 
A 2 (updating EF test score: <76/weak vs. :::76/strong) x 2 (age group: 
younger vs. older) factorial analysis of variance with composite first- and second-
order ToM scores as the dependent measure did not reveal a significant effect of 
updating EF, E(I,45) = 0.838,12>0.30 or a main or interaction effect involving age 
group. Table 4.29 reports the means and standard deviations of composite ToM scores 
across first- and second-order ToM tasks for the weak and strong updaters across age 
groups. Similarly a 2 (updating EF test score: <76/weak vs. :::76/strong) x 2 (age 
group: younger vs. older) factorial analysis of variance with composite predictive 
scores across the first- and second-order ToM tasks as the dependent measure did not 
reveal a significant effect of updating EF, E(1,45) = 1.023,12>0.30 or a main or 
interaction effect of age group. Table 4.30 reports the means and standard deviations 
of composite predictive ToM scores across first- and second-order ToM tasks for the 
weak and strong updaters across age groups. 
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Table 4.27: Composite ToM score means and standard deviations across the first-order ToM tasks for 
the weak updaters (updating EF test score: < 76) and strong updaters (updating EF test score ~76) 
across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Updating group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 1.71 0.59 
Strong 2.00 0.00 
Older Weak 2.00 0.00 
Strong 1.82 0.53 
Table 4.28: Composite ToM score means and standard deviations across the second-order ToM tasks 
for the weak updaters (updating EF test score: <76) and strong updaters (updating EF test score ~76) 
across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Updating group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 1.65 1.32 
Strong 2.17 1.47 
Older Weak 1.89 1.17 
Strong 2.00 0.71 
Table 4.29: Composite ToM score means and standard deviations across the first- and second-order 
ToM tasks for the weak updaters (updating EF test score: <76) and strong updaters (updating EF test 
score ~76) across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Updating group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 3.35 1.62 
Strong 4.17 1.47 
Older Weak 3.89 1.17 
Strong 3.82 0.88 
Table 4.30: Composite predictive ToM score means and standard deviations across the first- and 
second-order ToM tasks for the weak updaters (updating EF test score: <76) and strong updaters 
(updating EF test score ?76) across the older and younger age groups. 
Age group Updating group Mean ToM score Standard deviation 
Younger Weak 2.59 1.00 
Strong 3.17 0.75 
Older Weak 3.11 0.60 
Strong 3.06 0.75 
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Sf performance 
One-tailed 1-tests were performed to compare SI scores and justifications with 
chance performance. The SI scores of the older age group were found to be 
significantly greater than a chance level of 50%,1(28) = 2.287, R<0.05 (see Table 4.2 
for group mean and standard deviation). However, the SI justifications of the older 
age group were found to be at chance levels, 1(28) = 0.300, R>0.07. The SI scores and 
justifications of the younger age group were both found to be at chance levels, 1(32) = 
0.796, R>OAO and 1(32) = 1.433, R>O.lO respectively. 
EF performance 
A 2 (age group: younger vs. older) analysis of variance with updating EF test 
scores as the dependent measure revealed that the positive effect of age was 
significant, .E(1,47) = 5.530,12<0.05 (see Table 4.2 for means and standard deviations 
across the age groups). Table 4.31 reports the summary data for this analysis. An 
analysis of variance could not be conducted on updating training score as this 
dependent measure had only 2 levels. However a correlational analysis revealed that 
updating training score was not significantly associated with age in months, r=0.057, 
R>0.30. 
Table 4.31: Summary table/or the 2(age group: younger vs. older) analysis o/variance o/updating EF 
test scores. 
Source SS df MS .E R Partial Eta 2 
Between Groups 330.933 1 330.933 5.530 0.023 0.105 
Within Groups 2812.455 47 59.839 
Total 261643.000 49 
Updating EF test scores were not found to correlate significantly with 
inhibition EF scores when the effects of age were partialled out, r=0.072, R>0.30. 
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Similarly Updating EF training scores were not found to correlate significantly with 
inhibition EF scores when the effects of age were partialled out, r=0.146, n>O.1 O. 
ToM performance 
Correlations partialling out age revealed that scores for the two first-order 
ToM tasks were significantly correlated, r = 0.331, n<O.Ol. However, scores for the 
two second-order tasks were not significantly correlated, r =-0.065, n>0.30. At-test 
revealed a significant difference between mean scores for the two first-order tasks 
!(61)=2.185, n<0.05. Scores for the task presented first were greater (M=0.95, 
SD=0.22) than scores for the task presented second (M=0.85, SO=0.36). A significant 
difference was also found between the mean scores for the second-order tasks 
1(61)=6.156, n<O.OOl. Scores for the task presented second were greater (M=1.40, 
SO=0.78) than scores for the task presented first (M=0.50, SO=0.81). 
4.4 Discussion 
This study was concerned with examining the relationship between EF, 
appreciation of the "some-all" SI and ToM, using different measures ofEF to those 
employed in Experiment 1. 
In line with the hypotheses and in support of the masked competence account of 
the emergence ofCU, a relationship was found between EF, assessed in terms of 
updating ability, and the demonstration of CU as sed in terms of the computation of 
SIs. The fact that a relationship was revealed not only between EF and SI scores, but 
also between EF and SI justifications (a more conservative measure of SI 
appreciation), strengthens the validity of this finding. The relationship found between 
updating EF and CU was based upon updating training rather than updating test 
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scores but this was likely due to the comparatively reduced proportion of variance in 
the test scores. Although inhibition did not demonstrate a main effect on SI 
performance, it was found to interact with age. Significantly better SI scores were 
associated with weak inhibitory performance in the older age group, than were 
associated with strong inhibitory performance in this age group, whilst inhibitory 
ability did not significantly affect SI scores in the younger age group. However, there 
were over twice as many strong inhibitors as weak inhibitors overall and the 
proportion of weak to strong inhibitors was even smaller in the older age group, with 
only just over one third of children in this age group being classified as weak 
inhibitors. Although the difference in SI scores for the weak and strong inhibitors in 
the younger age group was not significant, there was a trend for higher SI scores to be 
associated with strong inhibitors in this age group. Since the ratio of weak. to strong 
inhibitors was less skewed in the younger age group than in the older age group, this 
relationship is more likely to reflect the true nature of the relationship between 
inhibitory ability and SI appreciation. One might thus expect that a more even 
proportion of weak to strong inhibitors would demonstrate a significant positive 
relation between inhibitory ability and SI appreciation. 
Although recent research has indicated that EF is related to another aspect of 
CU relating to the ability to take account of common ground information (Nilsen & 
Graham, 2009), the relationship found between updating EF and SIs is the first time 
that a relationship has been demonstrated between EF and the specific ability to 
compute SIs. However, in contrast to expectations, regressions conducted to 
investigate the role of ToM in the relationship between EF and CU, indicated that 
ToM did not account for a significant amount of variance in SI scores. Only updating 
EF ability was found to predict SI scores. The same relationship dynamic, Le., 
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updating training but not ToM, updating test scores or inhibitory performance, 
successfully predicting SI appreciation, existed when analyses considered both SI 
score and also SI justifications. Since SI justifications are a more conservative 
measure of SI appreciation, the replication of this relationship with this measure 
strengthens the validity of this finding. Thus the masked competence account has 
been partially supported. EF has been found to playa role in the demonstration of CU 
as assessed through SI appreciation, but it is not clear that the effect of EF on CU is 
due to its impact on ToM. 
The lack of support for the ToM-CU relationship contrasts with standard 
accounts of CU which conceptualise CU in terms of the appreciation of 
communicative intentions. However, it concords with the findings from Experiment 1. 
Although previous studies have demonstrated relationships between ToM and other 
aspects of CU such as the ability to detect violations of Gricean maxims and the 
ability to appreciate irony, no evidence has so far been provided evidence for a 
relationship between ToM and the ability to compute Sis. 
Nevertheless, the absence of a significant link between ToM and CU, might be 
attributable to problems with the ToM measures used. The validity of the ToM scores 
produced in Experiment 1, was questioned in Section 3.4. The comparatively high 
number of children failing on the second but not the first ToM task was interpreted as 
a sign that some of the variation in overall ToM scores might have been reflecting 
fatigue rather than individual differences in ToM. This was especially likely given 
that the first-order ToM tasks used in Experiment 1 are typically passed by children 
who are of the same age as the participants taking part in that study. To gain a more 
accurate assessment of ToM appreciation, Experiment 2 thus also incorporated more 
difficult second-order ToM tasks. These are typically passed by 6- to 7-year-olds. 
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Since the likelihood of the 5- to 6-year-olds passing these tasks was expected to be 
smaller compared performance on first-order measures, failure on these tasks was 
expected to be more reflective of ToM deficiency than fatigue. The first-order ToM 
tasks used in Experiment 1 were also presented in Experiment 2. These were 
employed to distinguish children failing the second-order tasks who had a degree of 
ToM appreciation but hadn't quite achieved second-order competency, from those 
failing due to a more comprehensive ToM deficit. 
In line with the findings from Experiment 1, more children in Experiment 2 
failed the first-order task presented second than failed the first-order task presented 
first, 9 and 3 respectively. Indeed, analyses indicated that scores for the first-order 
task presented first were significantly greater than scores for the task presented 
second. Although 2 children failed both tasks, indicating a genuine ToM deficit, 7 
children passed the first task but went on to fail the second, whilst only child 
demonstrated the opposite pattern. This result indicates that some of the variation in 
the composite first-order ToM task scores may have been attributable to fatigue rather 
than genuine lack of ToM. However, the strong relation found between scores from 
the two first-order tasks supports the suggestion that the two tasks were both tapping 
the same ability, and thus fatigue had a limited effect. 
In contrast to the sequential performance patterns on the first-order ToM tasks, 
more children actually failed the second-order ToM task presented first than failed the 
task presented second, 43 compared to 11. In accord with this, analyses indicated that 
scores for the second-order ToM task presented second were significantly greater than 
scores for the task presented first. This suggests that fatigue was unlikely to account 
for much of the composite second-order score variation. The performance pattern on 
the second-order tasks makes sense because the second task presented was 
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specifically designed by Sullivan, Zaitchik, and Tager-Flusberg (1994) to be a 
simplified version of the first task given (developed by Perner and Wimmer, 1985). 
Indeed Sullivan et al. found that the age at which children usually passed their 
simplified task was considerably younger than the age at which children were found 
to pass the Perner and Wimmer task (5.5 and 7 years respectively). 
Unlike performance in the two first-order ToM tasks, performance on the two 
second-order tasks did not appear to be related. This suggests that a considerable 
degree of score variation for at least one of the second-order tasks was not reflective 
of individual differences in ToM. Indeed performance on the more difficult Perner 
and Wimmer (1985) task might have actually been more reflective of processing 
demands than ToM appreciation. However, analyses indicate that whilst EF 
performance was related to performance on the Sullivan et al. (1994) task, it was not 
related to performance on the Perner and Wimmer task, which is the reverse pattern to 
that which would be expected if the Perner and Wimmer task was more reflective of 
processing demands. Whatever the reason for the variation discrepancy in the two 
second-order tasks, the lack of relation between them does suggest that a factor other 
than ToM appreciation might have accounted for some of the composite second-order 
task score variation. 
Analysis of performance on both the first- and second-order ToM tasks 
supports the suggestion that a considerable proportion of variance in ToM scores 
might have been reflecting a factor other than ToM ability. Thus, the absence of a 
relationship between ToM and CU, could have been attributable to problems with the 
specific ToM measures used. Ifmore suitable ToM measures had been employed it is 
expected that a relationship would have been uncovered between ToM and CU and 
that this would have accounted for the relationship between EF and CU. 
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However, as hypothesised, a positive relationship was found between EF 
assessed via the new Frog Simon inhibitory EF task, and ToM appreciation, although 
the uneven spread of children across the weak and strong inhibitory groups entails 
that this relationship is drawn cautiously. The uncovering of this relationship is in 
accordance with previous reports of an association between inhibitory EF ability and 
ToM in the literature (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hala, Hug, & Henderson, 2003). The 
demonstration of a significant relationship between inhibitory EF ability assessed via 
the new Frog Simon inhibitory EF task and ToM also supports the suggestion that 
inhibition-requiring training trials present in the inhibitory EF task employed in 
Experiment 1 but not required for the Frog Simon Task, served to mask individual 
differences in inhibitory ability displayed in test trials. Finding a relationship between 
EF and ToM indicates that at least some of the variance in ToM scores was valid, 
reflecting differences in ToM appreciation. Nevertheless, updating EF ability was not 
significantly associated with ToM. 
The discovery that the amount of variance in SI score accounted for by 
updating EF ability, doubled when analysis focused on a restricted sample identified 
by their superior updating EF performance, is noteworthy. This finding suggests that 
the better children are at updating, the greater the role that updating EF ability is 
assigned in computing SIs. Not only does this demonstrate the significance of 
updating EF ability in the expression ofCU, but also highlights that other factors are 
playing a role, and are more responsible for the level of CU demonstrated when 
updating EF ability is less advanced. 
In line with the findings from Experiment 1, in which performance on the two 
EF tasks employed (measuring inhibitory and shifting ability) appeared to be 
differentiated once the effects of age had been partialled out, performance on the two 
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EF tasks employed in Experiment 2 (reflecting inhibitory and updating ability) was 
found to be unrelated. Although Miyake et al (2000) found that inhibitory. shifting 
and updating ability all correlated moderately with each other. their statistical 
analyses also indicated that these abilities were clearly distinguishable. Friedman et 
al. (2006) replicated these findings. Moreover. Miyake et al. found that these abilities 
actually contributed differentially to complex EF tasks. further promoting the idea of 
EF as a compound construct. The differentiation between the two EF abilities 
measured in this study supports the conceptual differentiation of these skills and so 
lends strength to the possibility that the two EF factors might be affecting CU in 
different ways. 
The level of implicatures drawn in this study. as indicated by the SI score. was 
compared to the proportion drawn in Papafragou and Musolino (2003) Experiment 2. 
The 5- and 6-year-olds tested in this study (M= 73.92 months) correctly rejected 62.1 
% of descriptions in the SI trials. This can be contrasted with Papafragou and 
Musolino's sample of 5- and 6-year-olds (M= 67 months), who correctly rejected 52.5 
% descriptions in these trials. However, as in Experiment 1, when the oldest 6-year-
olds in the current study were excluded, to reduce the mean age of our sample to a 
level comparable to that ofPapafragou and Musolino's sample (new M for the present 
sample = 67.04 months), the sample of5- and 6-year-olds from this study were found 
to have rejected 57.69 % of descriptions in the SI trials. This level is more in line with 
the findings ofPapfragou and Musolino's study. Furthermore, consistent with the 
findings from Experiment 1. only the older 6-year-old age-group was performing at 
above chance-levels on the SI task in Experiment 2. 
In contrast to both expectations, and the findings from the previous study in 
which all the abilities measured improved significantly with age, only updating ability 
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appeared to get significantly better with age in Experiment 2. However, Experiment 2 
focused on a smaller age range (5-6 years) than that investigated in Experiment 1 (4-6 
years), so there was less variance in age available to exert an effect. 
4.5 Conclusions 
Experiment 2 provided partial support for the masked competence account of 
CU. It provided evidence of relations between updating EF and SI appreciation, and 
of an intermediary relation between inhibitory EF and ToM. However, it did not 
reveal an association between ToM and SI appreciation and ToM was not found to 
playa mediatory role in the relationship between EF and CU. The ability to compute 
SIs is only one of many skills involved in CU. Experiment 3 was therefore undertaken 
to investigate whether EF would be found to contribute to a different measure of CU: 
The Conversational Violation Task (CVT) and whether ToM would be found to play 
a mediatory role in this relationship. 
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Chapter 5: Experiment 3 - Investigating the relationships between executive 
functioning, conversational understanding and theory of mind using a broad 
measure of conversational understanding: The Conversational Violations Task 
5.1 Introduction 
Experiment 2 investigated whether inhibitory and updating components of EF 
are related to a specific aspect of CU in 5- and 6-year-olds: the appreciation of SIs. 
Children with strong updating EF performed significantly better in the SI task than 
children with weak EF, supporting the proposal that EF enhances CU. These results 
concur with the masked competence account of the emergence ofCU. However, the 
ability to appreciate SIs is only one of many skills that comprise CU. 
The third experiment employed a more comprehensive measure of CU to see 
if EF is related to CU more broadly. CU was assessed using a Conversational 
Violations Test (CVT) employed previously by Surian, Baron-Cohen and van der 
Lely (1996) and Siegal, lozzi and Surian (2009). The CVT presents children with 
questions, each of which is paired with two possible answers: 
Question: "Have you seen my dog?" 
Answer 1: "Yes, he's in the garden." 
Answer 2: "Yes, he's in the clouds." 
Children have to choose which answer is the most appropriate response to the 
question. In order to determine the most appropriate response, they need to be aware 
of conversational maxims relating to the informativeness (Maxims of First and 
Second Quantity), truthfulness (Maxim of Quality), relevance (Maxim of Relation) 
and courteousness (Maxim of Politeness) of communication. One of the two answers 
to each question violates a maxim, and the task on the CVT as presented here was to 
select the alternative response each time. In the above example, Answer 2 violates the 
Chapter 5: Experiment 3 155 
maxim relating to the validity of communication - it could not be true that the dog is 
in the clouds, so children should select Answer 1 as the most appropriate response. 
The CVT has the advantage that maxim violations are counterbalanced across 
puppets over the course of the trials and the consequences of the violating puppet's 
responses are not made explicit. It is therefore not susceptible to the criticism directed 
at the study of Eskritt, Whalen, and Lee (2008) mentioned in Section 1.5.1: that task 
success might simply reflect learning over the course of trials. In Eskritt et. al.' s 
study, such learning would not require children to draw conclusions about intended 
meanings such as deception, purposeful vagueness or deliberate irrelevance. Instead, 
they could come to believe that asking for help from a particular puppet would not aid 
them in locating the sticker. 
Because the CVT presents children with violations of a number of different 
maxims, this task requires broad knowledge of Grice's conversational maxims. Thus 
the CVT is a more comprehensive measure of CU than the SI task that only requires 
appreciation of the First Maxim of Quantity. This maxim dictates that people should 
try to be as informative as possible in communication, leading to the use of the 
stronger term "all" in conversation when it is applicable, rather than the logically 
compatible, but weaker term "some". Knowledge of the First Maxim of Quantity 
should lead children in the SI task to reject a puppet's statement that a character had 
performed "some" of a task when in fact the character had completed all of their task. 
However the SI task does not require appreciation of Grice's other conversation 
maxims. The puppet's statement should not be rejected on the grounds that it 
provided more information than was necessary, so the task does not require 
appreciation of the Second Maxim of Quantity. Neither should the statement be 
discredited on the grounds that it was irrelevant, as the puppet's statement was given 
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in response to an enquiry about the character's performance. Appreciation of the 
Maxim of Relation is thus not required either. Additionally, since it is actually true 
that the character in the SI task does complete some oftheir task, the puppet's 
statement should also not be rejected on the grounds that it provided false 
information. Appreciation of the Maxim of Quality is therefore also not required. 
Further, the puppet's statement should not be rejected on the grounds that it is 
impolite, so the task does not require appreciation of the Maxim of Politeness. 
Moreover, the CVT can be seen as more appropriate for a younger age group 
than the SI task which was established as suitable for 5- and 6-year-olds in 
Experiment 1. The age of participants selected for the current study: 4- and 5-years, 
was based on the findings of Eskritt, Whalen, and Lee (2008) who reported that 3-
year-olds failed to demonstrate appreciation of two of three maxims assessed: the 
maxims of Quality and Politeness. However, they reported that 4-year-olds revealed 
appreciation of the maxims of Quality, Politeness and Relation. 
The other tasks employed in Experiment 3 were chosen to be suitable for this 
younger age group. The Frog Simon Inhibitory and Dibbets Updating tasks, used to 
assess EF in Experiment 2, were also employed in Experiment 3. However, in 
Experiment 2, almost a third of the younger age group had failed to achieve a 
sufficient level of training in the updating task, to enable them to pass on to the test 
phase of this task. Given that the mean age of the younger group in Experiment 2 (68 
months), corresponded to the older age group in the current study, it was anticipated 
that an even greater proportion of the younger age group in Experiment 3 would fail 
to achieve a sufficient level of updating training to enable them to move on to the test 
phase of this task. Therefore, in Experiment 3, updating scores were based only on 
performance in the updating training phase of the task. The children in Experiment 3 
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were not presented with the updating test trials employed in Experiment 2. The DCCS 
shifting task was also employed in Experiment 3, as Experiment 1 had established 
that the task was suitable for this younger age group. All three of Miyake et al.' s 
(2000) proposed components ofEF: inhibition, updating and shifting, were therefore 
assessed in Experiment 3. ToM was assessed using the first- and second-order false 
belief tasks employed in Experiment 2. 
In Experiment 3, it was hypothesised that all abilities would improve 
significantly with age, and that appreciation of false beliefs and EF abilities would be 
significantly related to performance on the CVT. Demonstration of a relationship 
between appreciation of false beliefs and EF abilities was also envisaged. It was 
further expected that the relationship between CVT performance and EF abilities 
would be mediated by appreciation of false beliefs. 
5.2 Method 
Participants These were 60 children aged between 4 and 5 years, split equally 
into two age groups: a younger group (M=56.5 months, range =48-59 months) and an 
older group (M= 67.07 months, range =60-71 months). These children were 
predominantly white and were recruited from primary schools located in middle class 
areas of Sheffield and Surrey. All children spoke English as their first language, and 
none were known to have any specific language impairment. Three other children 
(aged 59,62 and 64 months) were excluded. Of the children excluded, one child was 
too distracted to complete all of the tasks presented, one child failed to complete 
initial training in the updating task and one child was unable to attend the second 
testing session due to illness. 
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Procedure. Children were tested individually, in a quiet area of their school, 
and all took part in eight tasks. Testing was conducted over the course of two 
sessions, lasting between approximately 10 and 20 minutes, and the order of task 
presentation was fixed. The first session commenced with the two first-order false-
belief tasks, followed by the two second-order false-belief tasks, the DCCS task, the 
Frog Simon Inhibitory task, and the Dibbets Updating task. The second session was 
used to present the CVT. 
First-order false belief tasks. These were identical to the first-order false 
belief tasks used in Experiments 1 and 2. Each task score had a possible range of 0-1. 
Second-order false belief tasks. These were identical to the Second-order false 
belief tasks used in Experiment 2. As in the previous study, the total number of 
correct responses to the two test questions in each task was recorded separately for 
each task, with each task score having a possible range of 0-2. No children failed the 
first set of control questions. 
DCCS. This was identical to the DCCS task used in Experiment 1. The post-
switch score for this task had a possible range of 0-6 and no child failed to meet the 
pre-switch score criterion for task inclusion. 
Frog Simon Inhibitory task. This was identical to the task used in Experiment 
2. The score for this task had a possible range of2-20 and no child failed to respond 
correctly to the first two slides. 
Updating task. This was identical to the Updating task used in Experiment 2, 
except that children were not presented with Test trials in Experiment 3. Thus only 
the Training score was recorded. This had a possible range of 0-1. 
CVT. The CVT was presented on a laptop and was an English translation of 
the task employed by Siegal, Iozzi, and Surian (2009). Children were introduced to 
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three puppets: Mark, Lucy and Jane. Mark then proceeded to put 25 questions to Lucy 
and Jane. Both Lucy and Jane provided answers to each question. However, one of 
them (counterbalanced across questions) would provide an inappropriate response, 
which violated one of Grice's five conversational maxims. The other puppet would 
provide an acceptable response which didn't violate any of the maxims. For example: 
Mark: "What food do you like?" 
Lucy: "I like the sea." 
Jane: "I like ice-cream." 
In this trial, Lucy's response is inappropriate, as "the sea" is not a type of food 
and so her answer violates Grice's maxim of Relevance. However, Jane's response is 
appropriate as "ice-cream" is a type of food. Prior to the start of the puppet trials, 
children were told "We're going to see some puppets on the computer. One of them is 
going to ask some questions and the others are going to give some answers. Each 
time, one of the puppets is going to give a bit of a silly or a rude answer and one is 
going to answer well and I want to see if you can point to the puppet who answers 
well." Following each trial, children were asked "Can you point to the puppet that 
answered well?" 
All four of Grice's conversational maxims, together with the Maxim of 
Politeness ("Be Polite), were represented in the CVT (see Appendix VIII for the CVT 
Script providing the full list ofCVT items). Questions violating the different maxims 
were interspersed with each other (see Appendix IX for the sequence of violations). 
Presentation order of the questions was counterbalanced across participants, with half 
of the participants receiving the sequence of questions as it is read downwards in 
Appendix IX, and halffeceiving the order as it is read upwards. 
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5.3 Results 
Score means and standard deviations are presented in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Mean scores and standard deviations/or EF, ToM and CU tasks employed in Experiment 3. 
Age group (in years) 4 5 
No. of children 30 30 
Age (months) 56.50 (2.39) 67.07 (3.80) 
First first-order FB/l 0.87 (0.35) 1.00 (0.00) 
Second first-order FB/l 0.70 (0.47) 0.93 (0.25) 
Perner second-order FB/2 0.10 (0.40) 0.43 (0.77) 
Sullivan second-order FBI2 0.93 (0.79) 1.40 (0.77) 
DCCS/6 4.57 (2.57) 5.53 (1.55) 
Frog Simonl20 17.87 (1.63) 18.73 (1.26) 
Dibbets updating training/l 0.37 (0.49) 0.70 (0.47) 
CVT/25 15.57 (3.10) 18.30 (3.44) 
CVT Maxims/5: 
First Quantity 2.60 (0.93) 3.10 (1.27) 
Second Quantity 2.83 (0.87) 2.70 (0.99) 
Quality 3.10 (1.30) 4.07 (1.23) 
Relation 3.27 (0.87) 3.93 (1.23) 
Politeness 3.77 (1.10) 4.50 (0.78) 
Note: FB=False belief task; DCCS-Dimensional Change Card Sort task; CVT=Conversational 
Violations Task. 
Relation between EF and CVT performance 
Table 5.2 displays the results of ANOVAs investigating the effects ofEF, age 
and maxims on CVT performance and Table 5.3 reports the means and standard 
deviations of CVT scores for the weak and strong EF groups across maxims and age 
groups. Children's shifting EF was classed as strong if their scores for the DCCS task 
were 6 and weak if these were less than 6. Their inhibitory EF was classed as strong if 
scores for the Frog Simon task were 19 or greater and weak if these were less than 19. 
Updating EF was classed as strong if scores for the training phase of the Dibbets task 
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Table 5.2: Results of2 (age group: 4-year-olds vs. 5-year-olds) x 2 (EF level: shifting EF 
scores<6=weak vs. shifting EF scores=6=strong; inhibitory EF scores <19 =weak vs. inhibitory EF 
scores ?19 =strong; updating EF scores < 1 =weak vs. updating EF scores = I =strong) x 5 (type of 
maxim: First Quantity vs. Second Quantity vs. Quality vs. Relation vs. Politeness) ANOVAs on scores 
for the CVT measure. N.B. Shifting analyses did not include the age group variable. 
df E ~ partial Eta 2 
Age group 
Inhibitory EF 1,280 13.982 0.001 0.048 
Updating EF 1,280 12.070 0.001 0.041 
EF level 
Shifting EF 1,140 4.455 0.037 0.031 
Inhibitory EF 1,280 3.190 0.075 0.011 
Updating EF 1,280 3.231 0.073 0.011 
Type of maxim 
Shifting EF 4,140 2.544 0.042 0.068 
Inhibitory EF 4,280 14.575 0.001 0.172 
Updating EF 4,280 15.558 0.001 0.182 
Age group x EF level 
Inhibitory EF 1,280 1.036 0.310 0.004 
Updating EF 1,280 0.585 0.445 0.002 
Age group x type of maxim 
Inhibitory EF 4,280 1.631 0.167 0.023 
Updating EF 4,280 1.766 0.136 0.025 
EF level x type of maxim 
Shifting EF 4,140 1.542 0.193 0.042 
Inhibitory EF 4,280 0.503 0.734 0.007 
Updating EF 4,280 0.634 0.639 0.009 
Age group x EF level x type of maxim 
Inhibitory EF 4,280 0.769 0.546 0.011 
Updating EF 4,280 0.178 0.950 0.003 
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Table 5.3: CVT score means and standard deviations/or weak and strong EF groups across the 4-
year-old and 5-year-old age groups. N.B. shifting EF was only considered/or the 4-year-olds. 
Age group EF group Maxim Mean CVT score Standard deviation 
4 Shifting weak First Quantity 2.63 0.74 
Second Quantity 2.88 0.99 
Quality 2.75 1.75 
Relation 3.00 0.76 
Politeness 2.88 0.99 
Shifting strong First Quantity 2.59 1.01 
Second Quantity 2.82 0.85 
Quality 3.23 1.11 
Relation 3.36 0.90 
Politeness 4.09 0.97 
4 Inhibition weak First Quantity 2.4 7 1.01 
Second Quantity 2.76 0.90 
Quality 3.24 1.03 
Relation 3.l2 0.70 
Politeness 3.76 1.09 
Inhibition strong First Quantity 2.77 0.83 
Second Quantity 2.92 0.86 
Quality 2.92 1.61 
Relation 3.46 1.05 
Politeness 3.77 1.17 
5 Inhibition weak First Quantity 2.80 1.32 
Second Quantity 2.90 0.99 
Quality 3.70 1.57 
Relation 3.60 1.58 
Politeness 4.10 0.99 
Inhibition strong First Quantity 3.25 1.25 
Second Quantity 2.60 1.00 
Quality 4.25 1.02 
Relation 4.10 1.02 
Politeness 4.70 0.57 
4 Updating weak First Quantity 2.63 0.96 
Second Quantity 2.79 0.92 
Quality 2.89 1.24 
Relation 3.21 0.98 
Politeness 3.79 1.18 
Updating strong First Quantity 2.55 0.93 
Second Quantity 2.91 0.83 
Quality 3.45 1.37 
Relation 3.36 0.67 
Politeness 3.73 1.01 
5 Updating weak First Quantity 2.78 1.20 
Second Quantity 2.56 1.01 
Quality 3.67 1.00 
Relation 3.56 1.01 
Politeness 4.56 0.53 
Updating strong First Quantity 3.24 1.30 
Second Quantity 2.76 1.00 
Quality 4.24 1.30 
Relation 4.10 1.30 
Politeness 4.48 0.87 
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were 1 and weak if these were O. The weak and strong division criteria were selected 
on the basis that they enabled as equal a split as possible in the number of children 
assigned to the two EF ability groups for each task. Age group had two levels: 4-year-
olds vs. 5-year-olds. Type of maxim had five levels: First Quantity vs. Second 
Quantity vs. Quality vs. Relation vs. Politeness. For weak versus strong shifting 
groups respectively, N was 8:22 for the 4-year-olds and 3:27 for the 5-year-olds. 
Since the 5-year-olds were performing at ceiling on the DCCS task, only the shifting 
data of the 4-year-olds was analysed. Thus, analyses looking at the effects of shifting 
and maxims on CVT performance did not also investigate age effects. For weak 
versus strong inhibitory groups respectively, N was 17: 13 for the 4-year-olds and 
10:20 for the 5-year-olds. For weak versus strong updating groups respectively, N 
was 19: 11 for the 4-year-olds and 9:21 for the 5-year-olds. 
There were significant main effects for shifting EF, age group and type of 
maxim. Children with strong shifting EF attained significantly greater CVT maxim 
scores (M=3.22, SD=1.09) than children with weak shifting EF (M=2.83, SD=1.06), 
F(1,140)= 4.455, p<0.05. Although, the uneven distribution ofN across the weak and 
strong shifting EF groups indicates that the findings of the shifting analysis should be 
treated cautiously. Furthermore, 5-year-olds had significantly higher CVT maxim 
scores (M=3.66, SD=1.28) than 4-year olds (M=3.11, SD=1.09), F(I,280)= 12.070 
and 13.982, p's<O.OOl. Scheffe tests following the significant main effect for maxims, 
F(4,280)= 14.575 and 15.558, p's <0.001, F(4,140)=2.544, p<0.05, found that the 
data for the inhibitory and updating analyses revealed performance on CVT items 
,reflecting the Maxims of First Quantity (M=2.85, SD=l.13) and Second Quantity 
(M=2.77, SD=0.93) was significantly lower than performance on items reflecting the 
Maxims of Quality (M=3.58, SD=1.34), Relation (M=3.60, SD=1.11) and Politeness 
Chapter 5: Experiment 3 164 
(M=4.13, SO=1.02), n's <0.01. Consistent with this, Scheffe tests on data for the 
shifting analysis revealed that performance on CVT items reflecting the Maxims of 
First Quantity (M=2.60, SO=0.93) and Second Quantity (M= 2.83, SD=0.87) was 
significantly lower than performance on items reflecting the Maxims of Politeness 
(M=3.77, SD=1.lO), n's <0.05. 
Role o/ToM in the relationship between EF and CU 
Regressions were conducted on CVT scores, using composite measures of 
ToM comprising either total scores on the first-order ToM tasks, total scores on the 
second-order ToM tasks, total scores on both the first- and second-order ToM tasks or 
total scores both on the first- and second-order ToM tasks not including points for 
appropriate second-order justifications (i.e. total predictive scores across the first- and 
second-order ToM tasks). Total scores across just the first-order ToM tasks did not 
prove a significant fit, E(1 ,58) = 2.094, n>O.lO. However the remaining ToM 
composite measures accounted for a significant amount of variance. When total 
scores across just the second-order ToM tasks were considered, .E(1 ,58)= 5.468, 
n<0.05, when total scores across the first- and second-order ToM tasks were 
considered, .E(1,58)= 5.786, n<0.05 and when only total predictive scores across the 
first- and second-order ToM tasks were considered, .E(1,58)= 5.362, n<0.05. 
Nevertheless, when ToM was entered into regressions on CVT performance 
with age and DCCS scores, ToM scores did not make a significant contribution. Both 
age and DCCS scores predicted a significant amount of variance (see Table 5.4) 
accounting for a quarter of the variance in CVT scores, total R2adj = 25.6%. However 
no composite ToM measure accounted independently for a significant amount of 
variance (see Table 5.5). 
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Table 5.4: Summary table of regression analysis looking at the contributions of age and DCCS scores 
to CVT performance when age was enteredfirst. 
B SEB P ! 
Step 1 
Constant 2.511 4.240 0.592 0.556 
Age in months 0.233 0.068 0.410 3.419 0.001 
Step 2 
Constant 3.608 3.992 0.904 0.370 
Age in months 0.168 0.068 0.295 2.488 0.016 
DCCS scores 0.580 0.194 0.355 2.994 0.004 
Table 5.5: Step 3 results for regression analyses looking at the contributions of age, various ToM 
composite measures and DCCS performance 10 CVT scores. 
B SEB ! 
151 order ToM 
Constant 3.661 4.032 0.908 0.368 
Age 0.162 0.073 0.284 2.222 0.030 
ToM composite 0.187 0.798 0.029 0.235 0.815 
DCCS 0.579 0.196 0.355 2.963 0.004 
2nd order ToM 
Constant 5.337 4.212 1.267 0.210 
Age 0.128 0.075 0.225 1.718 0.091 
ToM composite 0.484 0.391 0.155 1.239 0.221 
DCCS 0.590 0.193 0.361 3.054 0.003 
151 + 2nd order ToM 
Constant 4.945 4.169 1.186 0.241 
Age 0.128 0.077 0.225 1.673 0.100 
ToM composite 0.347 0.317 0.141 1.093 0.279 
DCCS 0.585 0.194 0.358 3.023 0.004 
151 + 2nd order ToM Predict 
Constant 4.526 4.048 1.118 0.268 
Age 0.129 0.075 0.227 1.735 0.088 
ToM composite 0.539 0.446 0.151 1.207 0.232 
DCCS 0.589 0.193 0.360 3.047 0.004 
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Further regressions were conducted on the individual maxims reflected in the 
CVT, using age, ToM composite measures and DCCS scores as predictors. None of 
these factors explained a significant amount of variance in scores for CVT items 
reflecting the Maxims of First and Second Quantity. However, age alone accounted 
for a significant amount of variation in scores for CVT items reflecting the Maxim of 
Relation explaining 18.3% of the variance, DCCS performance alone provided the 
best model for variation in scores for CVT items reflecting the Maxim of Politeness 
explaining 36.8% of the variance and both age and DCCS performance independently 
accounted for a significant amount of variation in scores for CVT items reflecting the 
Maxim of Quality together explaining 21.4% of the variance. ToM did not contribute 
significantly to any model of maxim score variance. Table 5.6 presents the final steps 
in regressions focused upon age and DCCS predictors of maxim scores. 
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Table 5.6: Step 2 results for regression analyses looking at the contributions of age, and DCCS 
performance to scores for CVT items reflecting individual maxims. 
B SEB ~ 1 
Step 2 -First Quantity 
Constant 1.410 1.492 0.945 0.349 
Age 0.019 0.025 0.105 0.763 0.449 
DCCS 0.049 0.072 0.094 0.681 0.499 
Step 2 - Second Quantity 
Constant 3.489 1.234 2.828 0.006 
Age -0.011 0.021 -0.073 -0.523 0.603 
DCCS -0.009 0.060 -0.021 -0.153 0.879 
Step 2 -Quality 
Constant -1.505 1.563 -0.963 0.340 
Age 0.067 0.026 0.310 2.547 0.014 
DCCS 0.182 0.076 0.293 2.403 0.020 
Step 2 -Relation 
Constant -0.953 1.313 -0.726 0.471 
Age 0.066 0.022 0.369 2.973 0.004 
DCCS 0.093 0.064 0.180 1.451 0.152 
Step 2 -Politeness 
Constant 1.167 1.050 1.112 0.271 
Age 0.026 0.018 0.160 1.480 0.144 
DCCS 0.265 0.051 0.564 5.206 0.001 
Relationship between EF and ToM performance 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 display the results of2 (age group) X 2 (shifting, inhibitory 
and updating EF level: weak vs. strong) ANOVAs with ToM scores as the dependent 
measures. Children's shifting EF was classed as strong if their scores for the DCCS 
task were 6 and weak if these were less than 6. Their inhibitory EF was classed as 
strong if scores for the Frog Simon task were 19 or greater and weak if these were less 
than 19. Updating EF was classed as strong if scores for the training phase of the 
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Dibbets task were 1 and weak if these were O. As before, weak and strong division 
criteria were selected on the basis that they enabled as equal a split as possible in the 
number of children assigned to the two EF ability groups for each task. Age group 
had two levels: 4-year-olds vs. 5-year-olds. For weak versus strong shifting groups 
respectively, N was 8:22 for the 4-year-olds and 3:27 for the 5-year-olds. Since the 5-
year-olds were performing at ceiling on the DCCS task, only the shifting data of the 
4-year-olds was analysed. Thus, analyses looking at the effects of shifting on ToM 
scores did not also investigate age effects. For weak versus strong inhibitory groups 
respectively, N was 17:13 for the 4-year-olds and 10:20 for the 5-year-olds. For weak 
versus strong updating groups respectively, N was 19: 11 for the 4-year-olds and 9:21 
for the 5-year-olds. 
For both inhibitory and updating EF, there were consistent significant age 
group main effects, with 5-year-olds having higher ToM scores than 4-year-olds, .E's 
2: 6.089, n's <.03. However, there were no significant main or interaction effects 
involving EF for any of the analyses. Nevertheless, as indicated previously, the 
disproportionality ofN across the shifting EF groups entails that the results of 
analyses using shifting EF should be treated cautiously. 
Age and EF performance 
Table 5.10 displays the results of ANDV As investigating the effect of age 
group on EF. A main effect of age group was uncovered, with 5-year-olds again 
demonstrating greater inhibitory and updating EF than 4-year-olds (see Table 5.1 for 
age group means and standard deviations), F(I,58)= 5.298 and 12.100, p's<0.05. 
Neither shifting EF nor updating EF was found to correlate significantly with 
inhibition EF scores when age was partialled out, r=0.015, 12>0.40 and r=0.004, 
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Q>OAO respectively. Similarly, partial correlations covarying out the effects of age 
revealed that shifting EF was not related to updating EF, r=0.038, Q>0.30. 
Table 5.7: Results of2 (age group) x 2 (EF level) ANOVAs on the first order composite and second 
order composite ToM measures for the shifting, inhibition and updating EF measures. N.B. Shifting 
analyses did not include the age group variable. 
df E Q partial Eta a 
Age group 
First order ToM: Inhibitory EF 1,56 6.746 0.012 0.108 
Updating EF 1,56 6.264 0.015 0.101 
Second order ToM: Inhibitory EF 1,56 6.089 0.017 0.098 
Updating EF 1,56 6.864 0.011 0.109 
EF level 
First order ToM: Shifting EF 1,28 0.102 0.752 0.004 
Inhibitory EF 1,56 0.000 0.999 0.000 
Updating EF 1,56 0.011 0.917 0.000 
Second order ToM: Shifting EF 1,28 0.012 0.915 0.000 
Inhibitory EF 1,56 1.100 0.299 0.019 
Updating EF 1,56 0.010 0.923 0.000 
Age group x EF Level 
First order ToM: Inhibitory EF 1,56 0.128 0.721 0.002 
Updating EF 1,56 0.115 0.736 0.002 
Second order ToM: Inhibitory EF 1,56 1.581 0.214 0.027 
Updating EF 1,56 1.587 0.213 0.028 
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Table 5.8: Results 0/2 (age group) x 2 (EF level) ANOVAs on the first and second order ToM 
composite and the first and second order predictive ToM composite measures/or the shifting, 
inhibition and updating EF measures. N.B. Shifting analyses did not include the age group variable. 
df E 12 partial Eta 2 
Age group 
1st & 2nd ToM: Inhibitory EF 1,56 9.013 0.004 0.139 
Updating EF 1,56 9.534 0.003 0.145 
1st & 2nd Predict ToM: Inhibitory EF 1,56 7.568 0.008 0.119 
Updating EF 1,56 7.221 0.009 0.114 
EF level 
1st & 2nd ToM: Shifting EF 1,28 0.052 0.822 0.002 
Inhibitory EF 1,56 0.705 0.405 0.012 
Updating EF 1,56 0.014 0.905 0.000 
1 st & 2nd Predict ToM: Shifting EF 1,28 0.021 0.886 0.001 
Inhibitory EF 1,56 0.210 0.648 0.004 
UpdatingEF 1,56 0.122 0.728 0.002 
Age group x EF Level 
1st & 2nd ToM: Inhibitory EF 1,56 1.318 0.256 0.023 
Updating EF 1,56 1.310 0.257 0.023 
1st & 2nd Predict ToM: Inhibitory EF 1.56 0.904 0.346 0.016 
Updating EF 1.56 1.170 0.284 0.020 
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Table 5.9: Composite ToM score means and standard deviations/or weak and strong EF groups across 
the 4-year-old and 5-year-old age groups. NB. shifting EF was only considered/or the 4-year-olds. 
Age ToM composite EF group Mean ToM Standard 
grouE score deviation 
4 1 sl order Shifting weak 1.50 0.76 
Shifting strong 1.59 0.67 
Inhibition weak 1.59 0.62 
Inhibition strong 1.54 0.78 
Updating weak 1.58 0.69 
Updating strong 1.55 0.69 
2nd order Shifting weak 1.00 1.31 
Shifting strong 1.05 0.90 
Inhibition weak 1.06 0.90 
Inhibition strong 1.00 1.16 
Updating weak 1.16 1.12 
Updating strong 0.82 0.75 
1 sl+2nd order Shifting weak 2.50 1.77 
Shifting strong 2.64 1.33 
Inhibition weak 2.65 1.22 
Inhibition strong 2.54 1.71 
Updating weak 2.74 1.56 
Updating strong 2.36 1.21 
1 st+2nd order predictive Shifting weak 2.25 1.28 
Shifting strong 2.32 1.09 
Inhibition weak 2.35 1.00 
Inhibition strong 2.23 1.30 
Updating weak 2.37 1.17 
Updating strong 2.18 1.08 
5 1 st order Inhibition weak 1.90 0.32 
Inhibition strong 1.95 0.22 
Updating weak 1.89 0.33 
Updating strong 1.95 0.22 
2nd order Inhibition weak 1.40 0.70 
Inhibition strong 2.05 1.23 
Updating weak 1.56 1.24 
Updating strong 1.95 1.07 
1 sl+2nd order Inhibition weak 3.30 0.68 
Inhibition strong 4.00 1.34 
Updating weak 3.44 1.42 
Updating strong 3.90 1.09 
1 st+2nd order predictive Inhibition weak 2.80 0.42 
Inhibition strong 3.15 0.75 
Updating weak 2.78 0.83 
UEdating strong 3.14 0.57 
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Table 5.10: Results of2 (age group) ANOVAs on the shifting, inhibition and updating EF measures. 
df E 12 partial Eta 2 
Shifting EF 1,58 3.117 0.083 0.051 
Inhibitory EF 1,58 5.298 0.025 0.084 
Updating EF 1,58 12.100 0.001 0.173 
ToM performance 
Scores for the two first-order ToM tasks were found to be strongly positively 
correlated, r = 0.391,2<0.01. However, scores for the two second-order tasks did not 
appear to be related, r =-0.210,12.>0.05. A t-test revealed that scores for the first, first-
order ToM task presented were significantly greater than scores for the second, first-
order ToM task presented (see Table 5.1 for age group means and standard 
deviations), 1(59)=2.427, 12.<0.05. A further t-test indicated that scores for the first, 
second-order ToM task presented were significantly lower than scores for the second, 
second-order ToM task presented (see Table 5.1 for age group means and standard 
deviations), 1(61)=7.619, 12.<0.001. 
CVT performance 
The coefficient for internal consistency of the CVT task demonstrated 
reasonably good reliability, Cronbach's alpha = 0.613. One-sample 1-tests revealed 
that children scored significantly above chance for each group of CVT items 
reflecting an individual maxim or rule: The Maxim of First Quantity (M=2.85, 
SD=1.13), 1(59)=2.394, 12.<0.05; Maxim of Second Quantity (M=2.77, SD=0.93), 
1(59)=2.228,12.<0.05; Maxim of Quality (M=3.58, SO=1.34), 1(59)= 6.243, 12.<0.001; 
Maxim of Relation (M=3.60, SD=1.11), 1(59)=7.692, 2<0.001; Maxim of Politeness 
(M=4.13, SO=1.02), 1(59)=12.449, 12.<0.001. 
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5.4 Discussion 
This study was concerned with extending the results of Experiment 2 by 
examining the relationship between all three of the proposed components of EF and a 
broad measure ofCU: the CVT. 
In line with expectations, and in support of the masked competence account of 
the emergence of CU, a relationship was found between EF, assessed in terms of 
DCCS performance, and the demonstration of CU assessed using the CVT. Although 
the skewed nature of DCCS performance indicates that the relationship between 
shifting EF and CVT performance should be considered tentatively. 
Although previous research has revealed relationships between EF and other 
specific aspects of CU such as the ability to take account of common ground 
information (Nilsen & Graham, 2009) and to compute SIs (Chapter 4), this is the first 
time that a relationship has been demonstrated between EF and a general measure of 
CU. However, in contrast to expectations and standard accounts ofCU, although in 
line with the findings from Experiments 1 and 2, analyses did not reveal convincing 
evidence of a significant association between CU and ToM measures. Although ToM 
initially appeared to predict CVT performance, this effect disappeared once age and 
EF ability were considered. The lack of relation between ToM and performance on 
the CVT is at odds with the findings of Surian, Baron-Cohen and van der Lely (1996) 
and Tedoldi, Surian and Siegal (2005), both of whom found a relation between ToM 
and CVT performance. However, the relationship found by Surian, Baron-Cohen and 
van der Lely (1996) was demonstrated by children with autism. Because this 
population is known to demonstrate difficulties with ToM, the children were given 
first-order false-belief tasks typically passed by 3- to 4-year-olds, despite having a 
mean mental age of 5 years 7 months. Indeed, in support of the use of these tasks, 
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only 3 of the 8 children with autism (37.5 %) passed these tasks. The relationship 
found by Tedoldi, Surian and Siegal (2005) was demonstrated by a sample of deaf 
children with a mean age of approximately 9 years. However these children also 
appeared to demonstrate a ToM deficit, with only 24 % scoring correctly on the first-
order false belief tasks (in comparison to the 79 % of hearing children with a mean 
age of approximately 7 years scoring correctly). 
In both the aforementioned studies, the relationships found between ToM and 
CU were borne by associations between first-order ToM and CVT performance. 
However, in the current study, the children tested were performing at ceiling on the 
first-order tasks, 93% scored correctly on the first task presented, 81.5% on the 
second task. This would be expected of typically developing children of the age 
sampled (4 and 5 years), and provided the rationale for including second-order false 
belief tasks in the study. The age of participants selected for the study had been based 
more on their expected performance on the CVT, than the suitability of ToM tests. 
Although there were no ceiling effects in the second order tasks (the mean score 
across both tasks was 1.43 out of 4), the lack of association between second-order 
ToM and CVT performance does not contrast with the Surian, Baron-Cohen and van 
der Lely (1996) or Tedoldi, Surian and Siegal (2005) studies, in which second-order 
ToM ability was not investigated. Such findings might simply reflect the fact that 
first-order ToM plays a more central role in success on the CVT than second-order 
ToM. 
The fact that the relationship between first-order ToM and CVT performance 
appears restricted to populations demonstrating ToM deficits, suggests that although 
ToM plays a role in CVT performance, it has a greater significance for those whose 
ToM is less well developed. It could well be that once ToM comes online, other 
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factors which don't come into play without ToM appreciation, begin to play more of a 
role. 
Furthermore, also in contrast to expectations, and Experiment 2, analyses 
failed to reveal an association between ToM and EF measures. This is also at odds 
with the findings of Carlson and Moses (2001) and Hala, Hug, and Henderson (2003) 
who demonstrated a relationship between ToM and inhibitory ability and Frye, Zelazo 
and Palfai (1995) and Pemer, Lang and Kloo (2002) who reported an association 
between ToM and DCCS performance. The age of the children tested in the first three 
of these studies was younger than the age tested in the current study. However, the 
suggestion that the older age of children in the current study might have reduced 
performance variation, and so the likelihood of finding evidence for the ToM-EF 
relationship, appears to be weakened by Pemer, Lang and Kloo (2002). 
Pemer, Lang, and Kloo (2002) found evidence for a relationship between ToM 
and performance on the DCCS in a sample of 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds. Pemer et al. 
demonstrated this association using only first-order false belief tasks. However, they 
reported that only 66% of their participants scored correctly on the traditional false 
belief tasks they employed, and an even smaller proportion (51.7%) on a more 
contemporary task used. This contrasts greatly with the 93% of participants who 
scored correctly on the first traditional first-order task presented and the 81.5% who 
passed on the second traditional first-order task presented in the current study. Such a 
discrepancy in pass-rates can probably be attributed to the inclusion of 3-year-olds in 
the Pemer, Lang and Kloo study who would be less likely to pass first-order ToM 
tasks, and so might be expected to have brought overall performance measures down 
below the ceiling functioning demonstrated in the current study. Therefore, the initial 
suggestion that the older age of children in the current study might have reduced 
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performance variation, and so the likelihood of finding evidence for the ToM-EF 
relationship, would appear plausible with more sensitive measures. 
Thus, as in the previous studies, the masked competence account has been 
partially supported. EF has again been found to playa role in the demonstration of 
CU, and this time the effect has been demonstrated using the CVT. However, because 
the current study did not reveal relationships between ToM and CU or between EF 
and ToM, it is still not clear that the effect of EF on CU is due to its impact on ToM. 
As suggested in Section 4.4, the failure to find significant relationships with 
ToM might be due to the inappropriateness of the ToM measures used for the age 
range tested. The validity of the ToM scores produced in Experiments 1 and 2 was 
questioned in Sections 3.4 and 4.4. In line with the findings from the previous two 
studies, the results of the current study revealed that significantly more children failed 
the second, first-order ToM task they were presented with, than failed the first, first-
order task. Furthermore, consistent with the previous pattern of results, whilst 3 
children failed both tasks in the current study, indicating a genuine ToM deficit, 8 
children passed the first task but went on to fail the second, whilst only one child 
demonstrated the opposite pattern. In view of the fact that first-order ToM tasks are 
typically passed by children of the age of the participants in this study, it seems highly 
likely that some of the variation in composite first-order ToM scores might have been 
reflecting fatigue rather than individual differences in ToM. Although, as in the 
previous two studies, the strong correlation found between performance on the two 
first-order tasks in the current study, suggests that the effects of fatigue were limited. 
Second-order ToM tasks were included to differentiate between children with, 
and children without, a more advanced level of ToM, and so increase ToM score 
variation. Such tasks are typically passed by 6- to 7-year-olds. Just as in Experiment 
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2, in Experiment 3 significantly more children failed the first, second-order task 
presented, than failed the second, second-order task. This suggests that fatigue was 
unlikely to account for much of the composite second-order score variation. However, 
also in line with the findings from Experiment 2, performance on the two second-
order tasks did not appear to be related. This suggests that a considerable degree of 
score variation for at least one of the second-order tasks was not reflective of 
individual differences in ToM. 
As argued in Section 4.4, analysis of performance on both the first- and 
second-order ToM tasks indicates that a considerable degree of variance in ToM 
scores might have been reflecting a factor other than ToM ability. Therefore the 
failure to find relationships with ToM in the current study, could have been 
attributable to the inappropriateness of the specific ToM measures used. 
Unfortunately, there is a paucity of evidence to suggest a ToM task suitable for the 
precise age range targeted in this study. However, a scale of ToM tasks put forward 
by Wellman and Liu (2004) suggests that children find tasks which assess 
appreciation of the difference between real and apparent emotion, more difficult than 
traditional first-order ToM tasks. Furthermore, Wellman and Liu indicated that the 
mean age at which children pass tasks measuring awareness of the differentiation 
between real and apparent emotion was just over 5 years. This is younger than the age 
at which children are reported to pass second-order ToM tasks. Wellman and Liu's 
report indicates that, if tasks assessing appreciation of the difference between real and 
apparent emotion had been employed in place of the second-order ToM tasks in this 
study, a greater degree of variation in ToM score might have been produced. It is 
expected that greater variation in ToM scores would have resulted in significant 
relationships between ToM and EF and between ToM and CU. 
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It is also worth noting that although updating ability appeared to be related to 
the appreciation of SIs in Experiment 2, this did not seem to be associated with the 
more general CVT measure of CU in Experiment 3. However, the SI task assesses 
appreciation of only one component of the CVT: the First Maxim of Quantity. The 
CVT requires appreciation of four more conversational maxims, in addition to the 
First Maxim of Quantity. It could be that updating ability playa rather narrow role in 
CU, associated specifically with the First Maxim of Quantity, whilst shifting ability 
plays a more general role associated with appreciation of all of the conversational 
maxims. Shifting ability was not measured in Experiment 2, as the task was deemed 
too easy for the age range tested, but had a more age-appropriate measure been 
employed, it is expected that a relationship would have been revealed between 
shifting ability and the appreciation of SIs. Such a scenario fits in well with the 
general finding that the Maxim of First Quantity is grasped after the rest of the 
conversational maxims (Siegal, Iozzi, & Surian, 2009; Surian, Baron-Cohen, & van 
der Lely, 1996). One would expect appreciation ofa maxim to emerge later on ifit 
placed additional demands on EF. Despite the absence of significant EF and maxim 
interaction effects, the significant links between DCCS scores and responses on the 
Quality and Politeness items are consistent with the notion that distinct EF 
components can exert a differential influence on the CVT maxim sub-scales. 
In line with the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, in which the EF components 
assessed appeared to be unrelated: inhibitory and shifting ability in Experiment 1, 
inhibitory and updating ability in Experiment 2, the three EF tasks components 
examined in Experiment 3: inhibitory, updating and shifting ability were also not 
found to be related. This is in concordance with the suggestion of Miyake et al. (2000) 
that inhibition, shifting and updating ability are differentiated components of EF, and 
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leaves open the possibility that different EF factors might be affecting CU in different 
ways, as has been suggested in the preceding paragraph. 
The CVT was found to demonstrate good internal reliability, indicating that that 
all of the items in the task were tapping the same basic ability: CU. However, the 
level of performance in individual trials appeared to depend on the specific maxim 
being tapped. The children in this study demonstrated a greater understanding of the 
maxims of Quality, Relation and Politeness than the maxims of First or Second 
Quantity. This is in concordance with the findings of Siegal, Iozzi, and Surian (2009) 
who reported the same performance pattern in bilingual children aged between 3 
years 9 months and 6 years, and consistent patterns in monolingual Italians and 
Slovenians aged between 3 years 6 months and 6 years. The implication that children 
have more difficulty appreciating the Maxim of First Quantity than some of the other 
conversational maxims is also in concordance with the findings of Surian, Baron-
Cohen and van der Lely (1996). These authors reported that children with SLI (age 
M= 11 years 10 months) and typically developing children (age M= 6 years 7 months) 
demonstrated only chance performance on CVT items tapping appreciation of the 
Maxim of First Quantity. However, the same children demonstrated above chance 
performance on CVT items tapping appreciation of the rest of the conversational 
maxims. 
It has been suggested (by an anonymous reviewer of the Siegal, Iozzi and 
Surian 2009 paper) that poor performance on the CVT items representing the Maxim 
of First Quantity, can be attributed to the inappropriateness of the exact statements 
used in the CVT to represent this Maxim. The Maxim of First Quantity calls for 
sufficient information to be provided in conversation, in an effort to avoid ambiguity 
and so enable precise meanings to be identified. This maxim was represented in the 
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CVT by pairs of statements, one of which was intended to be ambiguous, and one of 
which was considered detailed enough to communicate an exact meaning. However, it 
has been proposed that some of the responses which had been intended to be 
ambiguous, could in fact be construed as appropriate (and thus adequately 
informative) alternatives to additional possible responses. To illustrate this, consider 
the following exchange (Appendix VIII, Item AI): 
MARK : What would you like to buy in this pet-shop? 
LUCY: An animal. 
JANE: A cat. 
It had been intended that children should interpret Lucy's response of "An 
animal" as ambiguous and so inappropriate. Unlike Jane, she doesn't inform Mark 
which animal she wants, and so doesn't enable Mark to identify what exactly she 
would like to buy. However, a child might not initially construe the situation as 
requiring information alluding to which animal is to be bought. It could be they 
consider the first priority to be to establish the type of thing to be bought, in this case 
an animal, instead of pet food for example, which is often bought from a pet shop. 
The exchange below (Appendix VIII, Item A2), can be reinterpreted in a similar 
fashion: 
MARK : How would you like your tea? 
LUCY: with milk. 
JANE : In a cup 
It had been intended that children should interpret Jane's response of "In a cup" as 
ambiguous and so inappropriate. Unlike Lucy, she doesn't tell Mark what she wants 
in her drink, and so doesn't enable Mark to identify what he should put in the tea. 
However, a child might consider it an initial priority to establish that the tea is 
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actually to be made in a vessel they don't have too much experience with at this age: a 
cup, rather than a tumbler, which 4- and 5-year-olds more standardly drink from. 
In support of the suggestion that the Maxim of First Quantity was inadequately 
represented in the CVT, Cronbach's Alpha rose from 0.613 to 0.650 when the five 
items used to represent this maxim were removed. This indicates that the CVT is a 
slightly more reliable measure of CU without the First Quantity items. However, 
since DCCS performance had not been found to predict scores for CVT items 
reflecting the Maxim of First Quantity, these items did not affect the relationship 
established between EF and CU in Experiment 3. 
Of the 11 children who scored less than perfectly on the DCCS (Le. scored less 
than 6), none scored over 20 on the CVT and most (72.7%) scored 14 or less. This 
contrasts with the 49 who did well on the DCCS (Le. scoring 6), of whom only 14.3% 
scored 14 or less on the CVT, with 75.5% scoring 16 or more. However, whilst no 
child who performed poorly on the DCCS gained a high CVT score, supporting the 
proposal that the shifting aspect of EF plays a necessary role in the emergence of CU, 
nearly a quarter of children who performed well on the DCCS nevertheless performed 
rather poorly on the CVT (24.5 % scored 15 or less). This indicates that the shifting 
aspect of EF is necessary but not sufficient for the emergence of CU. Other factors 
such as breadth of general knowledge might be expected to affect CU. It could be that 
those children with relatively poor general knowledge are less familiar with different 
contexts and so are less able to make inferences about the influence of these contexts 
on the meaning of language used. 
Although it has been suggested that the effect of EF on CU is mediated by ToM, 
it is unlikely that ToM is the factor identified here, as it is not clear to see why 
children would demonstrate unequal competence across the different 
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maxims/conversational rules. It seems much more likely that this other factor is world 
knowledge, whose demands seem much more likely to differ across the maxim-based 
groups of CVT items. For the CVT items reflecting the Second Maxim of Quantity 
for instance, children need to possess quite specific knowledge: that puppies have four 
legs, that eggs are boiled in a saucepan. Similarly, for the CVT items reflecting the 
First Maxim of Quantity, children need to bring to mind comprehensive food 
knowledge relating to the fact that there are a number of different types of cuisine one 
could eat, and a similarly broad knowledge of gifts relating to the fact that there are 
many different types of presents that could be received. However, for CVT items 
reflecting the Maxim of Quality, children need only to know basic facts relating to 
more common knowledge such as whether a dog could be in the clouds, or whether 
people live on the moon. For CVT items reflecting the Maxim of Politeness, children 
need only to recognise when someone is being rude. 
For items reflecting the Maxim of Relevance, children need to know if the sea is 
a type of food, or if wearing trousers is a type of holiday activity, which would seem 
to tax general knowledge slightly more than the items reflecting the Maxims of 
Quality and Politeness, but to a lesser degree than the items reflecting the two 
Maxims of Quantity. Indeed in support of this proposal, whilst 21 and 29 children 
achieve a perfect score on the items reflecting the Maxims of Quality and Maxim of 
politeness respectively, and only 6 and 3 children achieve this on items reflecting the 
First and Second Maxim ofInformativeness respectively, an intermediate number of 
children: 16, manage to achieve the top score for items reflecting the Maxim of 
Relevance. 
Siegal, Iozzi and Surian (2009) looked at the effect of bilingualism on CVT 
performance and investigated the role that inhibitory and shifting aspects of EF 
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played in this relationship. The day-night task employed in Experiment 1 of the 
current study, and the DCCS used in Experiments 1 and 3 of the current study, were 
used to assess inhibitory and shifting ability respectively. They did not look directly at 
the relation between either aspect of EF and CVT performance, but investigated 
whether either inhibitory or shifting proficiency could account for the bilingual 
advantage in CVT performance. Siegal et a1. did not find a significant relationship 
between bilingualism and inhibitory ability, but found that Italian-Slovenian 
bilinguals and Slovenian monolinguals outperformed Italian monolinguals on shifting 
ability. However, they reported that entering shifting ability as a covariate did not 
remove the bilingual advantage in CVT performance. 
The CVT performance of the children in this study was compared to that of the 
Italian monolinguals in Siegal et aI's Experiment 1. The 4- and 5-year-olds tested in 
this study (M=61.78 months) achieved means scores of2.85, 2.77, 3.58, 3.60 and 4.13 
for groups of CVT items assessing the appreciation of the maxims of First Quantity, 
Second Quantity, Quality, Relation and Politeness respectively. This can be 
contrasted with Siegal et a1.'s sample of 4- to 6-year-olds (M=64 months), who 
achieved mean scores of 3.37,3.26,3.84,3.84 and 4.26 respectively in these trials. 
The Siegal et a1. sample appear to be scoring more highly in all of the maxim-based 
item groups. However, although Siegal et al.'s sample was older, this was only by 3 
months. Such a slight age advantage would not be expected to result in the consistent 
display of enhanced performance across the different groups of CVT items. However, 
the performance superiority of the Siegal et al. sample might have been attributable a 
difference in CVT task demands. In the Siegal et a1. study, children were directed to 
identify the silly or rude responses in each statement pair. However, children in the 
current study were asked to identify the appropriate statement in each pair. It could 
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well be that the silly or rude responses are actually more salient to the children 
precisely because of their inappropriateness. This could mean that children in the 
current study who were asked to identify the appropriate statements, had to exert 
inhibitory ability to overcome their attention to the inappropriate responses, to enable 
them to respond correctly in this study. This inhibitory demand would not have been 
made of the Siegal et al. sample, who in contrast, were asked to identify the 
inappropriate responses. 
In line with expectations, and as in Experiment 1, all the abilities measured in 
Experiment 3 improved significantly with age. The age range tested in Experiment 3 
spanned only two years (4-5 years), as in Experiment 2 (5-6 years). This indicates that 
the failure to find a general significant association between performance and age in 
Experiment 2, was not due to the restricted age variance available to exert an effect. It 
suggests however, that age has more of an influence on the performance of younger 
children, recruited in both Experiments 1 and 3, but not Experiment 2. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Experiment 3 provided partial support for the masked competence account of 
CU. Although ToM was not found to demonstrate associations with either CU or EF, 
a relationship was discovered between the shifting component of EF and a broad 
measure of CU: the CVT. Experiment 4 was conducted to examine whether training 
children on the shifting component of EF would improve their CU. An EF training 
effect would provide further support for the masked competence account of CU. 
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Chapter 6: Experiment 4 - Effects of executive functioning training on 
conversational understanding. 
6.1 Introduction 
Experiment 3 investigated whether inhibitory, updating and shifting 
components of EF are related to the CVT as a broad measure of CU in 4- and 5-year-
oIds. Results indicated that shifting EF assessed using the DCCS was significantly 
associated with CVT scores. This finding is consistent with the proposal that EF 
enhances CU and concurs with the masked competence account of the emergence of 
CU. However, the relationship found between shifting EF and CU could be 
attributable to a third mediating factor which promotes both shifting EF and CU. 
Establishing that training EF results in enhanced CU would provide evidence of a 
more direct link between EF and CU. 
A number of studies have attempted to train children's EF abilities. For 
example, Dowsett and Livesey (2000) trained 3-year-olds on the DCCS and an 
adaptation of the Change task (Logan & Burkell, 1986). The Change task, like the 
DCCS, requires shifting from a previously activated response set to an alternative 
response set. Dowsett and Livesey found that training children over the course of 
three sessions on these two EF tasks led to significant improvements in performance 
on a GolNo-Go EF task that requires production of a response in accord with the 
presence of a "go" stimulus and inhibition of the response in accord with the presence 
of a "no-go" stimulus. Similar improvements were neither demonstrated by a control 
no-intervention group nor by a control practice-task group who were not given EF 
training but practiced on the GolNo-Go task for three sessions. 
As part of their investigation into the relationship between EF and ToM in 3-
and 4-year-olds, Kloo and Perner (2003) also employed EF training using the DCCS. 
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In one condition, children were trained on the DCCS. In another condition, children 
were trained on ToM. In a control condition, children were trained on either number 
conservation or relative clauses. Kloo and Perner found that DCCS training 
significantly improved not only DCCS performance, but also ToM performance. The 
DCCS improvement shown by the DCCS training group was significantly greater 
than the non-significant DCCS improvement shown by the control group. However, 
although the ToM training group also improved significantly on the DCCS task, their 
performance was not significantly greater than that of the control training group. 
Furthermore, as with the control training, ToM training was not found to significantly 
improve ToM performance. 
More recently, Mack (2007) reported that 3-year-olds given pre-training on 
the DCCS task performed significantly better on a post-training DCCS than controls 
who did not receive training. The pre-training comprised drawing attention to the two 
dimensions of shape and colour evident in the target and sorting cards, and explaining 
and demonstrating how each sorting card could be sorted in two different ways, one 
of which was in accord with the shape of the target cards and one of which was in 
accord with the colour of the target cards. Children then practiced sorting to each rule 
and were provided with feedback on their performance. Mack found children in the 
group who received pre-training and children in another group who did not receive 
training but were asked an irrelevant question between pre-switch and post-switch 
sorting performed significantly better than control children following the standard 
DCCS format (as illustrated in Section 3.2). 
Tasks other than the DCCS have also been employed in EF training studies. 
Diamond, Barnett, Thomas, and Munro (2007) compared the influence ofEF training 
with the impact of a balanced literacy program (dBL) on the EF ability of 4- and 5-
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year-old U.S. preschoolers. The EF program promoted children's use of self-
regulatory private speech, provided EF aids such as pictures to cue self-inhibition and 
encouraged use of planning. By contrast, behavioural control in the dBL program was 
predominantly teacher-, rather than self-imposed. EF ability was measured using a dot 
task and a flanker task, both of which required inhibition of pre-potent responses. In 
the dot task, children were required to follow rules which frequently required them to 
inhibit a pre-potent response. For example, they would be asked to press on the 
opposite side of a page that a flower appeared - a task which demanded inhibition of 
the pre-potent tendency to signal the same side on which an image appears. In the 
flanker task, children were asked to respond to a central shape (either a circle or a 
triangle) which often required inhibition of attention to a conflicting external shape. 
Diamond et al. reported that EF-trained children performed significantly better than 
dBL control group children in trials requiring inhibition in both the dot and flanker 
tasks. 
Further evidence of the effectiveness of EF training was provided by 
Klingberg et al. (2005). These authors investigated whether EF training using visuo-
spatial and verbal working memory (WM) span computer tasks could lead to EF 
improvements in 7- to 12-year-olds with ADHD. EF training comprised presentation 
of tasks taxing memory for multiple object-locations and phoneme, letter or digit 
strings. The precise quantity of items in a string was adjusted over trials to match each 
child's ability. Control training comprised presentation of the same WM span tasks, 
but the number of objects/phonemes/lettersldigits to be remembered was kept at a 
minimum level of two to three items in each string. Children who underwent EF 
training were found to perform significantly better than children in the control-trained 
group, on a span-board visuo-spatial WM span task (requiring memory for object 
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locations presented on a three-dimensional board rather than the computer grid used 
in training), a digit-recall verbal WM span task, a colour-word Stroop response-
inhibition task and the Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices non-verbal reasoning 
ability EF task. 
However, EF training has not always been found to significantly improve EF 
ability. Rueda et al. (2005) used EF computer programs to train 4- and 6-year olds to 
track and anticipate stimuli, to resolve conflict and to enhance their inhibitory ability. 
Training effects were established by analysis of pre- and post-test performance on a 
Flanker EF task. Task performance was calculated in terms of conflict scores 
generated by subtracting reaction times for trials in which the central item was 
surrounded or flanked by congruent items from reaction times for trials in which the 
central item was flanked by conflicting items. Rueda et al. found that training led to 
enhanced functioning on the Flanker task. The children's low conflict scores were 
similar to an adult performance. Although the training effect was not found to reach 
significance (post-training conflict scores were not significantly smaller than pre-
training scores), an electrophysiological investigation indicated that the training led to 
an altered distribution of task-related neural activity relative to the controls, 
resembling the distribution found in adults during the Flanker task. 
Similarly, Fisher and Happe (2005) were not able to find a significant effect of 
EF training on EF ability. Fisher and Happe used EF and ToM training in a study of 
6- to 15-year-olds with autistic spectrum disorders. Children with autism in the ToM 
training condition were encouraged to think of beliefs as "photos in the head", and 
children with autism in the EF training condition were taught to conceptualise the 
brain as a machine which used EF "tools" which help it to think. Children in the ToM 
and EF training groups performed significantly better on post-test and follow-up ToM 
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tests relative to pre-test tasks, and showed greater improvement than children with 
autism in the control group, who improved in only one of four ToM tasks given at 
post-test and did not improve in any of the ToM tasks given at follow-up. However, 
EF -trained children failed to demonstrate enhanced performance on EF tasks given 
post-test or follow-up. Although the ToM-trained children performed significantly 
better on the DCCS EF task, the level of improvement was comparable to that of the 
children in the control group and so could not be attributed to ToM training. 
Therefore, neither Rueda et al. (2005) nor Fisher and Happe (2005) reported 
significant effects of EF training on EF ability. Furthermore, when considering the 
comparable success of EF training studies, the bias to publish positive results ought 
also to be borne in mind (Scargle, 2000). 
Nonetheless, the DCCS training program used by Kloo and Perner (2003) 
appeared to be effective, and was based on the DCCS task that was significantly 
related to CVT scores in Experiment 3. Therefore, this program formed the basis for 
the EF training in Experiment 4 to establish if shifting EF thought to be tapped by the 
DCCS task is directly related to performance on the CVT. Children aged 3 and 4 
years were recruited for Experiment 4, since the DCCS task is first passed between 3 
and 5 years of age (Zelazo, 2006). Thus, many of the 3- and 4-year-olds could be 
expected to fail the DCCS task and so require DCCS training. 
In addition to DCCS training, children in Experiment 4 were given pre- and 
post DCCS tasks to determine whether the training was successful, and pre- and post-
CVT tasks to assess whether the training led to the hypothesised improvement in CVT 
scores. Control number-conservation pre- and post-test tasks, taken from Kloo and 
Perner (2003), were also presented to establish whether the facilitatory effect of EF 
training was specific to EF and CVT competence, or whether it led to a broad 
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improvement in post-test performance. Additionally, a picture vocabulary task 
(BPVS) was given to establish mental age. 
It was initially intended that Experiment 4 would also include CVT training to 
investigate the possibility that the relationship between EF and CU stemmed from the 
positive influence of CU on EF. However, a pilot study indicated that a variety of 
CVT training methods did not raise CVT performance above chance levels. Similarly, 
the administration of control-task training would have enabled examination of the 
hypothesis that CVT and EF competence were facilitated by general training effects, 
rather than improvements in EF per se. However, the DCCS training condition was 
presented first and the data produced from this consequently rendered a control 
condition redundant. 
In Experiment 4, it was hypothesised that all abilities would improve 
significantly with age, and that EF training would lead to a significant improvement 
on both the DCCS as a measure of shifting EF ability and the CVT. It was not 
expected that EF training would enhance performance on a number conservation 
control task. 
6.2 Method 
Participants. These were 29 children, ranging in age from 40- to 57-months 
(M = 46.93 months, SD = 5.26). The children were selected from a larger sample of 
72 children aged between 40 and 57 months (M =49.07 months, SD = 5.21) who had 
been given an initial DCCS screening task. There were 35 children, ranging between 
42 and 57 months-old (M =51.06 months, SD = 4.28), who were excluded from the 
study for attaining perfect scores of 6 out of 6 in the DCCS task. Exclusion would 
also have been a consequence of error-less performance on the pre-training CVT, 
Chapter 6: Experiment 4 191 
reflected in scores of 12 out of 12. However, no child achieved a perfect pre-training 
CVT score. A further 8 children were also excluded from the study: 2 children (aged 
41 and 48 months) were unable to identify shapes and/or colours appropriately, 1 
child (56 months) was scared of the puppets used in the CVT and asked to withdraw, 
1 child ( 44 months) missed her second testing session, 1 child (4 7 months) had to 
leave before completing their third testing session, 1 child (41 months) could not sort 
according to the DCCS pre-switch dimension and 2 children (53 and 55 months) were 
unable to complete the third testing session because the testing environment was too 
noisy. In total, 43 children ranging between 41- and 57-months-old (M =50.51 
months, SO = 4.71) were excluded. The children included in the study were 
predominantly white, and were recruited from primary schools located in middle class 
areas of Sheffield and Surrey. All children spoke English as their first language, and 
none were known to have any specific language impairment. 
Procedure. Children were tested individually, in a quiet area of their school, 
and were presented with tasks in a fixed order. Those who were not excluded on the 
basis of the criteria stated above, took part in three testing sessions, each of which 
lasted between 10 and 15 minutes. 
Design. This consisted of three phases in which the children in the study were 
tested over three sessions. 
Session 1 - Screening, pre-training measures andfirst training period. The initial 
DCCS screening task was given, which also served as the pre-training DCCS 
(PreDCCS). Children who scored less than 6 out of 6 on the DCCS went on to receive 
the pre-training CVT (PreCVT), the pre-training number conservation control task 
(PreCon) and the first phase of DCCS training. 
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Session 2 - Vocabulary measure and second training period. The British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) was administered and children received the second phase 
of DCCS training. 
Session 3 - Post- training measures. Children received post-training measures of 
DCCS (Post2BoxDCCS and Post3BoxDCCS), CVT (PostNewCVT and 
PostOldCVT) and control-task (PostCon) performance. 
DCCS 
Screening/pre-training task (PreDCCS): The procedure was identical to that used in 
the DCCS task given in Experiment 1, except that children were asked to sort by size 
and colour. Half of the children were presented with target cards depicting a big red 
cat and a small blue snail, and sorting cards showing a big blue snail or a small red cat 
(see Appendix Xa). When sorting by colour, these children were instructed "Here's a 
redlblue one, where does it go?" When sorting by size, the children were instructed 
"Here's a smalllbig one, where does it go?" The other half of the children were 
presented with an alternative sorting set, comprising target cards depicting a big green 
snake and a small yellow horse, and sorting cards showing a small green snake or a 
big yellow horse (see Appendix Xb). When sorting by colour, these children were 
instructed, "Here's a yellow/green one, where does it go?" When sorting by size, the 
children were instructed, "Here's a smalllbig one, where does it go?" As before, 
children were asked to sort 6 cards in the pre- training and 6 cards in the post-
training. Task scores were based on post- training sorting, with a possible range of 0-
6. 
Training: First session - Children were presented with an initial sorting task 
which used the same general procedure followed in the pre-training. However, in the 
training session, participants were asked to sort the cards four times, twice according 
Chapter 6: Experiment 4 193 
to number and twice according to colour. Feedback was given on their performance. 
If a child sorted incorrectly, the experimenter repeated the current sorting rule, 
pointed to the relevant dimension on the target and sorting cards and showed the child 
how to sort correctly. As in the pre-training task, children were asked to sort the first 
six cards according to one dimension, and the remaining six cards according to the 
alternative dimension. The sorted cards were then removed and shuffled and children 
asked to sort the first six cards again according to the initial dimension and the 
remaining cards according to the alternative dimension. 
Half of the children received one sorting set comprising target cards of two red 
strawberries and one green strawberry and sorting cards of one red strawberry or two 
green strawberries (see Appendix Xc). When sorting by colour, these children were 
instructed, "Here's a red/green one, where does it go?" When sorting by number, the 
children were instructed "Here is one, where does it go?lHere are two, where do they 
go?" The other half of the children received an alternative sorting set. This set 
comprised target cards consisting of two blue aeroplanes and one yellow aeroplane 
and sorting cards consisting of one blue aeroplane or two yellow aeroplanes (see 
Appendix Xd). When sorting by colour, these children were instructed "Here's a 
blue/yellow one, where does it go?" When sorting by number, the children were 
instructed "Here is one, where does it go?lHere are two, where do they goT' 
When children had sorted the first set of cards four times, the sorting cards 
were removed and children were presented with six more sorting cards. The target 
cards were kept to guide sorting. The six new sorting cards were identical to one 
another and revealed an image suitable for contrastive sorting along the number and 
colour dimensions. Children who had received the strawberry cards in the prior task 
were given cards depicting a single red car, and children who had previously sorted 
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cards with aeroplanes, received cards depicting two yellow apples (see Appendix Xe). 
Children were asked to sort all six cards according to one dimension and provided 
with feedback, as in the prior task. If the sorting dimension was colour, and children 
received the cards depicting a single red car, they would be asked "Here's a red one, 
where does it go?" These cards would be sorted in the tray with the two red 
strawberry target cards. When all the cards had been sorted, the cards were removed 
from the sorting tray and children were asked to sort according to the alternative 
dimension of number. If the children received the cards depicting two yellow apples, 
they would be asked "Here are two. Where do they go?" As in all card-sorting tasks, 
order of dimension sorting was counterbalanced across children. 
When children had sorted this set of six cards according to both dimensions, 
the target and sorting cards were removed. They were then given two new target cards 
differing on the dimensions of number and colour and a final set of six identical 
sorting cards. As in the previous sorting task, these cards revealed an image suitable 
for contrastive sorting along the number and colour dimensions depicted on the target 
cards. There were two sets of target and sorting cards, and those children who had 
started the session by sorting the strawberry cards were given target cards comprising 
two yellow flowers and one red flower, and sorting cards revealing one yellow flower 
(see Appendix Xi). When sorting by colour, these children were instructed, "Here's a 
yellow one, where does it go?" When sorting by number, the children were instructed, 
"Here is one, where does it go?" Children who had started the session by sorting the 
aeroplane cards received target cards depicting two green trees and one blue tree, and 
sorting cards revealing two blue trees (see Appendix Xg). When sorting by colour, 
these children were instructed "Here's a blue one, where does it go?" When sorting by 
number, the children were instructed "Here are two, where do they go?" 
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Training: Second session - This was identical to the first session, except that 
children completed the sorting tasks using the sets of sorting cards they had not used 
in the previous training session. 
Post- training tasks: Post training two box task (Post2BoxDCCS) - This 
followed the same procedure as the pre-training task. However, children were 
presented with the sorting set they had not been presented with in the pre-training 
task. Thus the score range for this task was 0-6. 
Post-training tasks: Post training three box task (Post3BoxDCCS)- This 
followed the same basic procedure as the pre-training /post-training two box task. 
However, children were presented with three target cards depicting a yellow hat, a red 
pencil and a green teddy and twenty-one sorting cards revealing a green pencil, a 
yellow teddy and a red hat (see Appendix Xh). Children were shown how to sort three 
different sorting cards according to either colour or shape, and then asked to sort nine 
more cards according to this rule. When sorting by colour, these children were 
instructed "Here's a green/yellow/red one, where does it go?" When sorting by shape, 
the children were instructed "Here is a hat/pencil/teddy, where does it go?" When 
these nine cards had been sorted correctly (no child failed to achieve this), children 
were asked to sort the remaining nine cards according to the alternative rule (Le. if 
they had started by sorting the cards according to colour, then they were asked to sort 
the last nine cards according to shape). The order of rule sorting was counterbalanced 
across children. Task scores were based on post-switch performance and so had 
possible range of 0-9. 
The use of a three-box task was in accordance with the suggestion of Kloo and 
Pemer (2003) that enhanced performance on a two-box DCCS task following DCCS 
training might only indicate that children had learnt to switch sorting boxes following 
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notice of a rule change. Thus an improvement in sorting on the two-box task need not 
necessarily demonstrate that children have acquired the ability to shift between 
alternative mental representations of a figure on a sorting card. However, correct 
performance on a three-box task requires more than simply switching sorting to an 
alternative box. As accurate sorting following a rule change in the three-box task 
requires selection of the appropriate sorting box from the two possible alternatives, 
children are required to shift their conceptualisation of the card figure in accordance 
with the rule-change. 
CVT 
Pre- training task (PreCVT),' This was based on the CVT task used in Experiment 3. 
However, Item 21 Appendix VIII was removed from the set of twenty-five items used 
in Experiment 3, and the remaining twenty-four items divided into two sets of twelve 
items. Each of the two sets contained either two or three items representing the First 
and Second Maxim of Quantity, the Maxims of Quality, Relation and Politeness (see 
Appendix XI: Series A and B). The removal ofItem 21 (Appendix VIII), enabled an 
even split between the number of items uSyd in the two pre-training CVT sets. This 
item had been used to represent the Maxim of Politeness in Experiment 3. However, 
as the Politeness Maxim had not, in fact, been included in Grice's original list of 
conversational maxims, a trial representing the Maxim of Politeness was thus deemed 
the most appropriate item to remove. 
Within each series, items reflecting the different conversational maxims and 
rules were presented in almost the same quasi-random order in which they had been 
presented, in Experiment 3. Each child was presented with one of the two series of 
items (counterbalanced across children). As in Experiment 3, children watched the 
CVT series on a laptop and were introduced to the three puppets: Mark, Lucy, and 
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Jane, who were involved in the task. Task scores were based on children's accurate 
identification of the puppet who gave the inappropriate response in each trial. The 
task had a possible score range of 0-12. 
Post- training task (PostNewCVT and PostOldeVT): Children were given a 
new pre-training series of CVT items that they had not received during the Pre-
training phase (PostNewCVT), followed immediately by the series of pre-training 
items that had been given previously (PostOldCVT). Thus if they had received Series 
A in the pre-training phase, they received Series B followed immediately by Series A 
in the post-training phase. The PostNewCVT and the PostOldCVT each had a 
possible score range of 0-12. Performance on the post-training Old Item CVT was 
used to provide a basic indication of CU. Post-training NewCVT scores were used to 
assess application of CU to new CVT items. 
Control Task 
Pre-training task (PreCon): Half the children were presented with two parallel, equal 
length rows of seven yellow counters, and half were presented with two parallel, 
equallength rows of six green paperclips. Children were told, "Here we have some 
yellow counters/ green paperclips." The experimenter pointed to the row nearest to 
the child and asked, "Are there more counters/paperclips in this row?" Then she 
pointed to the other row and asked, "Or are there more counters/paperclips in this 
row?" Finally, she pointed to both rows alternately, asking "Or are there the same 
number in both rows?" When the child had responded, the experimenter pushed the 
counters/clips further apart in one of the rows to lengthen it, and asked the child 
"Now, are there more counters/paperclips in this row?" pointing to the row nearest to 
the child, "Or are there more counters/paperclips in this row?" pointing to the other 
row, "Or are there the same number in both rows?" pointing to both rows alternately. 
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When the child had responded, the experimenter then pushed the counters/clips 
together in one of the rows to shorten it. She then asked the child, "Now, are there 
more counters/paperclips in this row?" pointing to the row nearest to the child, "Or 
are there more counters/paperclips in this row?" pointing to the other row, "Or are 
there the same number in both rows?" pointing to both rows alternately. 
Post-training task (PosfCon): This followed the same procedure as the pre-
training task. However, if children were given the yellow counters in the pre-training 
task, they were given the green paperclips in the post-training task. Children given the 
green paperclips in the pre-training task were given the yellow counters in the post-
training task. 
6.3 Results 
Score means and standard deviations on the measures are presented in Table 
6.1. Correlations between the tasks are shown in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.1: Mean scores and standard deviations of the pre-training and post-training tasks given to the 
children in Experiment 4 (N=29) * 
Two-Box DCCS/6 
Three-Box DCCS/9 
Pre-training CVT/CVT Old/12 
% scores for pre-training CVT/CVT Old 
First Quantity maxirnll 00 
Second Quantity maxirnllOO 
Quality maxirnll 00 
CVTNew/12 
Relation maxirnll 00 
Politeness maxirnll 00 
% scores for CVT New First Quantity maxirnll 00 
Second Quantity maxirnllOO 
Quality maxirnll 00 
Relation maxirnll 00 
Politeness maxirnll 00 

































*Post-training control data is missing/or one child who did not seem to understand the questions 
posed Note: DCCS=Dimensional Change Card Sort task; CVT=Conversational Violations Task; CVT 
Old: Post-training CVT using old items; CVT New: Post-training CVT using new items. 
Effect of DCCS training on CVT performance 
A 3 (CVT condition: Pre vs. PostNew vs. PostOld) X 5 (Maxim) ANOV A did 
not reveal a significant difference between perfonnance in the pre- and post-training 
CVTs, .E(2, 420) = 2.012, 12>0.10. There was also no significant difference between 
performance on CVT items representing different Maxims, £(4, 420) = 1.388,12>0.20, 
and no significant interaction between CVT condition and Maxim, £(8, 420) = 0.547, 
12>0.80. Table 6.2 reports the means and standard deviations of CVT percentage 
scores for the different maxims across the CVT conditions. 
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Table 6.2: CVT percentage score means and standard deviations for the maxims (first quantity, second 
quantity, quality, relation and politeness) across the pre-training, post-training new items and post-
training old items CVT conditions. 
CVT condition Maxim Mean%CVT Standard 
score Deviation 
Pre-training First Quantity 52.90 33.13 
Second Quantity 48.79 27.15 
Quality 50.10 30.96 
Relation 47.66 28.49 
Politeness 58.62 30.09 
Post-training New Items First Quantity 56.93 32.34 
Second Quantity 58.03 23.12 
Quality 60.34 32.62 
Relation 53.97 30.17 
Politeness 58.62 32.92 
Post-training Old Items First Quantity 55.69 32.91 
Second Quantity 47.07 28.25 
Quality 61.48 28.31 
Relation 59.21 31.75 
Politeness 67.24 36.05 
However, one-sample 1-tests determining CVT scores of 6 out of 12 as chance 
levels, indicated that although scores for the pre-training CVT were not significantly 
different from chance, 1(28) = 0.351, U>0.70, scores for the post-training NewCVT, 
which used items not seen in the pre-training, were greater than chance, 1(28) = 3.727, 
U<O.OI (see Table 6.1 for CVT score means and standard deviations). Scores for the 
post-training OldCVT, which was identical to the pre-training CVT but was presented 
after training, were also greater than chance, 1(28) =3.087, U<O.Ol(see Table 6.1 for 
CVT score means and standard deviations). Furthermore, one sample 1-tests on the 
individual conversational maxims, revealed that children were only scoring above 
chance levels: i.e. accurately detecting maxim violations over 50% of the time on 
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groups of items presented post-training. More specifically, analyses found above 
chance performance on the CVT items representing the Maxim of Quality and the 
Rule of Politeness in the post-training OldCVT, 1(28) = 2.185, ll<0.05 and 1(28) = 
2.576, ll<0.05 respectively (Table 6.1 presents the means and standard deviations for 
percentages of maxim violations correctly detected). 
Effect of DCCS training on DCCS performance 
To assess the effect ofDCCS training on DCCS performance, a paired 
samples 1-test was performed to compare performance on the two-box DCCS task 
before and after DCCS training had been received. This analysis indicated that DCCS 
training led to a significant improvement in performance on the standard two-box 
DCCS task, t(28) = 12.76912<0.001 (see Table 6.1 for pre- and post training mean 
scores and standard deviations). One-sample 1-tests were then performed on DCCS 
scores achieved in the two-box task, prior to and after DCCS training. Actual scores 
were compared to chance-level performance, determined as a score of 3 out of 6 in the 
post-switch phase. Pre-training performance on the two-box task was significantly 
worse than chance selection between the two post-switch alternatives, 1(28) = 8.485, 
ll<O.OOI (see Table 6.1 for pre-training two-box DCCS score means and standard 
deviations). However, post-training performance on the two-box task was 
significantly better than chance selection between the two post-switch alternatives, 
1(28) = 7.785,..I2<0.001(see Table 6.1 for post-training two-box DCCS score means 
and standard deviations). Further, a one-sample 1-test revealed that post-training 
performance on the three-box task was also significantly better than chance selection 
between the three post-switch alternatives determined as a score of 3 out of 9 in the 
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post-switch phase, 1(28) = 6.311,12<0.001 (see Table 6.1 for post-training three-box 
DCCS score means and standard deviations). 
Effect of DCCS training on Control task performance 
Although children achieved higher scores in the post-training control 
conservation task than in the pre-training control task, they were not performing 
significantly better at post-training, 1(27) = 1.694, 12>0.10. One-sample !-tests revealed 
that neither pre- nor post-training performance on the control task was significantly 
better than chance determined as a score of2 out of 4,1(28) = 0.942, 12>0.30 and 1(27) 
= 0.797, 12>0.40 respectively. 
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Table 6.3: Task score intercorrelatiollS (n = 29 except for the post-training control scores: data is missingfor one child who did not seem to understand the questions posed). 
Age (m) BPVS PreDCCS PreCVT PreCon Post2Box Post3Box PostCVT PostCVT PostCon 
DCCS DCCS New Old 
Age(m) 
BPVS 0.332* 
PreDCCS 0.182 0.324* 
PreCVT -0.226 0.293 0.321* 
PreCon 0.391* 0.291 -0.021 -0.070 
Post2BoxDCCS 0.125 0.155 0.191 -0.097 0.028 
Post3BoxDCCS 0.090 0.141 0.249 -0.049 0.084 0.746*** 
PostCVTNew 0.168 0.068 0.269 0.170 -0.020 -0.056 -0.008 
PostCVTOld 0.259 0.414* 0.381* 0.307 0.215 -0.050 0.015 0.030 
PostCon 0.118 0.161 0.100 0.278 0.613*** -0.104 0.033 -0.023 -0.054 
N.B. "*=p<O.OOI (I-tailed), *= p < 0.05 (I-tailed), BPVS: British Picture Vocabulary Scale, PreDCCS: Pre-training two box Dimensional Change Card Sort Task, PreCVT: 
Pre-training CVT items, PreCon: Pre-training control task, Post2BoxDCCS: Post-training two-box Dimensional Change Card Sort task, Post3BDCCS: Post-trainng three-box 
Dimensional Change Card Sort task, PostCVTNew: Post-trainng CVT using new items, PostCVTOld: Post-training CVT using old/pre-training items, PostCon: Post-training 
control task. 
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Relationship between DCCS and CVT 
BPVS scores were found to correlate significantly with pre-training DCCS 
performance (r=0.324, 12<0.05) and PostOldCVT scores (r=0.414, 12<0.05). However, 
age in months was not found to demonstrate significant correlations with DCCS or 
CVT performance. Thus BPVS, but not age, was partialled out of one-way 
ANCOV As to determine the effects of DCCS ability on CVT performance. Because 
of the number of analyses conducted to investigate the relationship between DCCS 
and CVT scores, a conservative significance level of 0.01 was adopted. 
DCCS improvement was calculated by subtracting pre-training 2 box DCCS 
scores from post-training 2 box DCCS scores. Children's DCCS improvement was 
classed as strong if their scores increased by 6 from pre- to post-training levels and 
weak if their scores increased by less than 6. The weak and strong division criteria 
were selected on the basis that they enabled as equal a split as possible in the number 
of children assigned to the two DCCS improvement groups. Of the 29 children given 
DCCS training, 13 demonstrated weak orcs improvement and 16 demonstrated 
strong DCCS improvement. Table 6.4 displays the results of ANCOV As investigating 
the effects of strong vs. weak DCCS improvement and maxim type on post-training 
CVT scores and pre to post-training CVT improvement, whilst partialling out BPVS 
scores. No effect of OCCS improvement was revealed. Table 6.5 reports the estimated 
marginal means and standard errors of post-training CVT percentage scores for the 
weak and strong shifters across maxims when the effect of vocabulary score was 
taken into account and Table 6.6 reports the estimated marginal means and standard 
errors of pre to post-training CVT percentage improvement for the weak and strong 
shifters across maxims when the effect of vocabulary score was taken into account. 
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Tables 6.7 and 6.8 display the results of ANCOVAs investigating the effects 
of post-training DCCS performance and maxims on post-training CVT scores and 
pre- to post-training CVT improvement, whilst partialling out BPVS scores. Tables 
6.9-6.12 report the estimated marginal means and standard errors of post-training 
CVT percentage scores and pre- to post-training CVT improvement for the weak and 
strong shifters across maxims when the effects of vocabulary scores were taken into 
account. Children's 2 box post-training DCCS performance was classed as strong if 
their scores were 6 and weak if their scores were less than 6. Again, the weak and 
strong division criteria were selected on the basis that they enabled as equal a split as 
possible in the number of children assigned to the two DCCS performance groups. Of 
29 children, 7 demonstrated weak 2 box performance and 22 demonstrated strong 2 
box performance. Children's 3 box post-training DCCS performance was classed as 
strong if their scores were 9 and weak if their scores were less than 9, with weak and 
strong division criteria chosen to enable as equal a split as possible in the number of 
children assigned to the two DCCS performance groups. Of 29 children, 18 
demonstrated weak 3 box performance and 11 demonstrated strong 3 box 
performance. No effect of post-training DCCS performance was revealed either, 
although the numbers were unevenly distributed between 2 box DCCS groups so only 
tentative implications can be drawn from these analyses. Further, the correlation 
between pre-training DCCS and pretraining CVT scores reported in Table 6.3 was not 
significant once BPVS scores were partialled out, r=0.263, lPO.08. 
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Table 6.4: Results for the 2 (2 box DCCS post training improvement level: <6 point increase = weak 
vs. 6 point increase = strong) x 5 (Maxim type) A NCO VAs partialling out standardised BPVS scores 
on post-training and improvement CVT measures. 
df E 12 partial Eta 2 
DCCS Improvement: PostNewCVT 1,134 0.159 0.691 0.001 
PostOldCVT 1,134 3.293 0.072 0.024 
PostCombinedCVT 1,134 2.320 0.130 0.017 
ImproveNewCVT 1,134 0.103 0.748 0.001 
ImproveOldCVT 1,134 0.568 0.452 0.004 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,134 0.191 0.943 0.006 
PostOldCVT 4,134 1.609 0.176 0.046 
PostCombinedCVT 4,134 1.241 0.297 0.036 
ImproveNewCVT 4,134 0.211 0.932 0.006 
ImproveOldCVT 4,134 0.664 0.618 0.019 
DCCS Improvement x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,134 0.574 0.682 0.017 
PostOldCVT 4,134 0.223 0.925 0.007 
PostCombinedCVT 4,134 0.233 0.920 0.007 
ImproveNewCVT 4,134 0.225 0.924 0.007 
ImproveOldCVT 4,134 0.872 0.482 0.025 
N.B. PostNewCVT= % scores for maxims in post-training new item CVT measure; PostOldCVT= % 
scores for maxims in post-training old item CVT measure; PostCombinedCVT= a combined % score 
measure produced by summing raw performance on each of the post-training CVTs and then 
converting into overall % scores; ImproveNewCVT=a CVT improvement measure calculated by 
subtracting % scores for maxims in the pre-training measure from % scores for maxims in the post-
training new item CVT; ImproveOldCVT= a CVT improvement measure calculated by subtracting % 
scores for maxims in the pre-training CVT measure from% scores for maxims the post-training old 
item CVT. 
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Table 6.5: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage scores and standard errors for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) produced across the post-training new 
items, post-training old items and combined post-training CVT conditions by children demonstrating 
weak and strong improvement in shifting when individual differences in vocabulary score were taken 
into account. 
CVT measure Shifting EF Maxim Mean % Standard 
im12rovement CVT score Error 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 65.4 08.6 
Second Quantity 56.4 08.6 
Quality 60.3 08.6 
Relation 49.9 08.6 
Politeness 61.5 08.6 
Strong First Quantity 50.1 07.7 
Second Quantity 59.4 07.7 
Quality 60.4 07.7 
Relation 57.2 07.7 
Politeness 56.2 07.7 
PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 61.1 08.8 
Second Quantity 52.1 08.8 
Quality 62.5 08.8 
Relation 68.8 08.8 
Politeness 72.7 08.8 
Strong First Quantity 51.3 07.9 
Second Quantity 43.0 07.9 
Quality 60.7 07.9 
Relation 51.4 07.9 
Politeness 62.8 07.9 
postCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 61.3 06.0 
Second Quantity 53.6 06.0 
Quality 61.3 06.0 
Relation 58.2 06.0 
Politeness 67.1 06.0 
Strong First Quantity 50.2 05.4 
Second Quantity 50.2 05.4 
Quality 60.2 05.4 
Relation 53.9 05.4 
Politeness 59.5 05.4 
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Table 6.6: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage improvements and standard errors for the 
maxims (first quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) calculated using the post-
training new items CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for 
children demonstrating weak and strong shifting improvement when individual differences in 
vocabulary score were taken into account. 
CVT measure Shifting EF Maxim Mean%CVT Standard 
ImQrovement score Error 
ImproveNewCVT Weak First Quantity 06.9 12.4 
Second 03.1 12.4 
Quantity 
Quality 04.3 12.4 
Relation 08.3 12.4 
Politeness 00.5 12.4 
Strong First Quantity 01.7 11.2 
Second 14.2 11.2 
Quantity 
Quality 15.1 11.2 
Relation 04.7 11.2 
Politeness -00.4 11.2 
ImproveOldCVT Weak First Quantity 02.5 11.1 
Second -01.2 11.1 
Quantity 
Quality 06.5 11.1 
Relation 27.0 11.1 
Politeness 11.7 11.1 
Strong First Quantity 02.9 10.0 
Second -02.2 10.0 
Quantity 
Quality 15.5 10.0 
Relation -01.2 10.0 
Politeness 06.1 10.0 
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Table 6.7: Results for the 2 (post-training DCCS level: 2 box scores: <6 = weak vs. = 6 = strong) x 5 
(Maxim type) ANCOVAs partialling out standardised BPVS scores on post-training and improvement 
CVT measures. 
df 1: R partial Eta 2 
2 box DCCS: PostNewCVT 1,134 0.532 0.467 0.004 
PostOldCVT 1,134 0.225 0.636 0.002 
PostCombinedCVT 1,134 0.149 0.700 0.001 
ImproveNewCVT 1,134 0.962 0.328 0.007 
ImproveOldCVT 1,134 0.025 0.875 0.000 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,134 0.584 0.675 0.017 
PostOldCVT 4,134 0.639 0.636 0.019 
PostCombinedCVT 4,134 0.751 0.559 0.022 
ImproveNewCVT 4,134 0.278 0.892 0.008 
ImproveOldCVT 4,134 0.856 0.492 0.025 
2 box DCCS x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,134 0.791 0.533 0.023 
PostOldCVT 4,134 1.156 0.333 0.033 
PostCombinedCVT 4,134 1.192 0.317 0.034 
ImproveNewCVT 4,134 0.066 0.992 0.002 
ImproveOldCVT 4,134 1.373 0.247 0.039 
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Table 6.8: Results for the 2 (post-training DCCS level: 3 box scores: <9 = weak vs. =9 = strong) x 5 
(Maxim type) A NCO VAs partialling out standardised BP VS scores on pos/-train ing and improvement 
CVT measures. 
df E 12 partial Eta 2 
3 box DCCS: PostNewCVT 1,134 0.733 0.393 0.005 
PostOldCVT 1,134 0.214 0.644 0.002 
PostCombinedCVT 1,134 0.566 0.453 0.004 
ImproveNewCVT 1,134 0.508 0.477 0.004 
ImproveOldCVT 1,134 0.239 0.626 0.002 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,134 0.037 0.997 0.001 
PostOldCVT 4,134 1.391 0.240 0.040 
PostCombinedCVT 4,134 1.020 0.399 0.030 
ImproveNewCVT 4,134 0.272 0.895 0.008 
ImproveOldCVT 4,134 0.966 0.428 0.028 
3 box DCCS x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,134 1.978 0.101 0.056 
PostOldCVT 4,134 0.547 0.701 0.016 
PostCombinedCVT 4,134 2.018 0.096 0.057 
ImproveNewCVT 4,134 3.106 0.018 0.085 
ImproveOldCVT 4,134 1.948 0.106 0.055 
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Table 6.9: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage scores and standard errors for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) produced by weak and strong post-training 
2 box shifters across the post-training new items, post-training old items and combined post-training 
CVT conditions when individual differences in vocabulary score were taken into account. 
CVT measure Shifting Maxim Mean % Standard Error 
EF level CVT score 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 59.6 11.6 
Second Quantity 57.1 11.6 
Quality 66.7 11.6 
Relation 38.0 11.6 
Politeness 50.0 11.6 
Strong First Quantity 56.1 06.5 
Second Quantity 58.3 06.5 
Quality 58.3 06.5 
Relation 59.0 06.5 
Politeness 61.4 06.5 
PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 47.9 11.9 
Second Quantity 64.5 11.9 
Quality 67.1 11.9 
Relation 64.7 11.9 
Politeness 57.5 11.9 
Strong First Quantity 58.2 06.7 
Second Quantity 41.5 06.7 
Quality 59.7 06.7 
Relation 57.5 06.7 
Politeness 70.3 06.7 
postCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 51.6 08.1 
Second Quantity 60.2 08.1 
Quality 65.9 08.1 
Relation 48.8 08.1 
Politeness 53.8 08.1 
Strong First Quantity 56.3 04.6 
Second Quantity 49.0 04.6 
Quality 59.0 04.6 
Relation 58.1 04.6 
Politeness 65.8 04.6 
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Table 6.10: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage improvements and standard errors for the 
maxims (first quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) calculated using the post-
training new items CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items C VT measure for 
children demonstrating weak and strong post-training 2 box shifting when individual diflerences in 
vocabulary score were taken into account. 
CVT measure Shifting Maxim Mean%CYT Standard 
EF Level score Error 
ImproveNewCYT Weak First Quantity -07.6 16.9 
Second Quantity 04.2 16.9 
Quality 09.0 16.9 
Relation -00.5 16.9 
Politeness -07.6 09.5 
Strong First Quantity 07.7 09.5 
Second Quantity 10.8 09.5 
Quality 10.6 09.5 
Relation 08.5 09.5 
Politeness 02.4 09.5 
ImproveOldCVT Weak First Quantity -19.1 15.0 
Second Quantity 11.8 15.0 
Quality 09.5 15.0 
Relation 25.9 15.0 
Politeness -00.1 15.0 
Strong First Quantity 09.7 08.5 
Second Quantity -06.0 08.5 
Quality 12.1 08.5 
Relation 06.8 08.5 
Politeness 11.4 08.5 
Chapter 6: Experiment 4, 213 
Table 6.11: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage scores and standard errors for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) produced by weak and strong post-training 
3 box shifters across the post-training new items, post-training old items and combined post-training 
CVT conditions when individual differences in vocabulary score were taken into account. 
CVT measure Shifting Maxim Mean % Standard Error 
EF level CVT score 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 62.1 07.1 
Second Quantity 60.2 07.1 
Quality 67.6 07.1 
Relation 45.3 07.1 
Politeness 61.1 07.1 
Strong First Quantity 48.4 09.1 
Second Quantity 54.5 09.1 
Quality 48.4 09.1 
Relation 68.2 09.1 
Politeness 54.5 09.1 
PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 58.1 07.5 
Second Quantity 46.1 07.5 
Quality 66.5 07.5 
Relation 55.4 07.5 
Politeness 69.3 07.5 
Strong First Quantity 51.7 09.6 
Second Quantity 48.7 09.6 
Quality 53.2 09.6 
Relation 65.4 09.6 
Politeness 63.9 09.6 
postCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 57.7 05.0 
Second Quantity 52.1 05.0 
Quality 66.6 05.0 
Relation 49.9 05.0 
Politeness 65.2 05.0 
Strong First Quantity 51.0 06.4 
Second Quantity 51.0 06.4 
Quality 51.0 06.4 
Relation 65.6 06.4 
Politeness 59.2 06.4 
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Table 6.12: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage improvements and standard errors for the 
maxims (first quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) calculated using the post-
training new items CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for 
children demonstrating weak and strong post-training 3 box shifting when individual differences in 





















































Since the 3- to 4-year-old group in the current study was younger than the 4· 
year old group who had demonstrated the DCCS-CVT relationship in Experiment 3, 
the data for the current study was split into separate 3-year-old and 4-year-old age 
groups. The previous two set of analyses focusing on pre-to-post training DCCS 
improvement and post-training DCCS scores were re-run on the two separate age 
groups (see Tables 6.13-6.18). Tables 6.19-6.30 report the estimated marginal means 
and standard deviations for these analyses. As for the previous analyses, children's 
DCCS improvement was classed as strong if their scores increased by 6 from pre- to 
post-training levels and weak. if their scores increased by less than 6. As before, weak 
and strong division criteria were selected on the basis that they enabled as equal a 
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split as possible in the number of children assigned to the two DCCS improvement 
groups. Of the 18, 3-year-olds given DCCS training, 7 demonstrated weak DCCS 
improvement and 11 demonstrated strong DCCS improvement. Of the 11, 4-year-olds 
given DCCS training, 6 demonstrated weak DCCS improvement and 5 demonstrated 
strong DCCS improvement. Children's 2 box post-training DCCS performance was 
classed as strong if their scores were 6 and weak if their scores were less than 6. 
Again, weak and strong division criteria were selected on the basis that they enabled 
as equal a split as possible in the number of children assigned to the two DCCS 
performance groups. Of 18, 3-year-olds, 5 demonstrated weak post-training 2 box 
performance and 13 demonstrated strong post-training 2 box performance. Of 11, 4-
year-olds, 2 demonstrated weak post-training 2 box performance and 9 demonstrated 
strong post-training 2 box performance. Children's 3 box post-training OCCS 
performance was classed as strong if their scores were 9 and weak if their scores were 
less than 9, with weak and strong division criteria chosen to enable as equal a split as 
possible in the number of children assigned to the two DCCS performance groups. Of 
18, 3-year-olds, 10 demonstrated weak 3 box performance and 8 demonstrated strong 
3 box performance. Of 11, 3-year-olds, 8 demonstrated weak 3 box performance and 
3 demonstrated strong 3 box performance. 
As in the previous analyses, there was no effect of pre-to-post-training DCCS 
improvement or post-training OCCS scores on post-training CVT scores or pre- to 
post-training CVT improvement. However, reflecting the pattern present in the 
combined age analysis, N was unevenly distributed between post-training 2 box 
DCCS score level groups formed for both the 3- and 4-year old age groups. 
Furthermore, N was found to be disproportionately spread between the post-training 3 
box DCCS score groups formed for the 4-year old age group. Thus implications 
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should be drawn from these analyses cautiously. There was no correlation between 
pre-training DCCS and pretraining CVT scores, even before BPVS scores had been 
partialled out, r=0.264, 12>0.140 for the 3-year-olds and [=0.447, 12>0.08 for the 4-
year-olds. 
Table 6.13: Results for the 3-year-olds of 2 (2 box DCCS post training improvement level: <6 point 
increase = weak vs. 6 point increase = strong) x 5 (Maxim type) A NCO VAs partialling out 
standardised BPVS scores on post-training and improvement CVT measures. 
df E 12 partial Eta a 
DCCS Improvement: PostNewCVT 1,79 0.082 0.776 0.001 
PostOldCVT 1,79 1.151 0.287 0.014 
PostCombinedCVT 1,79 1.283 0.261 0.016 
ImproveNewCVT 1,79 0.525 0.471 0.007 
ImproveOldCVT 1,79 0.013 0.909 0.000 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,79 1.199 0.318 0.057 
PostOldCVT 4,79 0.624 0.647 0.031 
PostCombinedCVT 4,79 1.257 0.294 0.060 
ImproveNewCVT 4,79 0.129 0.971 0.007 
ImproveOldCVT 4,79 0.792 0.534 0.039 
DCCS Improvement x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,79 2.323 0.064 0.105 
PostOldCVT 4,79 0.080 0.988 0.004 
PostCombinedCVT 4,79 0.682 0.606 0.033 
ImproveNewCVT 4,79 1.811 0.135 0.084 
ImproveOldCVT 4,79 0.597 0.666 0.029 
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Table 6.14: Results for the 3-year-olds of2 (post-training DCCS level: 2 box scores: <6 = weak vs. = 
6 = strong) x 5 (Maxim type) A NCO VAs partialling out standardised BP VS scores on post-training 
and improvement CVT measures. 
df E 12 partial Eta a 
2 box DCCS: PostNewCVT 1,79 0.110 0.741 0.001 
PostOldCVT 1,79 0.946 0.334 0.012 
PostCombinedCVT 1,79 0.226 0.635 0.003 
ImproveNewCVT 1,79 1.119 0.293 0.014 
ImproveOldCVT 1,79 0.013 0.910 0.000 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,79 1.568 0.191 0.074 
PostOldCVT 4,79 0.257 0.905 0.013 
PostCombinedCVT 4,79 0.847 0.499 0.041 
ImproveNewCVT 4,79 0.223 0.925 0.011 
ImproveOldCVT 4,79 0.758 0.556 0.037 
2 box DCCS x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,79 1.321 0.269 0.063 
PostOldCVT 4,79 0.680 0.608 0.033 
PostCombinedCVT 4,79 0.786 0.538 0.038 
ImproveNewCVT 4,79 0.491 0.742 0.024 
ImproveOldCVT 4,79 0.545 0.703 0.027 
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Table 6.15: Results for the 3-year-olds of2 (post-training DCCS level: 3 box scores: <9 = weak vs. = 
9 = strong) x 5 (Maxim type) A NCO VAs partialling out standardised BPVS scores on post-training 
and improvement CVT measures. 
df E 12 partial Eta a 
3 box DCCS: PostNewCVT 1,79 1.390 0.242 0.017 
PostOldCVT 1,79 0.452 0.504 0.006 
PostCombinedCVT 1,79 1.644 0.204 0.020 
ImproveNewCVT 1,79 0.040 0.842 0.001 
ImproveOldCVT 1,79 0.011 0.918 0.000 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,79 0.537 0.709 0.026 
PostOldCVT 4,79 0.668 0.616 0.033 
PostCombinedCVT 4,79 0.890 0.474 0.043 
ImproveNewCVT 4,79 0.464 0.762 0.023 
ImproveOldCVT 4,79 0.903 0.466 0.044 
3 box DCCS x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,79 3.060 0.021 0.134 
PostOldCVT 4,79 0.615 0.653 0.030 
PostCombinedCVT 4,79 2.883 0.028 0.127 
ImproveNewCVT 4,79 2.520 0.048 0.113 
ImproveOldCVT 4,79 0.903 0.466 0.044 
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Table 6.16: Results for the 4-year-olds 0/2 (2 box DCCS post training improvement level: <6 point 
increase = weak vs. 6 point increase = strong) x 5 (Maxim type) A NCO VAs part jailing out 
standardised BPVS scores on post-training and improvement CVT measures. 
df E 12 partial Eta a 
DCCS Improvement: PostNewCVT 1,44 0.120 0.730 0.003 
PostOldCVT 1,44 0.942 0.337 0.021 
PostCombinedCVT 1,44 0.357 0.553 0.008 
ImproveNewCVT 1,44 0.289 0.593 0.007 
ImproveOldCVT 1,44 1.328 0.255 0.029 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,44 0.305 0.873 0.027 
PostOldCVT 4,44 2.074 0.100 0.159 
PostCombinedCVT 4,44 1.270 0.296 0.103 
ImproveNewCVT 4,44 0.572 0.684 0.049 
ImproveOldCVT 4,44 0.853 0.500 0.072 
DCCS Improvement x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,44 0.418 0.795 0.037 
PostOldCVT 4,44 1.049 0.393 0.087 
PostCombinedCVT 4,44 0.269 0.896 0.024 
ImproveNewCVT 4,44 1.894 0.128 0.147 
ImproveOldCVT 4,44 1.173 0.336 0.096 
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Table 6.17: Results for the 4-year-olds of2 (post-training DCCS level: 2 box scores: <6 = weak vs. = 
6 = strong) x 5 (Maxim type) A NCO VAs partialling out standardised BPVS scores on post-training 
and improvement CVT measures. 
df E n partial Eta 2 
2 box DCCS: PostNewCVT 1,44 0.581 0.450 0.013 
PostOldCVT 1,44 0.043 0.837 0.001 
PostCombinedCVT 1,44 1.093 0.302 0.024 
ImproveNewCVT 1,44 0.045 0.833 0.001 
ImproveOldCVT 1,44 0.062 0.804 0.001 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,44 0.505 0.733 0.044 
PostOldCVT 4,44 0.990 0.423 0.083 
PostCombinedCVT 4,44 1.287 0.290 0.105 
ImproveNewCVT 4,44 0.320 0.863 0.028 
ImproveOldCVT 4,44 0.895 0.475 0.075 
2 box DCCS x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,44 0.332 0.855 0.029 
PostOldCVT 4,44 0.629 0.644 0.054 
PostCombinedCVT 4,44 0.654 0.627 0.056 
ImproveNewCVT 4,44 1.214 0.319 0.099 
ImproveOldCVT 4,44 1.300 0.285 0.106 
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Table 6.18: Results for the 4-year-olds of 2 (post-training DCCS level: 3 box scores: <9 = weak vs. = 
9 = strong) x 5 (Maxim type) A NCO VAs partialling out standardised BPVS scores on post-training 
and improvement CVT measures. 
df E R partial Eta 2 
3 box DCCS: PostNewCVT 1,44 0.133 0.718 0.003 
PostOldCVT 1,44 0.037 0.848 0.001 
PostCombinedCVT 1,44 0.371 0.545 0.008 
ImproveNewCVT 1,44 0.000 0.991 0.000 
ImproveOldCVT 1,44 0.033 0.856 0.001 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,44 0.407 0.803 0.036 
PostOldCVT 4,44 1.336 0.272 0.108 
PostCombinedCVT 4,44 1.172 0.336 0.096 
ImproveNewCVT 4,44 0.189 0.943 0.017 
ImproveOldCVT 4,44 0.644 0.634 0.055 
3 box DCCS x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,44 0.252 0.907 0.022 
PostOldCVT 4,44 0.491 0.742 0.043 
PostCombinedCVT 4,44 0.581 0.678 0.050 
ImproveNewCVT 4,44 0.725 0.580 0.062 
ImproveOldCVT 4,44 0.896 0.475 0.075 
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Table 6.19: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage scores and standard errors for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) produced across the post-training new 
items, post-training old items and combined post-training CVT conditions by three-year-olds 
demonstrating weak and strong improvement in shifting when individual differences in vocabulary 
score were taken into account. 
CVT measure Shifting EF Maxim Mean % Standard 
imQrovement CVT score Error 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 81.0 11.1 
Second Quantity 54.8 11.1 
Quality 57.2 11.1 
Relation 33.3 11.1 
Politeness 64.3 11.1 
Strong First Quantity 47.0 08.9 
Second Quantity 56.0 08.9 
Quality 68.2 08.9 
Relation 56.0 08.9 
Politeness 54.5 08.9 
PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 59.6 12.2 
Second Quantity 52.4 12.2 
Quality 57.2 12.2 
Relation 59.6 12.2 
Politeness 64.4 12.2 
Strong First Quantity 54.4 09.8 
Second Quantity 42.3 09.8 
Quality 46.9 09.8 
Relation 48.4 09.8 
Politeness 63.6 09.8 
postCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 68.6 08.0 
Second Quantity 54.3 08.0 
Quality 57.2 08.0 
Relation 45.8 08.0 
Politeness 64.3 08.0 
Strong First Quantity 50.9 06.4 
Second Quantity 47.2 06.4 
Quality 56.3 06.4 
Relation 50.9 06.4 
Politeness 59.1 06.4 
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Table 6.20: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage improvements and standard errors/or the 
maxims (first quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) calculated using the post-
training new items CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for 
three-year-olds demonstrating weak and strong shifting improvement when individual differences in 
vocabulary score were taken into account. 
CVT measure Shifting EF Maxim Mean % Standard 
Improvement CVT score Error 
ImproveNewCVT Weak First Quantity 11.8 15.9 
Second Quantity 02.2 15.9 
Quality -14.S IS.9 
Relation -04.8 lS.9 
Politeness 07.1 IS.9 
Strong First Quantity -IS.2 12.7 
Second Quantity 06.1 12.7 
Quality 31.8 12.7 
Relation 12.1 12.7 
Politeness 00.0 12.7 
ImproveOldCVT Weak First Quantity -10.0 IS.7 
Second Quantity 00.0 IS.7 
Quality -14.3 IS.7 
Relation 21.3 lS.7 
Politeness 07.1 IS.7 
Strong First Quantity -07.6 12.S 
Second Quantity -07.5 12.5 
Quality 10.7 12.S 
Relation 04.6 12.5 
Politeness 09.1 12.5 
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Table 6.21: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage scores and standard errors for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) produced by three-year-old weak and strong 
post-training 2 box shifters across the post-training new items, post-training old items and combined 
post-training CVT conditions when individual differences in vocabulary score were taken into account. 
CVT measure Shifting Maxim Mean % Standard Error 
EF level CVT score 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 73.4 13.4 
Second Quantity 56.6 13.4 
Quality 70.0 13.4 
Relation 26.6 13.4 
Politeness 50.0 13.4 
Strong First Quantity 55.2 08.3 
Second Quantity 55.1 08.3 
Quality 61.5 08.3 
Relation 55.1 08.3 
Politeness 61.5 08.3 
PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 50.0 14.3 
Second Quantity 63.2 14.3 
Quality 60.0 14.3 
Relation 63.4 14.3 
Politeness 60.0 14.3 
Strong First Quantity 58.9 08.9 
Second Quantity 39.7 08.9 
Quality 47.4 08.9 
Relation 48.7 08.9 
Politeness 65.4 08.9 
postCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 60.0 09.5 
Second Quantity 60.0 09.5 
Quality 64.0 09.5 
Relation 44.0 09.5 
Politeness 55.0 09.5 
Strong First Quantity 56.9 05.9 
Second Quantity 46.2 05.9 
Quality 53.8 05.9 
Relation 50.8 05.9 
Politeness 63.5 05.9 
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Table 6.22: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage improvements and standard errors/or the 
maxims (first quantity. second quantity. quality. relation and politeness) calculated using the post-
training new items CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for 
three-year-olds demonstrating weak and strong post-training 2 box shifting when individual differences 
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Table 6.23: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage scores and standard errors/or the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) produced by three-year-old weak and strong 
post-training 3 box shifters across the post-training new items, post-training old items and combined 
post-training CVT conditions when individual differences in vocabulary score were taken into account. 
CVT measure Shifting Maxim Mean % Standard Error 
EF level CVT score 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 70.1 




Strong First Quantity 47.9 




PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 64.8 




Strong First Quantity 45.9 




postCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 65.9 




Strong First Quantity 47.6 
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Table 6.24: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage improvements and standard errors for the 
maxims (first quantity. second quantity. quality. relation and politeness) calculated using the post-
training new items CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for 
three-year-olds demonstrating weak and strong post-training 3 box shifting when individual differences 
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Table 6.25: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage scores and standard errors for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) produced across the post-training new 
items, post-training old items and combined post-training CVT conditions by four-year-olds 
demonstrating weak and strong improvement in shifting. when individual differences in vocabulary 
score were taken into account. 
CVT measure Shifting EF Maxim Mean % Standard 
imQrovement CVT score Error 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 47.7 13.5 
Second Quantity 58.9 13.5 
Quality 64.5 13.5 
Relation 69.9 13.5 
Politeness 58.9 13.5 
Strong First Quantity 56.2 14.8 
Second Quantity 66.2 14.8 
Quality 42.6 14.8 
Relation 59.4 14.8 
Politeness 59.4 14.8 
PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 62.5 12.4 
Second Quantity 51.3 12.4 
Quality 68.1 12.4 
Relation 79.1 12.4 
Politeness 82.0 12.4 
Strong First Quantity 44.9 13.6 
Second Quantity 45.1 13.6 
Quality 91.7 13.6 
Relation 58.5 13.6 
Politeness 61.7 13.6 
postCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 52.7 09.3 
Second Quantity 52.7 09.3 
Quality 66.1 09.3 
Relation 72.7 09.3 
Politeness 70.2 09.3 
Strong First Quantity 48.7 10.2 
Second Quantity 56.7 10.2 
Quality 68.7 10.2 
Relation 60.7 10.2 
Politeness 60.7 10.2 
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Table 6.26: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage improvements and standard errors for the 
maxims (first quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) calculated using the post-
training new items CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for 
four-year-olds demonstrating weak and strong shifting improvement when individual differences in 
vocabulary score were taken into account. 
CVT measure Shifting EF Maxim Mean % Standard 
Improvement CVT score Error 
ImproveNewCVT Weak First Quantity 03.3 18.6 
Second Quantity 06.1 18.6 
Quality 28.3 18.6 
Relation 25.6 18.6 
Politeness -05.0 18.6 
Strong First Quantity 36.3 20.4 
Second Quantity 29.7 20.4 
Quality -24.1 20.4 
Relation -13.9 20.4 
Politeness -03.9 20.4 
ImproveOldCVT Weak First Quantity 18.1 15.1 
Second Quantity -01.4 15.1 
Quality 31.9 15.1 
Relation 34.7 15.1 
Politeness 18.1 15.1 
Strong First Quantity 24.9 16.6 
Second Quantity 08.3 16.6 
Quality 24.9 16.6 
Relation -15.1 16.6 
Politeness -01.7 16.6 
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Table 6.27: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage scores and standard errors for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) produced by four-year-old weak and strong 
post-training 2 box shifters across the post-training new items, post-training old items and combined 
post-training CVT conditions when individual differences in vocabulary score were taken into account. 
CVT measure Shifting Maxim Mean % Standard Error 
EF level CVT score 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 24.6 23.3 
Second Quantity 58.1 23.3 
Quality 58.1 23.3 
Relation 66.1 23.3 
Politeness 49.6 23.3 
Strong First Quantity 57.5 11.0 
Second Quantity 63.1 11.0 
Quality 53.8 11.0 
Relation 64.9 11.0 
Politeness 61.2 11.0 
PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 42.9 21.9 
Second Quantity 67.9 21.9 
Quality 84.9 21.9 
Relation 67.9 21.9 
Politeness 51.4 21.9 
Strong First Quantity 57.0 10.3 
Second Quantity 44.1 10.3 
Quality 77.5 10.3 
Relation 70.1 10.3 
Politeness 77.5 10.3 
postCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 30.5 15.6 
Second Quantity 60.5 15.6 
Quality 70.5 15.6 
Relation 60.5 15.6 
Politeness 50.5 15.6 
Strong First Quantity 55.4 07.4 
Second Quantity 53.2 07.4 
Quality 66.5 07.4 
Relation 68.8 07.4 
Politeness 69.3 07.4 
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Table 6.28: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage improvements and standard errors for the 
maxims (first quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) calculated using the post-
training new items CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for 
four-year-olds demonstrating weak and strong post-training 2 box shifting when individual differences 
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Table 6.29: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage scores and standard errors for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) produced by four-year-old weak and strong 
post-training 3 box shifters across the post-training new items, post-training old items and combined 
post-training CVT conditions when individual differences in vocabulary score were taken into account. 
CVT measure Shifting Maxim Mean % Standard Error 
EF level CVT score 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 51.6 11.8 
Second Quantity 64.1 11.8 
Quality 55.7 11.8 
Relation 59.9 11.8 
Politeness 55.7 11.8 
Strong First Quantity 51.3 19.4 
Second Quantity 57.0 19.4 
Quality 51.3 19.4 
Relation 79.0 19.4 
Politeness 68.0 19.4 
PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 53.1 11.1 
Second Quantity 47.3 11.1 
Quality 84.8 11.1 
Relation 66.0 11.1 
Politeness 70.2 11.1 
Strong First Quantity 62.9 18.2 
Second Quantity 46.3 18.2 
Quality 62.9 18.2 
Relation 79.6 18.2 
Politeness 79.6 18.2 
postCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 48.0 07.9 
Second Quantity 55.5 07.9 
Quality 70.5 07.9 
Relation 63.0 07.9 
Politeness 63.0 07.9 
Strong First Quantity 58.7 13.0 
Second Quantity 52.1 13.0 
Quality 58.7 13.0 
Relation 78.7 13.0 
Politeness 73.7 13.0 
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Table 6.30: Estimated marginal mean CVT percentage improvements and standard errors for the 
maxims (first quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) calculated using the post-
training new items CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for 
four-year-olds demonstrating weak and strong post-training 3 box shifting when individual differences 





















































Since BPVS performance was found to correlate with one of the DCCS 
measures and one of the CVT measures, participants were regrouped by BPVS scores. 
The age-group distinction was removed and all children who attained a standardised 
score of 104 or greater for the BPVS were assigned to a high BPVS group. The 
remaining children were assigned to a low BPVS group. The previous analyses minus 
the partialling out ofBPVS scores were then rerun within these new groupings (see 
Tables 6.31-6.36). Tables 6.37-6.48 report the means and standard deviations for 
these analyses. As for the previous analyses, children's DCCS improvement was 
classed as strong if their scores increased by 6 from pre- to post-training levels and 
weak if their scores increased by less than 6. Again, weak and strong division criteria 
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were selected on the basis that they enabled as equal a split as possible in the number 
of children assigned to the two DCCS improvement groups. Of the 13 children with 
low BPVS scores given DCCS training, 5 demonstrated weak DCCS improvement 
and 8 demonstrated strong DCCS improvement. Of the 16 children with high BPVS 
scores given DCCS training, 8 demonstrated weak DCCS improvement and 8 
demonstrated strong DCCS improvement. Children's 2 box post-training DCCS 
performance was classed as strong if their scores were 6 and weak if their scores were 
less than 6, with weak and strong division criteria selected on the basis that they 
enabled as equal a split as possible in the number of children assigned to the two 
DCCS performance groups. Of 13 children with low BPVS scores, 3 demonstrated 
weak post-training 2 box performance and 10 demonstrated strong post-training 2 box 
performance. Of 16 children with high BPVS scores, 4 demonstrated weak post-
training 2 box performance and 12 demonstrated strong post-training 2 box 
performance. Children's 3 box post-training DCCS performance was classed as 
strong if their scores were 9 and weak if their scores were less than 9, with weak and 
strong division criteria chosen to enable as equal a split as possible in the number of 
children assigned to the two DCCS performance groups. Of 13 children with low 
BPVS scores, 8 demonstrated weak 3 box performance and 5 demonstrated strong 3 
box performance. Of 16 children with high BPVS scores, 10 demonstrated weak 3 
box performance and 6 demonstrated strong 3 box performance. 
As in the preceding analyses, neither pre-to-post-training DCCS improvement, 
nor post-training DCCS scores were found to affect post-training CVT scores or pre-
to post-training CVT improvement. However, in line with the pattern present in the 
whole sample analysis, and the analysis split by age, N was found to be unevenly 
distributed between post-training 2 box DCCS score groups formed for both the high 
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and low BPVS groups. Thus only tentative conclusions can be formed from these 
analyses. There was no correlation between pre-training DCCS and pre-training CVT 
scores for the low BPVS group, r=0.118, 12>0.300. However, there was a significant 
positive correlation between pre-training DCCS and pre-training CVT scores for the 
high BPVS group, r=0.490, 12<0.05, although pre-training DCCS was not found to 
correlate with scores for the individual maxims presented in the pre-training CVT: 
r's<0.349,12's>0.09. 
Table 6.31: Results for the low BPVS group: Standardised scores <104 of2 (2 box DCCS post 
training improvement level: <6 point increase = weak vs. 6 point increase = strong) x 5 (Maxim type) 
ANOVAs on post-training and improvement CVT measures. 
df E 12 partial Eta 2 
DCCS Improvement: PostNewCVT 1,55 0.000 0.995 0.000 
PostOldCVT 1,55 3.618 0.062 0.062 
PostCombinedCVT 1,55 2.424 0.125 0.042 
ImproveNewCVT 1,55 0.320 0.574 0.006 
ImproveOldCVT 1,55 4.860 0.032 0.081 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,55 0.224 0.924 0.016 
PostOldCVT 4,55 2.551 0.049 0.156 
PostCombinedCVT 4,55 1.407 0.244 0.093 
ImproveNewCVT 4,55 0.417 0.795 0.029 
ImproveOldCVT 4,55 1.123 0.355 0.076 
DCCS Improvement x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,55 0.374 0.826 0.026 
PostOldCVT 4,55 0.788 0.538 0.054 
PostCombinedCVT 4,55 0.527 0.717 0.037 
ImproveNewCVT 4,55 0.326 0.859 0.023 
ImproveOldCVT 4,55 0.165 0.955 0.012 
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Table 6.32: Results for the low BPVS group of2 (post-training DCCS level: 2 box scores: <6 = weak 
vs. = 6 = strong) x 5 (Maxim type) ANOVAs on post-training and improvement CVT measures. 
df E Q partial Eta I 
2 box DCCS: PostNewCVT 1,55 0.446 0.507 0.008 
PostOldCVT 1,55 1.405 0.241 0.025 
PostCombinedCVT 1,55 0.153 0.697 0.003 
ImproveNewCVT 1,55 0.012 0.914 0.000 
ImproveOldCVT 1,55 1.811 0.184 0.032 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,55 0.424 0.791 0.030 
PostOldCVT 4,55 1.492 0.217 0.098 
PostCombinedCVT 4,55 1.002 0.414 0.068 
ImproveNewCVT 4,55 1.113 0.360 0.075 
ImproveOldCVT 4,55 0.662 0.621 0.046 
2 box DCCS x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,55 0.784 0.541 0.054 
PostOldCVT 4,55 0.344 0.847 0.024 
PostCombinedCVT 4,55 0.251 0.908 0.018 
ImproveNewCVT 4,55 1.358 0.260 . 0.090 
ImproveOldCVT 4,55 0.527 0.716 0.037 
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Table 6.33: Results for the low BPVS group of2 (post-training DCCS level: 3 box scores: <9 = weak 
vs.= 9 = strong) x 5 (Maxim type) ANOVAs on post-training and improvement CVTmeasures. 
df E 12 partial Eta a 
3 box DCCS: PostNewCVT 1,55 0.601 0.442 0.011 
PostOldCVT 1,55 0.076 0.783 0.001 
PostCombinedCVT 1,55 0.690 0.410 0.012 
ImproveNewCVT 1,55 1.338 0.252 0.024 
ImproveOldCVT 1,55 0.910 0.344 0.016 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,55 0.102 0.981 0.007 
PostOldCVT 4,55 1.826 0.137 0.117 
PostCombinedCVT 4,55 1.056 0.387 0.071 
ImproveNewCVT 4,55 0.345 0.846 0.024 
ImproveOldCVT 4,55 1.273 0.292 0.085 
3 box DCCS x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,55 0.578 0.680 0.040 
PostOldCVT 4,55 1.209 0.317 0.081 
PostCombinedCVT 4,55 0.951 0.442 0.065 
ImproveNewCVT 4,55 0.500 0.736 0.035 
ImproveOldCVT 4,55 1.141 0.347 0.077 
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Table 6.34: Results for the high BPVS group: Standardised scores ~ 104 of2 (2 box DCCS post 
training improvement level: <6 point increase = weak vs. 6 point increase = strong) x 5 (Maxim type) 
ANO VAs on post-training and improvement CVT measures. 
df E n partial Eta a 
DCCS Improvement: PostNewCVT 1,70 0.311 0.579 0.004 
PostOldCVT 1,70 0.524 0.472 0.007 
PostCombinedCVT 1,70 0.450 0.505 -0.006 
ImproveN ewCVT 1,70 0.698 0.406 0.010 
ImproveOldCVT 1,70 0.807 0.372 0.011 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,70 0.261 0.902 0.015 
PostOldCVT 4,70 1.288 0.283 0.069 
PostCombinedCVT 4,70 0.321 0.863 0.018 
ImproveNewCVT 4,70 0.436 0.782 0.024 
ImproveOldCVT 4,70 0.220 0.927 0.012 
DCCS Improvement x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,70 1.346 0.262 0.071 
PostOldCVT 4,70 1.238 0.303 0.066 
PostCombinedCVT 4,70 0.351 0.843 0.020 
ImproveNewCVT 4,70 0.717 0.583 0.039 
ImproveOldCVT 4,70 1.572 0.191 0.082 
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Table 6.35: Results for the high BPVS group of2 (post-training DCCS level: 2 box scores: <6 = weak 
vs. = 6 = strong) x 5 (Maxim type) ANOVAs on post-training and improvement CVT measures. 
df 
.E II partial Eta 2 
2 box DCCS: PostNewCVT 1,70 0.166 0.685 0.002 
PostOldCVT 1,70 0.533 0.468 0.008 
PostCombinedCVT 1,70 0.946 0.334 0.013 
ImproveNewCVT 1,70 1.147 0.288 0.016 
ImproveOldCVT 1,70 1.897 0.173 0.026 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,70 1.511 0.208 0.079 
PostOldCVT 4,70 1.398 0.244 0.074 
PostCombinedCVT 4,70 0.179 0.948 0.010 
ImproveNewCVT 4,70 0.939 0.447 0.051 
ImproveOldCVT 4,70 0.680 0.608 0.037 
2 box DCCS x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,70 2.829 0.031 0.139 
PostOldCVT 4,70 1.874 0.125 0.097 
PostCombinedCVT 4,70 1.823 0.134 0.094 
ImproveNewCVT 4,70 0.848 0.500 0.046 
ImproveOldCVT 4,70 0.908 0.464 0.049 
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Table 6.36: Results for the high BPVS group of2 (post-training DCCS level: 3 box scores: <9 = weak 
vs. = 9 = strong) x 5 (Maxim type) ANOVAs on post-training and improvement CVT measures. 
df E Q partial Eta 2 
3 box DCCS: PostNewCVT 1,70 0.216 0.644 0.003 
PostOldCVT 1,70 0.223 0.638 0.003 
PostCombinedCVT 1,70 0.096 0.758 0.001 
ImproveNewCVT 1,70 0.038 0.846 0.001 
ImproveOldCVT 1,70 0.051 0.822 0.001 
Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,70 0.042 0.997 0.002 
PostOldCVT 4,70 1.124 0.352 0.060 
PostCombinedCVT 4,70 0.399 0.809 0.022 
ImproveNewCVT 4,70 0.139 0.967 0.008 
ImproveOldCVT 4,70 0.447 0.774 0.025 
3 box DCCS x Maxim: PostNewCVT 4,70 1.740 0.151 0.090 
PostOldCVT 4,70 0.429 0.787 0.024 
PostCombinedCVT 4,70 1.391 0.246 0.074 
ImproveNewCVT 4,70 3.551 0.011 0.169 
ImproveOldCVT 4,70 0.968 0.431 0.052 
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Table 6.37: CVT percentage score means and standard deviations for the maxims (first quantity, 
second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) produced across the post-training new items, post-
training old items and combined post-training CVT conditions by children with low BPVS scores 
«104) demonstrating weak and strong improvement in shifting. 
CVTmeasure Shifting EF Maxim Mean % Standard 
imErovement CVT score Deviation 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 46.6 38.1 
Second Quantity 63.4 21.7 
Quality 56.8 15.2 
Relation 56.6 25.4 
Politeness 70.0 27.4 
Strong First Quantity 60.5 19.9 
Second Quantity 60.4 26.7 
Quality 58.3 28.3 
Relation 58.3 37.9 
Politeness 56.3 32.0 
PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 80.0 27.4 
Second Quantity 39.8 36.6 
Quality 73.4 25.3 
Relation 46.6 38.1 
Politeness 80.0 27.4 
Strong First Quantity 43.6 28.1 
Second Quantity 27.0 23.4 
Quality 68.8 38.3 
Relation 50.0 39.9 
Politeness 50.0 37.8 
PostCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 60.0 28.3 
Second Quantity 52.0 17.9 
Quality 64.0 08.9 
Relation 52.0 22.8 
Politeness 75.0 17.7 
Strong First Quantity 50.0 15.1 
Second Quantity 42.5 16.7 
Quality 62.5 22.5 
Relation 52.5 28.2 
Politeness 53.1 24.8 
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Table 6.38: CVT percentage improvement means and standard deviations for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) calculated using the post-training new items 
CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for children with low 
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Table 6.39: CVT percentage score means and standard deviations/or the maxims (first quantity, 
second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) produced by weak and strong post-training 2 box 
shifters who had low BPVS scores «104), across the post-training new items, post-training old items 
and combined post-training CVT conditions .. 
CVT measure Shifting Maxim Mean % Standard 
EF level CVT score Deviation 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 33.3 33.5 
Second Quantity 50.0 00.0 
Quality 55.7 19.6 
Relation 66.7 28.9 
Politeness 66.7 28.9 
Strong First Quantity 61.7 23.7 
Second Quantity 65.0 26.7 
Quality 58.3 25.3 
Relation 54.9 34.4 
Politeness 60.0 31.6 
PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 66.7 28.9 
Second Quantity 55.3 38.7 
Quality 83.3 28.9 
Relation 44.3 19.6 
Politeness 66.7 28.9 
Strong First Quantity 54.9 34.4 
Second Quantity 24.9 22.5 
Quality 66.7 34.3 
Relation 50.0 42.4 
Politeness 60.0 39.4 
PostCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 46.7 23.1 
Second Quantity 53.3 23.1 
Quality 66.7 11.5 
Relation 53.3 11.5 
Politeness 66.7 14.4 
Strong First Quantity 56.0 20.7 
Second Quantity 44.0 15.8 
Quality 62.0 19.9 
Relation 52.0 28.6 
Politeness 60.0 26.9 
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Table 6.40: CVT percentage improvement means and standard deviations for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) calculated using the post-training new items 
CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for children with low 
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Table 6.41: CVT percentage score means and standard deviations for the maxims (first quantity. 
second quantity. quality. relation and politeness) produced by weak and strong post-training 3 box 
shifters who had low BPVS scores «104). across the post-training new items. post-training old items 
and combined post-training CVT conditions .. 
CVT measure Shifting Maxim Mean % Standard 
EF level CVT score Deviation 
PostN ewCVT score Weak. First Quantity 58.4 34.6 
Second Quantity 64.6 22.6 
Quality 60.5 21.9 
Relation 52.0 20.9 
Politeness 68.8 25.9 
Strong First Quantity 50.0 12.0 
Second Quantity 56.6 28.1 
Quality 53.2 27.5 
Relation 66.6 47.2 
Politeness 50.0 35.4 
PostOldCVT Weak. First Quantity 68.8 37.2 
Second Quantity 24.9 34.5 
Quality 77.1 25.1 
Relation 41.6 34.6 
Politeness 62.5 35.4 
Strong First Quantity 39.8 09.3 
Second Quantity 43.2 09.3 
Quality 60.0 43.5 
Relation 60.0 43.5 
Politeness 60.0 41.8 
PostCombinedCVT Weak. First Quantity 60.0 23.9 
Second Quantity 45.0 20.7 
Quality 67.5 14.9 
Relation 47.5 21.2 
Politeness 65.6 22.9 
Strong First Quantity 44.0 08.9 
Second Quantity 48.0 11.0 
Quality 56.0 21.9 
Relation 60.0 31.6 
Politeness 55.0 27.4 
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Table 6.42: CVT percentage improvement means and standard deviations for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) calculated using the post-training new items 
CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for children with low 
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Table 6.43: CVT percentage score means and standard deviations/or the maxims (first quantity, 
second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) produced across the post-training new items, post-
training old items and combined post-training CVT conditions by children with high BPVS scores 
p-'J04) demonstrating weak and strong improvement in shifting. 
CVT measure Shifting EF Maxim Mean % Standard 
imErovement CVT score Deviation 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 77.1 36.7 
Second Quantity 52.0 24.5 
Quality 62.5 44.3 
Relation 45.8 35.4 
Politeness 56.3 32.0 
Strong First Quantity 39.6 26.7 
Second Quantity 58.4 22.0 
Quality 62.5 36.5 
Relation 56.3 21.9 
Politeness 56.3 41.7 
PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 50.0 31.0 
Second Quantity 60.4 25.2 
Quality 56.3 23.7 
Relation 83.4 23.5 
Politeness 68.8 37.2 
Strong First Quantity 58.3 38.9 
Second Quantity 58.4 20.0 
Quality 52.0 22.8 
Relation 52.1 10.9 
Politeness 75.0 37.8 
PostCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 62.5 16.7 
Second Quantity 55.0 17.7 
Quality 60.0 28.3 
Relation 62.5 24.9 
Politeness 62.5 26.7 
Strong First Quantity 50.0 23.9 
Second Quantity 57.5 12.8 
Quality 57.5 12.8 
Relation 55.0 14.1 
Politeness 65.6 35.2 
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Table 6.44: CVT percentage improvement means and standard deviations for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) calculated using the post-training new items 
CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for children with high 
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Table 6.45: CVT percentage score means and standard deviations for the maxims (first quantity. 
second quantity. quality. relation and politeness) produced by weak and strong post-training 2 box 
shifters who had high BPVS scores P-'I04). across the post-training new items. post-training old items 
and combined post-training CVT conditions .. 
CVT measure Shifting Maxim Mean % Standard 
EF level CVT score Deviation 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 79.3 24.9 
Second Quantity 62.5 28.6 
Quality 75.0 28.9 
Relation 16.5 19.1 
Politeness 37.5 25.0 
Strong First Quantity 51.4 38.0 
Second Quantity 52.8 21.3 
Quality 58.3 42.4 
Relation 62.5 21.6 
Politeness 62.5 37.7 
PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 33.3 27.4 
Second Quantity 70.8 34.5 
Quality 54.3 16.3 
Relation 79.3 24.9 
Politeness 50.0 40.8 
Strong First Quantity 61.1 34.4 
Second Quantity 55.6 16.5 
Quality 54.1 24.9 
Relation 63.9 23.4 
Politeness 79.2 33.4 
PostCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 55.0 19.1 
Second Quantity 65.0 19.1 
Quality 65.0 10.0 
Relation 45.0 19.1 
Politeness 43.8 23.9 
Strong First Quantity 56.7 22.3 
Second Quantity 53.3 13.0 
Quality 56.7 23.9 
Relation 63.3 18.7 
Politeness 70.8 29.8 
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Table 6.46: CVT percentage improvement means and standard deviations for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) calculated using the post-training new items 
CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for children with high 
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Table 6.47: CVT percentage score means and standard deviations/or the maxims (first quantity. 
second quantity. quality. relation and politeness) produced by weak and strong post-training 3 box 
shifters who had high BPVS scores p-'I04). across the post-training new items, post-training old items 
and combined post-training CVT conditions .. 
CVT measure Shifting Maxim Mean % Standard 
EF level CVT score Deviation 
PostNewCVT score Weak First Quantity 65.1 30.9 
Second Quantity 56.6 26.5 
Quality 73.3 37.1 
Relation 39.9 29.7 
Politeness 55.0 36.9 
Strong First Quantity 47.2 45.3 
Second Quantity 52.8 16.7 
Quality 44.5 39.0 
Relation 69.5 16.4 
Politeness 58.3 37.6 
PostOldCVT Weak First Quantity 49.9 32.5 
Second Quantity 63.3 27.1 
Quality 58.3 25.3 
Relation 66.7 24.9 
Politeness 75.0 35.4 
Strong First Quantity 61.2 39.0 
Second Quantity 52.8 06.9 
Quality 47.2 .16.7 
Relation 69.5 24.5 
Politeness 66.7 40.8 
PostCombinedCVT Weak First Quantity 56.0 20.7 
Second Quantity 58.0 17.5 
Quality 66.0 16.5 
Relation 52.0 21.5 
Politeness 65.0 31.6 
Strong First Quantity 56.7 23.4 
Second Quantity 53.3 to.3 
Quality 46.7 24.2 
Relation 70.0 11.0 
Politeness 62.5 30.6 
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Table 6.48: CVTpercentage improvement means and standard deviations for the maxims (first 
quantity, second quantity, quality, relation and politeness) calculated using the post-training new items 
CVT measure and calculated using the post-training old items CVT measure for children with high 






















































This study was concerned with applying the results of Experiment 3. A training 
study was employed to enhance the shifting EF ability of young children to 
investigate whether this would lead to a corresponding increase in CU. The training 
program was found to lead to a significant increase in shifting EF, assessed and 
trained using the DCCS task. This finding is in line with the report of increased EF 
following training, from Kloo and Perner (2003), on whose procedure the EF training 
program was based. Furthermore, whilst pre-training DCCS performance had been at 
significantly below-chance levels, post-training levels were at significantly greater 
than chance levels, indicating the attainment ofDCCS competence. However, because 
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a control training condition was not included in the study, due to a lack of significant 
differences between pre- and post-training CVT scores, conclusions based on the 
effects of DCCS training should only be drawn tentatively. It is possible, albeit 
unlikely, that the significant improvement in DCCS scores could be attributable to 
general training effects such as goal focussing, which could have been imparted 
through a control training condition. Without a comparison of DCCS improvement 
across the two training conditions, such a possibility cannot be ruled out. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to expectations and the results of Experiment 3, 
multiple varied analyses did not indicate that DCCS training resulted in a significantly 
enhanced CVT performance, that improvements in EF led to significant 
corresponding rises in CVT scores, that DCCS performance post-training affected 
CVT scores or improvement or even that pre-training DCCS scores were related to 
pre-training CVT performance once vocabulary ability was taken into account. This 
was the case when the entire sample was considered, but also when the performance 
of the 3- and 4-year-old age groups was considered separately and when the 
performance of children attaining high standardised vocabulary scores was considered 
separately from the performance of children attaining low standardised vocabulary 
scores. An exception was the single relationship found between pre-training DCCS 
and pre-training CVT scores for the group attaining high standardised vocabulary 
scores. 
However, the effectiveness of the DCCS training entailed an unequal division 
of children across post-training DCCS ability groups with the majority performing at 
ceiling. This means that conclusions regarding the absence of DCCS-CVT relations in 
the post-training phase should be drawn with caution. 
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Vocabulary scores were entered as a covariate when children were not split 
into groups based on their vocabulary performance to ensure that any relationships 
found were not simply reflecting the relationships between BPVS and pre-training 
DCCS performance and between BPVS and performance on the post-training Old 
CVT. Since vocabulary scores reflect linguistic proficiency and CVT performance 
reflects CU, which is an aspect of linguistic proficiency, one might expect the positive 
correlation found between BPVS and CVT scores. Furthermore, the implication that 
linguistic ability plays a role in EF (Vygotsky, 1962 ; Singer & Bashir, 1999) 
accounts for the relationship found between BPVS scores and EF ability. 
Nevertheless, tests indicated that although pre-training CVT scores were merely at 
chance levels, post-training CVT scores were significantly better than chance. This is 
consistent with the theory that a degree of CVT improvement had followed DCCS 
training. The CVT improvement from chance levels prior to DCCS training to 
significantly above chance levels, post-training, provides some support for the 
suggestion that CVT performance improved following DCCS training. However, the 
fact that the pre- to post-training CVT improvements were not significant suggests 
that the influence of EF might be fairly restricted, so that a larger number of 
participants would be required to reveal a significant effect. Nevertheless, as indicated 
above, the lack of a control training condition means that any conclusions based on 
the effects of DCCS training can only be drawn tentatively. The possibility remains 
that any significant improvement in post-training CVT scores could be attributable to 
general training effects such as goal focussing, which could have been imparted 
through a control training condition. Without a comparison of CVT improvement 
across the two training conditions, such a possibility cannot be ruled out. 
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More fine-grained analyses investigating scores for groups of CVT items 
reflecting individual conversational maxims or rules, indicated that the potentially 
positive influence of DCCS training was restricted to the groups of CVT items 
reflecting the Maxims of Quality and Politeness. Although the difference between 
performance on items reflecting the different maxims was not itself significant, nor 
the difference between pre- and post-training performance for any of these maxims, 
improvement from pre-training chance performance to post-training above chance 
performance was only demonstrated for items reflecting the Quality and Politeness 
maxims. This complements the findings of Siegal, Iozzi and Surian (2009), which 
demonstrated that superior bilingual performance on the CVT did not extend to items 
representing the Maxim of First Quantity, providing support for their suggestion that 
the items intended to reflect the Maxim of First Quantity might have lacked validity 
(see Section 5.4). However, Siegal, Iozzi and Surian's suggestion refers only to the 
CVT items reflecting the Maxim of First Quantity and so does not explain why EF 
training did not appear to have an effect on performance on items reflecting the 
Maxims of Second Quantity and Relation. Thus, an argument put forward in Section 
5.4 appears suitable to restate here: although it has been suggested that the effect of 
EF on CU is mediated by ToM, it is not clear that ToM is the factor identified in this 
instance, as it is not obvious as to why children would demonstrate unequal 
competence across the different maxims/conversational rules. It seems more likely 
that access to world knowledge is the factor involved here as the demands for world 
knowledge would seem much more likely to differ across the maxim-based groups of 
CVT items. 
The absence of significant relationships between improvements in shifting EF 
and CVT scores in Experiment 4, seems to contrast with the findings of Experiment 3, 
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which demonstrated a significant relationship between shifting EF ability and CVT 
performance. However, whilst 4- and 5-year-olds were recruited for Experiment 3, 
Experiment 4 used only 3- and 4-years-olds. The decision to restrict recruitment for 
Experiment 4 to 3- and 4-year-olds arose from the need to identify a large number of 
children who were unable to pass the DCCS task. These children could then be 
trained on the DCCS task. Since most children pass the DCCS task by 5 years of age 
(Zelazo, 2006), inclusion of 5-year-olds would have required a greater number of 
participants to be tested during the screening/pre-training phase, before a sufficient 
number of children would have been deemed eligible for the DCCS training program. 
Indeed, in Experiment 3, which had demonstrated the relationship between DCCS 
performance and CVT scores, only 11 of 60 participants aged 4 to 5 years, had 
attained less than perfect scores on the DCCS, of which 3 were 5 years old. 
However, the very fact that DCCS performance improves with age (Pemer & 
Lang, 2002) and thus that failing the DCCS at older ages is unusual, may indicate that 
the relationship between DCCS performance and CVT scores found in the older age 
group tested in Experiment 3, is merely incidental. It is conceivable that a third factor, 
which is related to the DCCS failure in older children, is also related to CVT 
performance. For example, if ToM is necessary for the development ofEF, as some 
would argue (Hughes & Graham 2002), it could be that the older children failing the 
DCCS in Experiment 3, were doing so due to a ToM deficit. Since ToM is believed to 
be related to CU, the DCCS failures in Experiment 3 could be accompanied by poor 
CVT performance. However, in such a scenario, the DCCS failures and poor CU 
would not be directly related, merely indirectly linked by their dependence on ToM. It 
could further be, that DCCS failures in younger children are more reflective of a 
different cause such as limitations in working memory capacity. Since working 
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memory capacity is more restricted at younger ages (Swanson, 1996), limitations in 
working memory might be the main cause of DCCS difficulties in the younger 
children. It is conceivable that, following age-related improvements in working 
memory, only those children with ToM deficits still experience problems with the 
DCCS task. 
However, the suggestion that the relationship found between CU and shifting 
EF is age-dependent, demonstrated only by older children experiencing a deficit in 
another domain such as ToM, is undermined by the lack of evidence for a significant 
CU-EF relationship when children were separated into older and younger age-groups. 
The older group in Experiment 4, which comprised 4-year-olds, corresponded to the 
younger age-group tested in Experiment 3, which also comprised 4-year-olds. 
Experiment 4 is the first examination of the effects ofEF training on CU. 
Thus, there are no previous, directly-related findings in the literature, with which to 
compare the results of this study. However, it is worth noting that only one of the two 
previously mentioned EF training studies undertaken to promote ToM (Kloo & 
Pemer, 2003; Fisher & Happe, 2005) produced convincing evidence that EF 
enhancements promoted ToM. Kloo and Pemer (2003) found that following EF 
training, children performed significantly better on both EF and ToM tasks. However, 
Fisher and Happe (2005) reported that although EF trained children with autism 
performed significantly better in post-test and follow-up ToM tests relative to pre-test 
ToM tasks, they did not demonstrate significantly enhanced performance on EF tasks 
given post-test or follow-up. This result suggests that the improvements in ToM 
which were reported, cannot be attributed to enhanced EF. Since it has previously 
been suggested that CU is an aspect of ToM (see Section 1.6), one might attribute 
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difficulties in promoting CU through EF training to difficulties promoting ToM in this 
manner. 
However, it should be borne in mind, that the EF training program employed 
in this study followed closely the procedure of the very study which appeared to 
promote ToM through the enhancement ofEF. Furthermore, the study which failed to 
find that EF-training promoted ToM, employed a clinical population: participants 
with autism. Thus, the absence of an EF training effect on ToM in the Fisher and 
Happe (2005) study could be attributable to a specific characteristic of people with 
autism, rather than a characteristic of the more general, non-clinical population. 
Furthermore, Siegal, Iozzi and Surian (2009) investigated whether advanced 
shifting EF abilities could account for the bilingual advantage they found in CVT 
performance. Siegal et al. found that although Italian-Slovenian bilinguals and 
Slovenian monolinguals outperformed Italian monolinguals on shifting ability, 
entering shifting ability as a covariate did not remove the bilingual advantage in CVT 
performance. 
Although consistent with the theory that EF promotes CU, the relationship 
found between shifting EF and CVT performance in Experiment 3 is also compatible 
with the suggestion that CU promotes EF. For this reason, initial attempts were made 
to incorporate CVT training into Experiment 4. However, piloting revealed that 
various forms of CVT training failed to improve the performance of 3- and 4-year-
olds on the CVT. For this reason, the CVT training condition was left out of 
Experiment 4. Thus, it remains a possibility that the relationship found between 
shifting EF and CVT performance in Experiment 3 is due to the facilitating effect of 
CU on EF. It is therefore conceivable, that the employment of an effective CVT 
training program would have revealed the enhancing effect of CU on EF. 
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In line with expectations, EF training was not found to affect performance on 
the control task. However, only BPVS scores and performance in the pre-training 
control task appeared to improve significantly with age in Experiment 4. The children 
tested in this experiment, were specifically selected on the basis of their poor 
performance in the pre-training DCCS task, thus an age effect would not be expected 
for performance on the DCCS task. Since performance on the pre-training CVT was 
at chance levels, it seems reasonable that CVT performance did not demonstrate an 
age effect either. 
6.5 Conclusions 
Experiment 4 found that enhancing the shifting EF of 3- and 4-year-olds 
through training did not significantly improve their performance on the CVT measure 
of CU. Thus the current study was not able to provide strong support for the masked 
competence account of CU. Although CVT performance was not found to improve 
significantly following training, or to be significantly related to DCCS performance 
subsequent to training, it was nonetheless found to have changed from chance to 
significantly above chance levels, consistent with the proposal that shifting EF was 
promoting CU levels. However, a control training condition would be required to 
establish that this was not the consequence of general training effects. Experiment 5 
was conducted to examine whether bilingual children, whom the literature suggests 
demonstrate advanced EF, would possess enhanced CU. Evidence that bilingual 
children demonstrate advanced CU would provide stronger support for the masked 
competence account of CU. 
